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ABSTRACT
Title of the Thesis: Police and Computers:
The Use, Acceptance and Impact
of Information Technology
Name of the Author: Kent W. Colton
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
In recent years the use of computers by the law
enforcement community has grown at an astounding rate.
Much of this rise must be attributed to the fact that
federal dollars have been available through the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration to help finance the cost. This
surge of technology, though, has been both praised and
criticized. The basic question is whether the expansion of
computer use by the police is an unnecessary waste stimulated
by the existence of federal money and industrial pressure;
or whether the ultimate result will be improved police
efficiency, a reduction in the crime rate, and greater
safety for both the citizen and the officer in the field.
Over the last decade, the scope of computer use
has evolved and expanded significantly. The earliest applica-
tions were traffic accident files established in two police
departments in 1960. From such initial programs for
statistical and "housekeeping" administrative tasks, computer
use has advanced to a number of applications related to
operations, management and program planning. There now seems
to be a spectrum of computer applications. At the one end
are uses which are basically "structured," the routine
automation of tasks which were already being performed on a
manual basis prior to the introduction of information technology.
These include such uses as real-time systems for police
patrol and inquiry, traffic, and police administrations. At
the other end are "unstructured" applications where use is
more complex and the machine becomes a tool for decision
making, strategic planning, and man-machine interaction.
Here are grouped applications related to resource allocation,
criminal investigation, and command and control.
One of the basic findings of this study is that
success among computer users varies widely from department
to department. The factors which seem most important in
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achieving favorable computer performance are therefore
outlined. It was also found that although the classification
of "structured" and "unstructured" applications do not
designate sharply defined categories, they provide a
useful distinction when it comes to evaluating computer
impact and success in implementation. Uses pertaining to
routine data processing where the parameters of inquiry
and retrieval can be highly structured have proven to be
rather effective, and implementation can be made with
relative ease although major differences still remain among
departments.
However, beyond these structured areas where com-
puter implementation begins to take on innovative, unstructured
applications the design and execution becomes more difficult
and the results less clear. Behavioral, political, and
organizational considerations are increasingly significant;
and the hope and theory as presented in the literature often
far exceeds the reality that exists in the practical world.
Still, it should be realized that computer technology
is in its infancy. Over time there will not only be
"technical" benefits through greater speed and precision in
processing and distributing information, but more subtle
impacts will be felt on police task, structure, and people.
Some of these trends can already be identified. They
include such shifts as an increase in influence and importance
of those who have technical backgrounds related to quantita-
tive or computer skills, a movement towards greater power
for those at the higher levels of police bureaucracy, and a
supporting and even stimulating effect for professional
police departments vs. more traditional style forces. It is
these kinds of shifts that will eventually be most signifi-
cant when it comes to the use of computers by the police.
There is potential, then, for information technology to aid
in the more effective enforcement of the law through rapid
communication and a more rational, structured approach to
decision making. On the other hand, these very benefits,
if not properly controlled or planned, may lead to misuse and
to a reinforcing of an inappropriate approach to police work.
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CHAPTER I
THE POLICE AND THE COMPUTER: AN INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement along with the entire criminal
justice system has been thrust into the public
spotlight over the last few years. According to the
fashion of the times, political figures clamor for law
and order in the streets of America. Although reaction
has probably been heightened through exaggeration and
excess publicity, citizen concern is widespread. A
poll conducted by the Gallup organization in 1971 showed
that a large and growing majority of Americans were
doubtful that the criminal justice system was working
very well.1
This increased attention has been met with calls
for a wide variety of reform, sometimes contradictory,
and with growing federal support. Funding for programs
administered by the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance
(OLEA) and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
1
"The Public: A Hard Line," Newsweek, March 8,
1971, p. 39. Only 23 per cent of the adult population
were found to think that the criminal justice system in
the United States was working very well today, compared
to 46 per cent who said they would have rated it highly
five years ago. (Interestingly, there was remarkably
little variation in the pattern of opinion from those
who lived in small rural towns with those who lived in
large metropolitan centers.)
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(LEAA)2 have jumped from an annual appropriation level
in 1966 of $7.25 million to an estimated $698.9 million
for fiscal year 1972.
Within this framework, the application of com-
puter technology has been heralded as one of the
potential methods by which to improve the criminal
justice system. The President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice stated that
probably the single greatest technical limitation
on the [criminal justice] system's ability to make
its decisions wisely and fairly is that the
people in the system often are required to decide
issues without enough information.3
The report went on to indicate that "criminal justice
could benefit dramatically from computer based informa-
tion systems."'
As if in response to such statements, the com-
puter has gained widespread use in police departments
2In 1965 the Law Enforcement Assistance Act was
passed and the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA)
was established within the Department of Justice to
administer programs funded under the Act. In 1968 the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was passed and
the OLEA was replaced by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration as the agency to administer programs under
the Act.
3The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, a
Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 13.
4Task Force Report: Science and Technology, a Report
to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 68.
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around the country in the past five to ten years. A
recent survey of 79 cities found that law enforcement
was the single most recurring municipal computer applica-
tion. Fifteen per cent of all the computer applications
in these cities were in the law enforcement area.5
Since 1968 the number of computer applications reported
by police departments throughout the country has more
than doubled. In the summer of 1971 the International
City Management Association sent a questionnaire to 498
police departments throughout the country. Of those
responding, more than a third, or 38.8%, were using a
computer. By 1974 the percentage is expected to rise
to two-thirds or 62.5%.6
This growth in computer use by the police seems
related to a recent surge in the overall application of
technology to law enforcement. In recent years computers,
helicopters, special television cameras, radar devices,
and elaborate riot-control equipment have become common
5Municipal Information Systems: The State of the
Art in 1970, Dial Kraemer, Mitchel and Weiner, Long
Island University, Public Administration Center, Chapter 15,
pp. 13-14.
6The International City Management Association
survey referred to was designed by this author and provides
the basis for a portion of this study. It will be
described in detail later on in the chapter. The specific
information cited above was obtained through the survey
and is found in Tables II-1 and II-2, Chapter II.
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in the equipment inventories of police departments.
Industrial sources estimated that the expense of such
police equipment in 1971 would soar to about $700 million,
up about 50% from 1967.7 This compares to an estimated
annual outlay of $6 billion for police salaries and
fringe benefits.8 What has stimulated this rapid rise;
and do the benefits of such tools justify the cost?
Critics claim that many of the expenses have been a
waste of money stimulated by industrial pressure and
the ease of attaining federal dollars through the LEAA.
On the other hand, advocates point to improved police
efficiency and the potential for a decrease in the crime
rate.
7Les Gapay, "Beyond Dick Tracy: Police Go Space
Age in Big Cities and Small, To Dismay of Critics,"
The Wall Street Journal, August 9, 1971, pp. 1, 21.
8In a 1970 study by U.S. News and World Report
("Crime Expense Now Up to 51 Billion a Year," U.S. News
and World Report, October 27, 1970, pp. 30-34) it was
found that $8.6 billion was spent on the criminal
justice system by federal, state, and local governments,
$5 billion of which was spent on the police. Since
1970 federal support through the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration alone has increased from
$268 million to $698.9 million per year. Based on
an assumption of additional increased state and local
expenditures for police activities, an estimate of a
current annual outlay of $6 billion dollars for police
salaries and fringe benefits seems reasonable.
(Salaries and fringe benefits usually comprise 85-90%
of a police department's budget.)
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This report will focus on the use of computers
by the police and will begin to answer the questions
raised above. The purpose of the study has been threefold:
1. To determine the state of the art regarding
the use of computers by police departments around
the country. (How are computers used, by whom,
and to what degree?)
2. To examine certain application areas more
closely and to begin to look at the positive and
negative aspects of computer use. (What benefits
are achieved, what costs?)
and 3. To begin to examine and hypothesize regarding
the actual impact that such automated systems might
have. (What impact on police structure and task
results, what behavioral and organizational
influences?)
In order to achieve such purposes, it is impor-
tant to provide at least an introductory understanding
of police work and how it relates to the use of the
computer. As a consequence, the remainder of the first
chapter provides such a foundation by elaborating on the
police department as an environment for computer use.
The nature of police work will be discussed and a summary
will be made of the basic issues which are currently
faced by the law enforcement community. With this as a
setting, the methods and extent of the research for the
study will be outlined. Throughout the chapter, hypo-
theses regarding the magnitude and impact of computer
use will be postulated.
19.
THE POLICE DEPARTMENT AS A
SETTING FOR COMPUTER USE
In order to explain police departments and the
environment which they provide for the implementation
of the computer, three topics will be covered: 1) the
nature of police work, 2) the basic issues faced by the
police, and 3) styles of police operation.
THE NATURE OF POLICE WORK
As a background in examining the nature of police
activity, imagine for a moment what it might be like to
serve as a law enforcement officer.
Three policemen are on patrol. One spots a
speeding car and hastens to stop the vehicle; another
hears the crash of splintering glass, angry words, and
the ringing out of a shot in the dark; a third is
summoned to a local residence--his only information is
a complaint of a family disturbance. At that moment
each of them alone must apply the law according to his
best understanding. It is up to each one to determine
what the proper enforcement should be. Should a ticket
be given? Was a crime committed or was it simply an
accident? Can the situation be handled through reasoning
and persuasion, or should an arrest be made? Their
judgement, although often largely intuitive, must be
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flawless. To the citizen who is stopped, at least at
that moment, the policeman's action is the expression
of the law. It is an oversimplification to state that
the policeman's job is often ill defined and filled with
judgement and discretion.
In theory, the police have almost no discretion;
officers are to enforce, not interpret, the law whenever
an infraction is committed. In reality, discretion is
inevitable. The disparity between law and accepted
social behavior, the inability of police officers to
personally observe every public infraction, the lack
of factual information, the need for police to overlook
minor crimes in order to obtain information about more
serious offenses, and the intolerance of the public
towards a policy of strict enforcement of every law with-
out exception, all merge together to necessitate the
exercise of police judgement.
Discretion is a common ingredient in most public
bureaucracies. However, there is something unique about
thepolice. In most organizations as a person moves to
a higher level, movement is accompanied by a greater
freedom of choice and decision making. Complexity increases
with responsibility. This is not the case in police
bureaucracies. The lowest ranking officer--the patrolman
--is often given the greatest discretion. In the daily
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tasks of his work he is continually forced to make
decisions that involve ambiguous conflicts among
citizens, or that require intervention without witnesses
or mandates regarding action. Further, this means that
thepolice administrator is often limited in his ability
to control and influence police behavior and public image.
James Q. Wilson has argued that
the principal limit on managing the discretionary
powers of patrolmen arises, not from the particular
personal qualities or technical skills of these
officers, but from the organizational and legal
definition of the patrolman's task.9
The nature of police work is further complicated
by the fact that the police often consider their job to
be an unpopular one and their behavior to be disliked by
the public. As a consequence they develop a defensive
posture and react by turning themselves inward, "minding
their own business," "keeping their mouth shut," and
"not sticking their necks out." This has been pointed
out in several situations. In a study done in Chicago
by James Q. Wilson it was found that even in a time of
increasing morale and satisfaction with the way the
department was being run, a majority of sergeants still
did not think that the police department had the respect
or cooperation of most of the citizens in the city (although
9James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior,
Atheneum, New York, 1970, p. 7.
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the perception of attitude did seem to improve from
1960 to 1965).1°
In Violence and the Police William A. Westley
reports on the results of detailed interviews in one
police department regarding the basic attitude and
mental set of the policeman. His findings indicate
that the police felt that the public was basically
hostile towards them. This in turn seemed to stimulate
an "inward movement" among the police. In fact, social
cohesion in the department was derived from this
perceived rejection and hostility of the public coupled
with the contrasting warmth, cohesion, and security of
the police force itself." With the focus turned within,
the potential for corruption seemed to increase. Secrecy
became the rule, and there was a suspicion of change,
particularly change introduced from the outside.
Within such an environment, one would expect
potential difficulty to accompany the introduction of
a computer in a police department. When relationships
1°James Q. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and
Citizen Respect: The Chicago Case," found in David
Joseph Bordna (ed.), The Police: Six Sociological
Essays, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1970, pp. 137-162.
"William A. Westly, Violence and the Police, A
Sociology Study of Law, Custom, and Morality (The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970), pp. 48-112.
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and organization structures are formed, people learn to
be comfortable with them and to use them. Security is
derived from stability and cohesion. The result in such
a setting is often to defend against change--change such
as that imposed by the computer. The computer is an
"innovation," a new approach to operation, a potential
controller and revealer of valuable information. At
least in some departments resistance should be anticipated
and success achieved only if other factors necessary to
introduce change into organizations are taken into
consideration and sought out.
However, the police process large amounts of
information. Whenever a call for help is requested, it
is noted; if an arrest is made, a record is kept; if an
officer in the field is about to stop a car which he
suspects to be stolen, basic information is needed to
help confirm or reject his intuition. Such information
requests create a demand to process large quantities of
information, and this demand is ideally suited to the
capabilities of the computer. It will work in favor of
utilizing automation in police departments, particularly
if it is introduced with care and tact. One of the
greatest abilities of the computer is to repeat itself
precisely, rapidly, and without fatigue. Once programmed
to perform a set of clerical tasks, it can process and
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retrieve masses of individual transactions in a formal,
preestablished manner without error and with great speed
and precision. As a consequence, it should be expected
that the computer will take over a large number of the
routine information processing activities which have in
the past been carried out on a manual basis. A certain
improvement in police effectiveness should be expected
as a result of this takeover. In fact, there is the
potential that by utilizing automation to make informa-
tion instantly available to the policeman on the street
some of the burdens of discretion may be lifted. If
a policeman knows that a person is wanted or that a car
is stolen, he may behave in an entirely different manner
than if such facts are unknown and unsuspected.
However, though the advantages are substantial,
the use of the computer still presents certain weak-
nesses. Two of the most important are the difficulty
of programming the machine to perceive behavioral
relationships and to handle human languages. Both limit
the application of computers in settings where human
relations are vital, and necessitate the translation and
interpretation of information before and after it is
processed. This also means that when computer use by the
police moves from those areas which are simply a replica-
tion of routine processing activities towards more
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"creative" applications to automate such endeavors as
the control and dispatch of police officers, and the
application of advanced techniques to allocate patrol
resources, the potential for difficulty will most likely
increase. Communication between those who design computer
programs and those who are to use them will be essential.
If results are promised too rapidly, it is possible that
implementation will take longer than expected and
disillusionment will be the result.
In summary then, the nature of police work has
both positive and negative aspects when coupled with
the potential for computer use. On the one hand, the
police task is highly discretionary and requires large
amounts of information to be processed and handled. The
capability of the computer to manipulate such data and
to provide information with speed and precision comple-
ments these basic needs of police work. On the other
hand, the police have a tendency to perceive their job
to be an unpopular one in the eyes of the public, to
seek privacy in their work, and to resist change. These
characteristics coupled with the inability to program
the computer to perceive behavioral relations and to
understand and reproduce human language begin to point to
potential problems which may occur in implementing com-
puter use, particularly in areas where the machine is being
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used for more than simply automating the routine processing
and retrieving of specific data.
BASIC POLICE ISSUES
The next few years will be a time of pressure
and possible change within the law enforcement community.
The inadequacies of the present system have been
characterized from all sides. On the one hand, publicity
rages regarding'ising crime rates" and the need for
greater safety on the streets of America. On the other
hand, there is a cry for a more responsive and personal
police force, one that is more fully controlled or at
least influenced by the community and the needs of
citizens within the community. It seems that public
and private pressure will result in some change, but it
is still unclear as to how much or in what direction.
There are a number of issues around which discussion
seems to focus, but no ultimate consensus exists. Those
questions which seem most basic to the dilemmas of police
administration evolve around three areas: task, structure
and people. What should comprise the principle task of
the police? What should be the organization and manage-
ment structure of police departments? And who should
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serve as a policeman and what standards should be employed
in the recruitment and training of people? 12
It is not the claim of this author that the com-
puter will have a major influence on changing or
resolving these issues, at least in the short run. The
conditions of the police are to a large extent determined
by the conditions of our society. As a consequence, the
computer, at best, will have only a marginal impact.
Still, the computer is here to stay as an aid in the
law enforcement field. It is therefore important to
begin to ask what influence, if any, this relatively new
tool will have on the basic issues that are faced. Even
if the influence to date has been small--which by the
way was one of the hypotheses at the outset of this study
--it may be possible to start to isolate trends and to
point to future or potential impacts. In order to begin
this examination of influence, the three basic issues
facing the police regarding task, structure and people
will be briefly outlined along with hypotheses regarding
what the influence of the computer might be in each area. 13
12For a similar classification of basic police issues
see Thomas Repetto, The Boston Police Department, study done
for the Boston Redevelopment Authority, Chapter II, pp. 34-39.
13 These basic issues correspond directly to an
organizational classification scheme developed by
Harold J. Leavitt. (Harold J. Leavitt, "Applied Organiza-
tional Change in Industry: Structural, Technological and
Humanistic Approaches" in Handbook of Organizations,
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Task of the Police. Although the popular image would
lead one to believe that the bulk of a policeman's time
is devoted to crime fighting, such is far from being the
case. In fact, a comparatively small part of a policeman's
time is devoted to crime control and law enforcement.
Instead, service activities and maintaining order occupy
the largest portion of police effort.
Policemen are essentially involved in three types
of work: service, order maintenance, and law enforcement.
Regarding the first, service, police are often asked to
provide emergency medical aid, respond to traffic accidents
and other emergency needs, escort vehicles, rescue cats,
direct traffic for church gatherings, etc. In essence,
James G. March, editor, Rand McNally and Co., 1965,
pp. 1144-1170.)
In his paper, Leavitt discusses organizations
as "complex systems in which at least four variables
loom especially large: task variables, structural
variables, technological variables and human variables."
He goes on to suggest that this four-variable concept
provides a useful approach to organizational change.
A change in one of the four will influence various
responses in the other three.
Leavitt's ideas are complementary to this study.
The introduction of computer use in a police department
is the introduction of a technological change in that
organization, a change whereby influence will also be
felt on structure, people, and task. One of the purposes
of this report will be to examine and to comment on the
impact that such technological change will have on the
structure, people, and task of the police.
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such activities are intended to please the recipient of
the service. It is only a matter of historical tradition
and community convenience that they are provided by the
police. Theoretically, if society chose to do so, such
services could be provided by a private firm and sold in
the marketplace competitively, perhaps for less expense.
Order maintenance activities invest the police
with the responsibility of maintaining peace in the com-
munity. Providing a solution to gang fights, disorderly
conduct, family trouble, and neighborhood disturbances
are illustrative situations in which the police are
called upon to maintain order. It is in the order main-
tenance activity that the police find their greatest
difficulties because it is in this area the greatest amount
of discretion is required. In disturbance situations
tempers are often on edge, and the wrong action will only
bring aggravation. If the situation is volatile enough a
riot may even result. The risk of physical harm is always
present. An officer must often choose between making
an arrest or in resolving the situation in another way.
Training for these situations is not in good marksmanship
or investigation, but in human psychology and group
behavior.
The third police activity, law enforcement, is
the one most commonly publicized, but the one where the
least time is usually spent. It includes such actions as
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responding to burglary calls, catching a person in the
act of stealing a car while on patrol, apprehending a
prowler, and making a crime related arrest. In a study
in the Syracuse Police Department, for example, it was
found that only 10.3% of the citizens complaints radioed
to patrol vehicles were in the law enforcement category.
The percentage breakdown was as follows:14
Service (accidents, ambulance calls, animals,
assistance of persons, drunk person, escort
vehicle, lost or found property, etc.) 37.5%
Order Maintenance (gang disturbance, family
trouble, assault, fight, neighbor trouble,
investigation) 30.1
Law Enforcement (burglary in progress,
check on car prowler, make an arrest, etc.) 10.3
Other (information gathering, book and
check, get a report) 21.1
Total 100.0%
Other studies also bear this illustration
out. 15
Given these three areas of police service and
the current distribution of police activities, the basic
question is what should be the mission of the police?
Should more time be spent fighting crime or in providing
service and maintaining order. Some argue that police
should be freed from the routine service tasks, and be
14James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 18.
15See for example John A. Webster, "Police Task and
Time Study," Journal of Criminal Law and Police Science,
March 1970, pp. 94-102.
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allowed to focus on the mission of fighting crime.
Others feel that since police actually spend a majority
of their time providing service and maintaining
order in highly discretionary and judgement oriented
situations, training should be altered to reflect this
reality (for example, expansion of police training in
areas of social work, family counselling training, etc.).
Experimentation in both directions is being made, but
the resolution of the question is still a long way off.
The basic question for this study, though, is
what influence, if any, will the computer have on the
performance of police task and the resolution of this
issue. In developing the study the first potential
impact that was expected was improved efficiency in
carrying out the activities of the police. (Efficiency
will be defined more precisely in Chapter III.) In
addition, since the computer is so good at manipulating
quantified information, it was felt that the computer
would lead to a greater emphasis on quantitative data;
and although the influence to date would not be over-
whelming, there would be some indication that the com-
puter would put pressure to define the task of the police
in more quantitative terms. Of the three basic police
tasks--law enforcement, order maintenance, and service--
the first, law enforcement, seems to lend itself best to
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quantification, so if anything, it was expected that the
computer would lead to an increased emphasis on the law
enforcement activities of the police, thus reinforcing
what seems to be at least the popular image in defining
police task.
Naturally there are certain risks involved in
utilizing a computer and in stressing the quantitative.
In keeping with this it was expected at the outset of
the study that the use of the computer in the performance
of police task would raise serious questions regarding
privacy and the maintenance of individual rights. It
was also felt that some evidence would be found in at
least some cities which would show that computer use could
have a somewhat depersonalizing effect on police
activity (e.g., shifting people around based on needs
identified through quantitative analysis, and as a
consequence not leaving a man in an area long enough to
really get to know the people and places so that he would
be able to carry out police work in a cordial and
personal manner) if special care was not taken to avoid
such influence. Further, it was hypothesized that the
use of the computer and the analysis which it makes
possible might eventually lead to alterations in the way
police work was performed (e.g., fluid patrols instead of
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set districts). If such was the case it was expected
that some evidence along those lines would be found.
Finally, it was anticipated that the use of the
computer would lead to a greater sharing of information
among various police jurisdictions at all levels (local,
regional, state and national). Before undertaking the
study it was clear that "networks" of computer users
among various law enforcement jurisdictions already
existed and it was hoped that the research would at
least be helpful in documenting the extent of these
"networks."
In summary then, it was the feeling at the out-
set of the study that the use of the computer would have
had little impact to date on police tasks, but that there
would be evidence of more subtle shifts to come in the
future. Since it is the opinion of this author that the
issues surrounding police task are the most significant
faced by the law enforcement community, even such subtle
shifts may be of real import. If a resolution is ever
made regarding the task of the police, it will have a
major impact on the other two basic law enforcement
issues, structure and people.
The Organization and Management Structure of the
Police. One of the basic concerns regarding police structure
today'is the-question of centralization vs. decentralization.
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In part this has stemmed from the almost unquestioned
emphasis until the last few years on the "professional"
model of police work as the primary key to police reform.
Although "professionalization" will be defined more
completely later on in the Chapter, some of the basic
tenets which have been at the heart of this approach
include highly centralized responsibility (greater power
for the chief of police and other administrative heads
of the police department), an effort to eliminate
political interference and corruption both at the
precinct and central headquarters level, and an attempt
to reduce discretion by laying down standards and
guidelines for behavior and performance.
In recent years, though, there has been a
renewed emphasis on at least the rhetoric of returning
greater control to "the people" and on personalizing
government through more decentralized forms of control.
With this movement has come varying and sometimes con-
flicting suggestions for decentralizing the police.
These range from programs for administrative decentrali-
zation within the police bureaucracy, to proposals for
citizen advisory boards, to plans for placing the police
under various forms of direct "community control." At
the one end is a call for the administrative decentrali-
zation of the functions of the-police. This would give
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component units of police departments greater freedom
and would result in a shift in decision making power
from centralized control at city headquarters to a
greater role at the precinct and district level. At the
other end of the various decentralization proposals,
though, is a call for a dispersal of the authority of
the police, and this is a highly different matter. The
objective here is not to merely pass the power down the
line within the police bureaucracy, the purpose is to
pass the power from the police to "the community", and
more specifically that would mean to the various
groupings of political forces which might be found
within the community.
In illustration of this second type of proposal,
a charter amendment was proposed in the Spring of 1971
to rather drastically alter the nature and reporting
responsibility of the police department in Berkeley,
California. The proposal received widespread publicity,
and was heralded by some to be the answer to "community
control". Others accused the suggested charter amendment
of being a disguised technique of bringing
chaos and radical control to segments of the city.
On the surface, the basic principles of the proposition
seemed straightforward: 1) to form smaller police depart-
ments for what appeared to be somewhat homogeneous
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neighborhoods, 2) to make these departments subject to
the control of neighborhood councils, and 3) to require
policemen to live within the boundary of the police
department for which they worked. Criticisms were raised,
though, from a variety of sources (e.g., fears that
the proposal would turn Berkely into three segregated
communities with segregated police protection), and
the measure was defeated on April 6, 1971 by a 2 to 1
vote. (33,726 voted no compared to 16,144 who voted
yes.) It seems certain, though, that proposals with a
similar intent will appear again.
Regarding the impact of the computer on police
structure, it is not supposed that automation will have
much to do, at least in the short run, with proposals
to disperse the authority of the police to "the com-
munity" such as with the Berkeley proposal. The resolu-
tion of these issues will be primarily political. On
the other hand, it is proposed that the use of the com-
puter by the police will have some impact on the question
of administrative decentralization or movements of
control or influence within police departments. Speci-
fically, two hypotheses were proposed at the beginning
of the study:
1. A movement towards greater centralization of
power for those at the top level. (although few
people at the top will have taken advantage of
the potential gain in control because of their
lack of understanding of the new systems and the
inability of computer people to bridge the gap
between computer terminology and police management.)
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and 2. An increase in influence and importance of those
who have technical backgrounds related to quantita-
tive and computer skills.
The People Who Serve as Police. The third
basic issue facing law enforcement evolves around the
people within the organization. What attributes
must be possessed by police personnel? What
criteria should be established for promotion? What
deficiencies exist in the current training and selection
process?
The complexities inherent in the policing
function dictate the importance of an officer possessing
such characteristics as intelligence, sound judgement,
tact, physical courage, emotional stability, and honesty.
According to the President's Crime Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice,
though,
while innumerable commissions and expert observers
of the police have long reported this need, com-
munities have not yet demanded that officers
possess these qualities, and personnel standards
for the police service remain low. 16
As a consequence, a variety of proposals have been made
16 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police
(U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967),
p. 125.
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to upgrade the standards and qualities of law enforce-
ment personnel through improved education, more careful
screening of personal and psychological characteristics,
new approaches to police training, reduction in police
residency requirements, etc.
Many of these proposals have merit, but often
they are also accompanied by certain drawbacks. For
example, the President's Crime Commission recommended
that in the long run all police recruits should possess
a bachelor's degree. As a minimum requirement in the
short run, the Commission suggested that all future
personnel serving as police officers should have com-
pleted at least two years of college at an accredited
institution.17 This proposal was intended to upgrade
police performance, but if implemented it may also work
at cross purposes with another goal of police staffing
--the recruitment of police officers from minority groups
where the opportunity and/or ethic for a college background
may be less.
This is an illustration of the type of questions
that must be resolved by the law enforcement community
regarding the people who serve as policemen and the standards
of recruitment and training which are utilized to obtain
l7Ibid., p. 126.
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them. However, this report will not attempt to elaborate
further on other "people" issues which exist. The focus,
instead, will be to begin to examine the relationship,
if any, between police personnel and the influence of
computer use.
Regarding the influence of the computer on police
personnel it is hypothesized that technically educated
people will gain in power and influence in police depart-
ments. In keeping with this, there is also the potential
that as the computer and the type of analysis it may
bring increases in importance in police departments, there
will be an increase in the quality of people who are
holding positions of responsibility within the depart-
ment, at least an increase in the quality of educational
backgrounds of those people. Finally, it is hypothesized
that although the computer will bring a shift in the
work activities of those doing routine and recording
tasks in police departments, it will not bring about
a loss of jobs.
Perhaps the most important impact related to
people, though, will not be the impact of the computer
on police personnel, but the reverse--the impact that
police personnel will have on computer use. Right from
the start of the study it has been anticipated that the
actions and reactions of various people involved in the
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implementation of electronic data processing in police
departments would have a significant influence on the
"success" or "failure" of any given computer application.
Primarily due to this fact, it is further expected that
the "success" and "influence" of computer use will vary
widely from police department to police department
throughout the country.
STYLES OF POLICE OPERATION
Police work in the United States is mainly
fragmented and local in character. When we refer to
police, we usually speak of separate police forces in
each of thousands of local law enforcement jurisdictions
in the United States. Certainly there are federal
police systems (the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Secret Service) and networks of state troopers in
each of the fifty states. However, the guiding principle
in the United States is that police work is almost entirely
a local function, and that recruiting, training, and levels
of compensation are determined and provided under local
control. 18 As a consequence, the police system in the
18 Gerald Leinwald, The Police (Pocket Books,
New York, March, 1972), pp. 18-19.
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United States is best described as a nonsystem.19 There
are no national standards as to entrance qualifications,
salaries, conditions of employment, processes of lateral
movement between departments, and standards for promotion.
Even given the fact that police departments are
basically different, it is still possible to identify
common groupings or styles of police work. James Q. Wilson
has identified three such styles: 1) the legalistic or
professional style, 2) the watchman or traditional style,
and 3) the service style.20 This classification system
is useful both in understanding the operations of various
police departments and in hypothesizing regarding the
potential of computer use in various police departments
depending upon their style of operation.
The first, the legalistic or professional style,
is characterized by a strict interpretation and enforce-
ment of the law. The administrator tries to influence
patrolmen to handle discretionary situations in a
"professional" manner and to treat every case in an identical
way. If a person is speeding 10 miles over the limit, for
"
9Thomas F. Adams, Law Enforcement (Prentice-Hall,
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968), p. 81.
20James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior,
particularly pp. 140-226. Wilson does not use the terms
"professional" and "traditional," but they are used by
other authors in similar contexts, so it seemed appro-
priate to add the additional terms to foster the readers'
understanding.
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example, he gets a ticket, no matter what the circum-
stances. Legalistic or professional departments are
usually further characterized by a centralized organiza-
tion structure, formal lines of authority, specified
standards for recruitment and training, continuous
evaluation, technical efficiency, and good record keeping.
In the second style of department, the watchman
or traditional style, the authority structure is weaker
and each patrolman handles situations more or less as
he feels best. The focus is primarily that of maintaining
order rather than of strictly enforcing of the law.
"Little stuff" is ignored, patrolmen are encouraged not
to create too much publicity, more "home town" boys are
hired, formal training is at a minimum, and in general
there is a smaller staff/population of civilian and
technical employees than in professional police departments.
The third style, service style, is oriented towards
service to the small homogeneous community. In fact it
is unlikely that this style could exist or be effective
in any large urban community. Law enforcement and the
maintenance of order are taken seriously, but police
avoid making arrests or imposing formal sanctions where
possible. The police are there to maintain law and order,
but they know most of the citizens personally, and their
existence is primarily to provide service and security.
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It is interesting to postulate what relationship
if any, the type of police department (whether legalistic,
watchman, or service oriented) will have on the use and
application of the computer. At first examination it
seems that computer application would be particularly
well-suited for the legalistic department. The tendency
towards technical efficiency is illustrative of the basic
desire in such a department to move towards the more
"precise" enforcement of the law. As a consequence it
can be hypothesized that the computer will be well received
in a legalistic department to the extent that it can aid
in this task, both through helping to make performance
more efficient and through providing for more accurate
reporting, record keeping, and ultimately better evalua-
tion. On the other hand, it can be hypothesized that
the computer would be of less utility in a police depart-
ment with a traditional or service style of operation
where improved efficiency or the ability to measure strict
enforcement may not be considered major benefits.
RESEARCH METHODS
Two research tools have been utilized to document
the growth, extent and influence of computer use by
police departments: 1) a questionnaire sent to police
departments throughout the country, and 2) site visits to
fourteen selected police departments.
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A National Survey of Police Departments. In the summer
of 1971 a questionnaire designed by this author was sent
to a total of 498 police departments throughout the
country under the sponsorship of the International City
Management Association (ICMA). (The questionnaire can
be found at the end of the thesis as Appendix A.) This
sample included all police departments in cities over
50,000 and 25% of police departments between 25,000 and
50,000. 376 or 75.5% responded, and Table II-1 tabulates
this response.
The survey consisted of two parts. The first
part (identified as Part A) was brief and primarily for
evaluative purposes. It consisted of twelve questions,
eight to be filled out if the department was using a
computer and four if it was not. Part A was to be
filled out by the chief of police. The second part
(identified as Part B) was to be filled out by all police
departments that were either using a computer or punch
card equipment. This portion of the survey was longer
and more technical, and the directions indicated that
it should be filled out by the data processing manager
or by a comparably qualified individual. Only Part A
was sent to the 25% sample of cities between 25,000 and
50,000 in population, both both parts were mailed to
all other cities. A second mailing was sent to cities
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that did not respond initially. Results from both the
first and second mailing are included in the analysis of
the survey results.
Site Visits To Selected Police Departments. Site visits
were conducted in fourteen selected police departments
in order to supplement information gathered from the
mailed survey. Interviews were held with 143 law enforce-
ment officials in these cities, 127 sworn police officers
and 16 civilian police employees. A formal questionnaire
was not administered, but an effort was made to ask a
fairly common set of questions to each person regarding
how his department used the computer; whether he felt
various applications had been successful; how automation
had been introduced and implemented; and what he saw as
the major effects on the people in the department, the
structure of organization and decision making, and the
police task. Some numerical tabulations of the responses
have been made and will be included in the report later.21
The fourteen police departments were selected to
obtain variety in terms of city size and geographic
21The site visits were conducted by the author and
several students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The related costs were supported in part by the MIT Under-
graduate Research Commission, in part by the International
City Management Association, and in part by the Joint
Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard. The students
who participated in the study were Jim Ebright, Dan Greenbaum,
Richard Prather, Roger Waldon and Roger Jeanly.
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location. They include Boston, Massachusetts; St. Louis,
Missouri; Wichita Falls, Texas; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Springfield,
Massachusetts; Hartford, Connecticut; Atlanta, Georgia;
Dayton, Ohio; Kansas City, Missouri; four cities in
California: Los Angeles, Long Beach, San Francisco and
Oakland; and Denver, Colorado.
Based on the distribution of geographic regions
utilized by the International City Management Association,
three of the police departments were in the northeast,
three in the north central region, three in the south,
and five in the west.22 One police department was in a
city with a population over one million, six were in
cities in the 500,000-1,000,000 population category, four
were in cities with a population of 250,000-500,000, and
three of them were in cities from 100,000-250,000.23
Three to four days were spent in each of nine
police departments (Boston, St. Louis, Wichita Falls,
Tulsa, Dayton, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Long Beach,
and Denver). In each of these cities interviews were
2The breakdown of cities by region is as follows:
Northeast: Boston, Springfield, Hartford. North Central:
Kansas City, St. Louis, Dayton. South: Atlanta, Wichita
Falls, Tulsa. West: Los Angeles, Long Beach,
San Francisco, Oakland, Denver.
23The breakdown on cities by population size is as
follows: Over 1,000,000: Los Angeles. 500,000-1,000,000:
Atlanta, Boston, Denver, Kansas City, St. Louis, San
Francisco. 250,000-500,000: Dayton, Long Beach, Oakland,
Tulsa. 100,000-250,000: Hartford, Springfield, Wichita Falls.
47.
held with a broad spectrum of people from the chief of
police to a sampling of patrolmen in the field. No
precise attempt was made to select interviews according
to any random sampling process, but it is felt that a
broad range of people and opinion was solicited. In
the other five departments where briefer contacts were
made (Springfield, Hartford, Atlanta, San Francisco,
Oakland), interviews focused on questions more specific
to that department.
For comparative purposes it was hoped that the
stages of computer implementation to date would vary
among the departments visited. With this in mind it
was learned that St. Louis, Los Angeles and Denver had
been utilizing a computer for some time, so these
departments were placed on the list of cities to visit.
In turn, people in the St. Louis Police Department
strongly recommended that Kansas City be included in the
study because of the success in computer use which that
department had achieved to date. Wichita Falls, Long
Beach and Dayton were of particular interest because
they were participating in a federally assisted experi-
ment in urban information systems under the direction
of a consortium of federal agencies chaired by HUD, the
Urban Information Systems Inter-Agency Committee (USAC).
San Francisco and Oakland were selected because they
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were experimenting with the use of computer terminals
in patrol cars.
The site visits to these various departments
provided very valuable information and insights into the
state of the art and influence of computer use by the
police. The visits were made in the spring and summer
of 1971, though, and it is likely that changes have
occurred since then regarding the status of the various
computer applications examined and described in this
report. Since the topic selected for this thesis is
one that is rapidly changing and expanding, it is almost
impossible to constantly remain up to date. In
writing the thesis, then, a research cutoff date of
the summer of 1971 was selected. Computer applications
will generally be described as they existed during the
summer of 1971, and in most cases no attempt has been
made to update or sort out changes which have taken
place since then.
Also it should be made clear that enough time
was not spent in every city to do a detailed case
evaluation of computer impact. Instead, site visits
to cities will be used as a basis from which to draw
specific "mini-case" illustrations of the costs, benefits,
and influences of certain computer applications. Based
on an analysis of the I.C.M.A. questionnaire, specific
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conclusions can be drawn regarding the state of the
art of computer use. Based on a coupling of the I.C.M.A.
survey with the site visits preliminary conclusions
regarding the costs, benefits, and influence of computer
use can be drawn. Perhaps at some future date further
research in this area will turn these preliminary
conclusions into more final ones.
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
Relying on the purposes of the thesis stated
earlier in the chapter, the remainder of the report will
focus on three areas: 1) outlining the state of the art
regarding the use of computers by the police, 2) examining
certain computer applications more closely to begin to
look at some of the costs and benefits of computer use,
and 3) analyzing and hypothesizing regarding the influence
that such automated systems might have.24
Chapter II will concentrate on reporting some of
the results of the I.C.M.A. survey and will outline how
2Throughout Chapter I various hypotheses and
expectations regarding the magnitude and impact of
computer use have been outlined. In the course of the
thesis each of these will be discussed or dealt with in
one way or another. For the reader who is interested
in seeing these expectations in summary fashion they
have been listed as Appendix B at the end of the thesis.
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computers are being used by the police and by which
departments. Chapter III will provide a brief framework
for the analysis performed in the remaining portions of
the report.
Chapters IV and V will examine various computer
applications in police departments around the country,
relying heavily on case illustrations developed from the
site visits. Chapter IV will look at computer applica-
tions being used to carry out somewhat routine, structured
activities, and Chapter V will begin to examine computer
use in more "creative," unstructured application areas.
Chapters VI and VII will expound and hypothesize
regarding the current and potential influence of the
computer in the law enforcement field. Chapter VI will
review the impact of the computer on police task,
structure and people; and Chapter VII will summarize
and conclude.
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CHAPTER II
THE EXTENT OF COMPUTER USE BY POLICE'
The police first used computers in the early
1960's, and in 1964 St. Louis installed the first real-
time police computer system in the United States.
Since then the growth of police computer use has been
widespread. The 1971 I.C.M.A. survey found that more
than a third, or 38.8% of the police departments were
using a computer (Table II-1).2 In addition, 11% of
the 230 police departments indicating that they were
not using computers acknowledge that punch card equip-
ment was used, bringing the percentage of police
departments who were using either computers or punch
card equipment to 45.5%.3 Future growth will continue
'This chapter is in the main adapted from several
recent articles by the author: "Police and Computers: Use,
Acceptance and Impact of Automation," 1972 Municipal Year
Book, International City Management Association; and "Use
of Computers by Police: Patterns of Success and Failure,"
Urban Data Service, International City Management Association,
April, 1972.
2Because of the large number of figures and tables
in this chapter, they will be found at the end of the chapter.
In other chapters in the thesis, figures and tables will be
included with the text.
3In the survey a distinction was made between elec-
tronic data processing (EDP) and automated data processing
(ADP). EDP equipment refers only to computer equipment
whereas ADP is a broader term and includes not only computer
equipment but punch card equipment (referred to as electronic
accounting machinery and abbreviated EAM).
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at a rapid rate. According to the indications from
the I.C.M.A. survey, two thirds (62.5%) of the police
departments will be using a computer by 1974 (Table II-2).
In order to understand this growth and to describe
the extent of computer use by the police, five topics will
be covered in this chapter. First, it is necessary to
explain just how police departments use computers and to
classify various law enforcement applications into basic
categories. Second, the evolution of computer use in
police departments over the last ten years will be out-
lined. Next, the primary reasons for computer use will
be discussed. The question will then be raised as to
how police departments who use computers differ from
those who do not. And finally, some comments will be
made as to the general acceptance and satisfaction of
computer use to date and the problems which have been
encountered.
CLASSIFICATION OF COMPUTER USE
Computers receive a wide range of use in police
departments. The I.C.M.A. survey identified twenty-two
specific police computer applications. These can be
grouped into eight basic application areas (Figure II-1):
1. Police patrol and inquiry. These applica-
tions allow a police officer to make rapid
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"real time"4 inquiries about the identification
of people or property to see if they are wanted,
stolen, etc. If a policeman stops a speeding
automobile and wants to know if the car has
been reported stolen, he can call the license
plate number into a dispatcher. The dispatcher
or a special terminal operator types the number
into the computer terminal in front of him and
reads back a response to the inquiring officer.
Depending upon the computer hardware/software
configuration and the load on the machine, the
response will be displayed on the terminal in
a time ranging from a fraction of a second to
half a minute. Quick response allows an officer
to know whether or not he should approach the
driver with special caution. Applications in-
cluded in these areas can relate to people, such
as automated files of outstanding warrants, or
articles, such as stolen property files. They
can also relate to a combination of the two,
such as files providing listings and cross-
references for registered vehicles and their owners.
4Real-time or on-line access refers to direct access,
through a terminal, to computer files at any time so that
all inquiries will receive almost immediate response--for
example, real-time access to a file of stolen vehicles
through a video display terminal.
2. Traffic applications. Computers are used
to provide automated records of traffic accidents,
traffic citations, and parking violations. Traffic
citation and accident information can then be
used to provide basic information necessary to
fill out state and federal traffic reports
(e.g., National Safety Council Reports), and for
determining the allocation of police resources
for best meeting local traffic needs. Computerized
files of parking violations can also be kept. In
some cities such records are used to spot check
cars to see if they have an excessive number of
unpaid parking tickets. If they do, the vehicle
will be towed.
3. Additional police operations. Applications
included in this classification are files per-
taining to jail arrests and files related to
intelligence records. Jail arrest files are
used primarily to monitor the process of admitting
and releasing prisoners. Such files can also be
tied to a court scheduling system so that when a
person is jailed a time can automatically be set
for his appearance before a judge. Also, a judge
can be provided with a printout on each of the
cases he will handle in a given day. Files
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related to intelligence records contain informa-
tion on police records and other activities of
individuals suspected or "known" to be associated
with organized crime or with groups considered to
be subversive, revolutionary, or dangerous.
4. Computer aided dispatch. In order to speed
up and more effectively handle the dispatch of
patrolmen to requests for police service, com-
puters are used to provide for the automated
command and control of units in the field. In
some departments elaborate command and control
systems have been proposed to have cars dispatched
on an almost fully automated basis. In other
departments, less ambitious efforts are intended
where the computer would "interact" with the
police dispatcher by suggesting alternative
patrol units that could be sent to a particular
call. The final choice between units, though,
would be left to the decision of the human
dispatcher.
5. Criminal investigation. Computers provide
officers and detectives with supporting informa-
tion for investigation and solving crimes.
Files may include information on individual or
group crime patterns (method of operation or
56.
modus operandi files), automated access to
field interview reports (police reports prepared
of interviews held in the field with suspicious
characters, individuals stopped but not arrested,
etc.), nickname files, and special automated
routines to match fingerprints. Another use of
computers on criminal investigation which has
been suggested in several departments is the use
of the computer to assign various cases to
particular detectives on the basis of informa-
tion available, the detective's previous experi-
ence, time initially allotted to work on the
case, etc.
6. Crime statistical files. Here are included
basic files on the type and number of criminal
offenses and arrests and on juvenile criminal
activity. Both personal and aggregate statistical
information may be kept in such files. These
records often provide the basic data base for
the police department and receive a wide variety
of use in filling out reports, supplying historical
records, providing basic information for planning,
and supplying background data for criminal
investigation.
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7. Police administration. Computer use here
corresponds closely to administrative uses in
other government and business organizations.
Personnel records, payrolls, budget analysis
and forecasting systems, inventory control files,
and fleet maintenance records all can be auto-
mated to aid in the administrative operation of
the police department. The majority of these
applications are routine activities, but they do
provide very useful administrative aid. Also,
the computer is being used more and more as a
device for planning, particularly for budget
analysis and forecasting.
8. Resource allocation. Computer programs are
widely used to analyze police service more
effectively and to provide for the effective
allocation and distribution of patrol units.
In some cities, programs have been developed
which can help to predict workloads as they vary
on an hourly, weekly and seasonal basis. This
information, in turn, is used in formulas or
algorithms to alter police deployment so as to
more effectively meet changing crime and work-
load patterns.
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These eight applications areas can be linked to
the basic operations of a police department. This is
demonstrated in Figure II-1 where the application areas
are grouped to show their relationship to police patrol
and daily operations, criminal investigation, administra-
tion and management, and program planning and evaluation.
EVOLUTION OF COMPUTER USE
The scope of computer use in police departments
over the last five to ten years has evolved and expanded
significantly. The earliest computer applications
reported in the I.C.M.A. survey were traffic accident
files established in two police departments in 1960.
From such an initial use for statistical tabulation and
"housekeeping" administrative tasks, the computer has
advanced to a number of applications related to operations,
management, and program planning. Specifically, there
seem to be three distinct eras in the evolution of com-
puter use by the police: 1) 1960 to around 1967, when
traffic and crime reporting applications were most promi-
nent; 2) 1967 to 1971, highlighted by the rapid expansion
of systems for police patrol and inquiry; and 3) 1971 to
a more hazy future, with an increasing focus on the more
difficult and perhaps potentially more beneficial applica-
tions related to resource allocation, criminal investigation,
and command and control.
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1960-67. This was the initial era of computer use
by the police. First applications began in the traffic
area, and were closely followed by the development of
crime-related files so that the computer could be used
as a tool in filling out local, state, and national crime
reports (e.g., the FBI Uniform Crime report). By 1967,
according to the I.C.M.A. survey, almost half of all
computer applications (46.4%) were devoted to either
traffic or crime related files. (Figure II-2A indicates
the average percentage of computer applications found in
each area at that time.) The chart clearly illustrates
the early emphasis on traffic and crime reporting uses.
This initial emphasis of computer use by the
police is also confirmed by a survey conducted by the
Institute for Police Studies at California State College,
Long Beach, during the summer of 1968. In that survey
it was found that the five most common police computer
applications at that time were traffic accidents, parking
citations, traffic citations, files on arrested persons,
and files on records of criminal offenses.5
1967-1971. In the middle 1960's a shift in focus
began to develop. Police departments continued to install
5Paul M. Whisenand and John D. Hodges, Jr.,
"Automated Police Information Systems: A Survey,"
Datamation, Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1969, pp. 94-95.
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traffic and crime related files, but the development of
real-time computer systems capable of providing a rapid
feedback of information to the inquiries of patrolmen
in the field became popular. In 1964 the St. Louis
Police Department installed the first real-time police
computer system. Soon other cities joined St. Louis,
and in the last few years the growth of computer applica-
tions related to police patrol and inquiry has been
remarkable. In 1971 one out of every five computer
applications was devoted to the rapid retrieval of informa-
tion pertaining to outstanding warrants, stolen property
or vehicle registration (Figure II-2B, Table II-3A). The
cumulative total of certain application areas for each
year since 1960 is illustrated in Figure II-3. Note
the relative "leveling off" of traffic uses and the
doubling of police and inquiry applications between 1969
and 1971. Figure II-3 also demonstrates the continuing
importance of crime statistical files among law enforce-
ment computer users.
As one would suspect, the emphasis in the establish-
ment of police patrol and inquiry systems has been on
rapid inquiry and response. If a policeman stops a speeding
car it is extremely helpful for him to know if the car is
stolen before he approaches the driver so that he can antici-
pate the latter's potential reaction rather than waiting
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until it is too late. Thus, one would expect a majority
of police patrol and inquiry systems to be "real-time"
to facilitate a response in seconds rather than minutes.
And indeed, such is the case. Of the 180 applications
reported 150, or 83.3%, were real-time. Real-time
applications related to police patrol and inquiry made
up close to half (46.7%) of all real-time police computer
applications in 1971 (Table II-4).
During the period of 1967-1971 major steps were
also made to provide access for local police departments
to regional, state, and national real-time computer net-
works. The establishment and development by the FBI of
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) occurred
during this period. In addition, numerous state and
regional law enforcement computer systems primarily for
police patrol and inquiry were established.
The Future. Police department responses indicate
that there will be another shift in the future regarding
the utilization of computers by the law enforcement com-
munity. Police departments were asked to indicate in the
I.C.M.A. survey what their specific plans were for computer
use by 1974. Apparently, real-time systems will continue
to be important, but the emphasis is shifting toward police
resource allocation. Further, there will be a rather
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striking increase in the installation of systems to aid
criminal investigation and computer aided dispatch.
The significance of police resource allocation
has already begun to appear. Figure II-3 indicates the
rising utilization of applications in this area. Whereas
police patrol and inquiry uses increased by more than
five times between 1967 and 1971, the percentage rise
in applications for resource allocation was only slightly
smaller, with a fourfold jump. More important, though,
the projected increase in 1971 to 1974 in police resource
allocation was 118.0%, while the increase in police
patrol and inquiry was only 76.7% (Table II-3A). If
estimates from the I.C.M.A. survey are valid, the
average percentage of total computer use devoted to
resource allocation will actually be slightly greater
than that devoted to real-time inquiry (see Figure II-2C).
Crime statistical files are predicted to have the highest
average use, by 1974, closely followed by resource allo-
cation. Use of police patrol and inquiry applications
will be third with traffic uses remaining fourth.
Though the use of the computer for criminal
investigation and dispatch has received little attention
to date, the mailed survey indicates that this will change
in the future. Uses for computer aided dispatch are
predicted to increase by more than six times between now
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and 1974, going from an average of 3.2% to 9.7% of total
computer use; and applications for investigations will
more than quadruple, rising from 3.7% to 8.8% of the
average total police computer use (Tables II-3A and II-3B,
Figures II-2B and II-2C).
However, such predictions of the future should be
qualified. These estimates are based on the responses of
police departments to the I.C.M.A. survey. They represent
informed opinion, but should be viewed with certain
skepticism. Estimates often tend to be overly optimistic.
It is also possible that federal sources of funds may
decrease in the next few years, thus causing the realities
of the future to be less than currently anticipated.
It is interesting to note, however, that the
predicted emphasis on resource allocation applications in
the future corresponds directly with the attitude of law
enforcement personnel. In the mailed survey police
departments were asked to indicate which three applica-
tions they considered the most significant. The ranking
of importance for each area is provided in Figure II-4.
Police deployment and resource allocation was clearly
regarded as the most important computer use, with crime
related files (used for investigation and analysis as
well as reporting) second and police patrol and inquiry
third. Although the police utilize the computer principally
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in areas related to daily police operations, they still
consider resource allocation to be the most important
application. It is also significant that although com-
puter aided dispatch and criminal investigation applica-
tions receive relatively little use by police departments
now, they were still ranked in importance above traffic,
police administration, and miscellaneous operations.
When considering the overall development of com-
puter use in other fields, the various shifts in emphasis
of use by the police seem logical. Computers have
traditionally been used first to replace "housekeeping,"
record-keeping activities within an organization,
activities which were formerly performed using desk
calculators and key punch equipment, hence the initial
emphasis on traffic and reporting uses. However, with
the advent of third generation computers (utilizing inte-
grated circuits to facilitate increased computation speed)
and real-time concepts, it seems reasonable that the police
would take advantage of this tool to implement real-time
systems. Still, from a technical point of view, such
inquiry systems to handle wanted warrants, stolen property,
and motor vehicles are relatively straightforward. In
fact the applications which have received greatest use to
date (police patrol and inquiry, traffic, police administra-
tion, and crime statistical files) would in general have to
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be classified as somewhat "routine" uses involving the
straightforward manipulation and retrieval of prescribed
data. For the sake of identification they can be classed
as applications to "structured" problems or situations.
However, there is another area in which applica-
tions become more elusive and complex. It is in this
"unstructured" area that the machine becomes a tool for
decision making, strategic planning, and man-machine
interaction. In law enforcement this includes such
application areas as resource allocation, the investiga-
tion of crime, and command and control. (Figure II-5
illustrates how the eight application areas outlined in
the first part of the chapter relate to the categories
of structured and unstructured.)
Naturally, it would be a mistake to consider
"structured" and "unstructured" categories as sharply
defined classifications. 6 It is more reasonable to
consider them as opposite ends of a spectrum. For
example, moving toward the unstructured end, systems
6The distinction between "structured" and
"unstructured" problems related to computer applications
first came to the author's attention in G. Anthony Gorry
and Michael S. S. Morton, "Management Decision Systems:
A Framework for Management Information Systems," Working
paper Number 458-70, Alfred P. Sloan School of Manage-
ment, MIT, April, 1970. (The terms "programmed" and
"unprogrammed" have also been used by Herbert A. Simon
in The New Science of Management Decision, Harper and
Rowe, 1960, p. 6, to draw a similar distinction.)
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design becomes more difficult; and behavioral, personality,
and organizational considerations become increasingly
significant. For more unstructured applications to be
successful there must be an effective interaction between
man and machine. Establishing the proper balance is
often the key to successful implementation. It is also
in this more "complex" area that the consideration of
costs and benefits often becomes more difficult.
To date, police use of computers has been almost
entirely in structured applications. However, since it
seems likely that in the future increased emphasis will
be placed on the more unstructured application areas, it
is important to consider the relative influence of both.
Only time will tell the ultimate effect, but later
chapters (Chapters IV and V) will begin to outline some
of the possible advantages and disadvantages of structured
and unstructured uses.
REASONS FOR COMPUTER USE
Police use computers for a number of different
reasons. Each department is unique and a variety of
motivations are often involved.
First, police departments process large amounts
of information, and for this processing speed and pre-
cision is often required. The computer is ideally suited
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for such purposes. When asked in the mailed survey to
indicate their major reasons for using a computer, the
most common responses were to improve service to the
public, to improve the patrolman's ability to rapidly
identify and apprehend criminals, and to make internal
operations more efficient (Table II-5). All three of
these reasons reflect a desire to increase police
efficiency and effectiveness through the use of the
computer to more rapidly process information.
However, computers are also being installed
because large amounts of money are presently being
spent by the federal government to support police and
criminal justice operations. One of the primary areas
for the allocation of these dollars has been the improve-
ment of police hardware and technical innovations. In
some instances the primary reason for installing a com-
puter is simply that the money is there. In the I.C.M.A.
survey it was found that four out of ten of those depart-
ments who were using computers had received funds from
the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) to aid in their automation effort.
Another two out of ten indicated that they had not yet
received aid but had applied or were planning to do so.
In addition, more than half of the non-users planning to
transfer to computer use (51.6%) indicated that they were
hoping to receive aid from the LEAA. Among those departments
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receiving federal aid, seven out of ten indicated that
LEAA funds had made a difference. Five out of ten said
that they would not have had a computer without assistance.
Only one out of ten indicated that computer usage would
have been the same without the LEAA (Table II-6).
The importance of money in the minds of the police
(and as a consequence the significance of LEAA funding)
was also demonstrated when those departments who were not
using a computer were asked in the I.C.M.A. survey to
explain why. Financial constraint was the dominant
reason provided (Table II-7). Approximately three-quarters
of the non-users felt that they had not been able to
afford such facilities, with this reason being cited
over 3-1/2 times more frequently than the second ranking
factor. This response, though, did not seem to be tied
significantly to size, as non-users from all size
cities indicated that finances represented their primary
problem. (The second and third ranking reasons cited
for lack of use were the small size of the department and
the belief that the costs outweighed the benefits. In
addition, about one-tenth said that they were not using
a computer because their present operations were
satisfactory.)
In reality, the emphasis of police departments on
the "inability to pay" seems to be one of the basic myths
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that has surrounded the application of research and
technology to police problems. Traditionally the police
have spent very little on research and technical improve-
ments. In the past the response to increased crime rates
and added demands for service has primarily been to hire
additional policemen to get more men "out on the street"
instead of trying to employ new techniques to use
existing personnel in a more efficient and effective
manner. In a recent book Richard Larson estimated that
less than one tenth of one per cent of the budget of law
enforcement agencies was devoted to research compared
with 2 to 4 per cent in industry and 10 to 13 per cent
in defense. 7
As an illustration, approximately $250,000-$500,000
is needed to run a small real-time computer operation.8
By comparison it costs a similar amount to simply maintain
7Richard C. Larson, Urban Police Patrol Analysis,
The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1972, p. 4.
8 It is figured that the hardware computer costs
for a small real-time computer system--say 50,000 records
with 52 characters/record--would be somewhere around
$12,000-$14,000/month. Further, it is usually estimated
that such hardware costs--rental or purchase of the
computer--usually run about 1/3 of the costs of the
overall computer operation--computer, personnel, over-
head, etc. Assuming conservatively that hardware com-
puter costs of $12,000-$14,000/month will range from 1/3
to 1/2 of total costs, the annual budget for such a
police computer facility would range from $250,000-$500,000.
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two two-man police patrol cars around the clock for one
year.' This is not to say that in a small or medium size
police department $250,000-$500,000 is not a significant
cost or that in every case a computer should be purchased
instead of personnel. However, the point is that there
is a tradeoff between the use of technology and hiring
more men, and although budget constraints may be real,
before a police department simply rules out the use of
the computer due to an "inability to pay," the benefits
and costs of improved technology vs. increased
personnel should be carefully considered.
As this report goes on it will try to assess more
thoroughly some of the benefits and costs of computer use,
and hopefully this type of analysis will be helpful to
a department making choices regarding limited resources.
Still, at this time the fact remains that the primary
perceived constraint hindering computer use is the
inability to pay, and this is one of the main reasons why
9 According to Richard C. Larson, Urban Police, p. 3:
"To fill one post 24 hours a day, each day of the year,
requires approcimately five individuals (considering
days off, vacations, and sick leave). Thus, one
two-man post such as a two-man patrol car requires
approximately ten individuals. Conservative
estimates of salary and direct benefits yield an
annual cost exceeding $10,000 per officer in most
cities, thereby giving a total annual cost per patrol
car in excess of $100,000."
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the influx of funds from an outside source, the federal
government through the LEAA, has had such a stimulus on
computer use.
In fact, visits to police departments confirm
the importance of LEAA backing for police computer use.
In several cases department personnel reported that
computer development took place as long as federal money
was available. One civilian employee went so far as to
say that his work (primarily related to resource alloca-
tion and scheduling) was considered a "luxury" in the
department: as long as outside sources could fund the
effort, the work could continue; but if such sources
were to dry up, his work would almost certainly cease.
This influx of federal dollars into the law
enforcement field over the last several years now raises
a new issue regarding technology and the police. It
seems appropriate that LEAA dollars should be used to
open the door to research and technology in the law
enforcement field. The question being asked currently,
though, is whether or not the door has been opened too
wide, thus leading to the possibilities of waste and
misuse. One of the primary criticisms of LEAA funding
to date has been that the emphasis has been on funding
projects devoted primarily to better police hardware, and
that little evaluation has been made as to the utility and
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benefits of such expenditures. In the view of some
critics, the principal result of the Safe Streets Act
of 1968
has not been a reduction in crime, but the
proliferation of crime fighting equipment into a
fast-growing industry. . . . Many of them believe
it would have been wiser to spend more of the
federal funds on courts, correction systems, and
social programs to prevent crime.'
One of the primary purposes of this study then
will be to begin to assess what the impact of the computer
has been to date. Perhaps it is easier to invest money in
hardware because the product is easily defined, whereas
ultimate solutions to the major police issues raised
in Chapter I are far less clearcut. However, if the
computer is sometimes considered an unnecessary "luxury,"
or if we do not make an effort to evaluate the actual
utility of the hardware expenditures such as the computer,
then there is always the possibility of waste and that
a better use of expended dollars exists.
The fact then, that the use of computers by the
police has been strongly motivated by LEAA funds and
the overall hardware approach to the solution of law
enforcement problems does not deny the
possibility of a positive impact for automation. It
10Les L. Gapay, "Pork Barrel for Police," The
Progressive, March 1972, p. 33.
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does mean, though, that there is a greater need for
evaluation.
COMPUTER USERS AND NON-USERS--HOW ARE THEY DIFFERENT?
Based on the I.C.M.A. survey, computer use among
police departments is apparently related to size, form
of government, type of city, and to a less extent
geographic distribution. A discussion of the difference
between police computer users and non-users will help
explain these relationships."1
Size. As one would expect, the most signifi-
cant factor separating police computer users and non-users
is size of city. While only 17.3% of the police depart-
ments in cities between 25,000 and 50,000 were using a
computer, the percentage rose to 25.7% in cities between
50,000 and 100,000, and to 58.4% in cities between
100,000 and 250,000 (Table II-2). All police departments
in cities over 500,000 that answered the questionnaire
indicated that they were using the computer. City size
will continue to be an important factor in influencing
computer use in the future. As Figure II-6 graphically
1Computer users are those police departments who
indicated in the I.C.M.A. that they were using a computer
whether it was owned by the police department, the city,
or a service bureau.
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illustrates, the percentage of police departments who
plan on using the computer by 1974 increases sharply as
the population category rises.
It is interesting to note the point at which size
becomes a determining factor in influencing computer use,
a point somewhere around a population of 100,000.
Whereas less than a quarter (23.2%) of the police
departments in cities with a population below 100,000
are using a computer, more than half (58.5%) of the
police departments in cities from 100,000 to 250,000
are utilizing electronic data processing equipment and
better than two thirds (69.8%) of departments in cities
over 100,000 were using computers. In other words, any
police department in a city of over 100,000 that is not
using a computer is definitely in the minority.
This notion was further confirmed by the qualita-
tive judgement of those departments not using computers.
Chiefs of Police were asked to select their reasons for
non-use from a series of alternative choices (Table II-7).
Of the 48 departments indicating that their main reason
for not using a computer was because their department was
too small, a very large majority (96%) were from cities
with a population below 100,000. On the other hand,
police departments in cities over 100,000 which were not
using a computer did not indicate that size was the problem
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per se. In other words, there seems to be a psychological
cut-off around 100,000 which corresponds with the numerical
cut-off indicated above.
Type of Cityl2--Form of Government. 13 Previous
studies by the I.C.M.A. have shown that use of data
processing equipment is related to both types of city
and form of government.14 Central cities tend to use
computers more than suburban or independent cities, and
council-manager cities display a greater amount of EDP
use than do cities with mayor-council, commission, or
town meeting forms of government. This same pattern
seems to hold true for police departments (Table II-1).
Among computer users, 70.5% are from central
cities, while only 26% are from suburban and 3.5% from
independent cities. On the other hand, among non-users
45% are from suburban cities, 43% from central cities,
and 12% from independent cities. Much of this difference
can be attributed to the fact that the great majority of
the larger cities are also central cities.
'
2Type of city is used by the I.C.M.A. to refer to
three major classifications: central, suburban, independent.
13Form of government includes five classes according
to the I.C.M.A.: mayor-council, council-manager, commission,
town meeting, representative town meeting.
14 See for example, "Municipal Use of Automated
Data Processing," Municipal Year Book, 1971, pp. 36-50.
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However, this is not the case regarding form of
government. The fact that police departments in
council-manager cities seem more prone to utilize a
computer stands by itself, and does not relate solely
to the influence of size of city. More city manager
cities use computers despite the fact that most large
cities (which are prone to use computers) are mayor-council
cities.
Overall, it was found that of all the police
departments in mayor-council cities reporting, 35.1%
(47 of 134) used the computer. Of all the police depart-
ments from council-manager cities reporting, 42.2%
(89 of 211) were using the computer. 100% of the cities
over 500,000 use computers (20 of 20 reporting). The
large majority of these (75% or 15 of the 20) are
mayor-council cities. As a consequence this has a
tendency to bias the statistics in favor of mayor-council
cities. Still, even considering this, the percentage
of police departments using computers in city manager
cities is slightly higher than the percentage in
mayor-council cities (see Table II-8).
When cities with a population of 500,000 and over
are removed from the comparison, the difference is far
more dramatic. Of the 206 police departments in city
manager cities below 500,000 in size reporting, 84 were
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using computers or 40.8% (a slight 1.4% drop from 42.2%).
Of the mayor-council cities reporting, though, the
drop was a major one. Only 32 of 119 or 26.9% were
found to use computers (a 8.2% drop from 35.1%).
Figure II-7 illustrates the influence that size of
city has on the percentage of mayor-council and council-
manager cities using the computer. The evidence seems
clear: police departments in cities with a city manager
form of government seem more prone to use a computer than
police departments in cities with a mayor-council form
of government. The possible significance of this finding
will be discussed later in Chapter VI.
Geography. Computer use is greatest in the
southern part of the United States with the west and
north central regions a very close second and third,
respectively. What is striking is the lack of use in
the northeast region of the country, the New England
and the Mid-Atlantic States (Table II-1). Only 9% of
the departments using computers are found in these
regions, while 34% of the non-users are found here. Only
one out of seven police departments in the northeast
indicated that it was using computers; the national
average is more than one out of three.
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Patterns of Computer Users in the Future. Survey
results suggest that computer use will expand rapidly
over the next three years. More than one out of every
three departments are now using a computer (38.8%). The
survey response indicates that by 1974 that number will
have grown to almost two out of every three (62.5%) (see
Table II-2).
Basic distribution patterns of use will continue.
The increase will be greatest among larger cities, and
central cities will continue to dominate the field of
users. Police departments in council-manager cities will
continue to have a greater percentage of computer users
than departments in mayor-council or commission cities.
Geographically, police departments in New England and
the Atlantic States will continue to be the smallest
users of computers, and growth will be greatest in the
west and the south.
It is anticipated that more departments will be
giving up the operation of punch card equipment by itself.
A greater number of departments will also be moving toward
the use of remote access real-time terminals and files.
Among departments responding, 43.3% indicated that they
were currently using remote terminals. Of the total num-
ber of EDP applications in responding police departments,
slightly over a third were real-time (35.4%). However,
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according to future estimates, this percentage will more
than double by 1974, with three quarters of the planned
computer applications being real-time (75.5%) (see Table II-4).
A certain amount of skepticism should be
expressed, though, about the predictions for future use.
As a rule, implementation of computer applications almost
always takes longer than expected, and such estimates
tend to be optimistic. Also, although a response rate
of 75% is considered good, one must still remember that
one-fourth of the cities surveyed did not reply. Depart-
ments that use computer and punch card equipment are
probably more likely to respond to such a survey than
those who do not. As a consequence, the numbers given
for current and predicted use may be slightly high.
National, State, and Regional Computer Systems.
Police computer use is not limited to local departments.
In fact, one of the most striking aspects of police
computer use is the strength and growth of law enforce-
ment information system networks throughout the country.
National, state and regional systems are in operation all
over the United States, and non-computer-users have
access to many of these facilities. Such networks have
numerous implications, and their impact is discussed in
several sections later on in the thesis (e.g., the impact
on police task is discussed in Chapter VI, and the relation
to issues of privacy is referred to in Appendix C).
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On January 27, 1967, the FBI established the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) as a pilot record
index and inquiry system on wanted persons, stolen
property and criminal events. Initially, 16 law enforce-
ment agencies throughout the country were on-line with an
FBI computer in Washington, D.C. By January 1, 1970,
over 2,000 law enforcement agencies had direct access to
the NCIC through local or state computer terminals.15
More than 1,737,500 active records were stored on wanted
persons, vehicles, boats, license plates, articles, guns,
and securities.
Many states have established, or are in the
process of establishing, state information systems. For
many small police departments the link to NCIC will come
through a state computer system. In addition, regional
systems have been established in some metropolitan areas
to store information on local warrants, stolen automobiles,
stolen property, dangerous persons, etc., at a central
computer facility. Access is then provided to surrounding
localities, usually through real-time direct terminal to
computer hookup. As an illustration, the Los Angeles
Police Department and the Los Angeles City Data Service
Bureau have established an "Automated Want Warrant System"
which services over fifty associated law enforcement
agencies in the greater Los Angeles area and provides a
15The FBI's Computer Network," Datamation, June 1970,
pp. 146-147, 151.
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response to inquiries within seven to ten seconds. Such
a service may be "free of charge" as it is in Kansas City
or St. Louis, or it may be maintained on a "shared cost"
basis as in Los Angeles and in northern California.
The number of non-computer user police depart-
ments who are tied to one or several of these national,
state or regional networks is striking. More than
three-quarters have direct terminal access to information
generated from NCIC and state police information systems
(Table II-9). Regional systems are often the most useful
on a day-to-day basis, and over one-third of the non-users
are tied to a regional network.
Among non-users the west and the north central
regions have the greatest access to NCIC, while the
northeast and north central regions have the greatest
tie to state systems. (The state systems in the northeast
may compensate, at least in part, for the lack of municipal
police computer users.) Police departments in the west,
particularly those of the Pacific Coast States, clearly
have the greatest link to regional hookups.
One of the biggest debates over the use of com-
puters in law enforcement today is whether police depart-
ments should own and/or control their own computer or
whether EDP facilities should be owned and controlled by
the municipality, with the police system only one part of
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an integrated urban information system. Table II-10
shows that the majority of police computer systems are
owned and controlled by the municipality. The question
of computer ownership will be discussed more fully in
Chapter IV; however, it is worth mentioning here since
the fact that there are extensive regional, state, and
national computer networks in law enforcement particularly
complicates this issues. For example, policies have
been under consideration in the FBI to allow state and
city computers to interface directly with NCIC (National
Crime Information Center) only if the computer is dedicated
solely to criminal justice purposes and only if such
dedicated computers are managed and operated solely by
law enforcement personnel. In other words, a police
computer system utilizing the city's data processing
facilities could not interface directly with NCIC. It
now appears that the policy will be somethat less strict,
requiring only that partitions of computers rather than
the entire machine be dedicated to law enforcement.
However, the resolution of this issue has far reaching
consequences for the development of state and municipal
information systems.
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THE ACCEPTANCE AND PROBLEMS OF COMPUTER USE
In general it was found in the I.C.M.A. survey
that the overall level of satisfaction with the computer
within police departments was good, although in the site
visits it was discovered that response varies widely from
department to department. In the mailed survey police
chiefs were asked to indicate if the police computer
system had met their original expectations. More than
half (54.2%) indicated that the computer had either met
or exceeded their expectations. Specifically, over four
out of ten said their expectations had been met and one
in ten said they had been exceeded. Only one in seven
actually indicated that their expectations had not been
met (Table II-11).
In regards to a question as to whether the benefits
of the computer justified the cost the response was even
more positive. Even where expectations had not been met,
many chiefs felt that the benefits justified the cost, or
at least that they would in the future. In the I.C.M.A.
survey only 2% of all respondents said that they did not
think that the computer was worth the cost (Table II-12).
Even among those chiefs who said their expectations had
not meen met, only 10% said that the costs outweighed the
benefits. In the site visits the same phenomenon was
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found to be true. In St. Louis where the computer has
been used for a number of years, six out of every ten
policemen interviewed indicated that their expectations
had not been met. However, three quarters of them still
went on to say that the benefits justified the costs.
One possible explanation for such reactions is
the traditional human nature feeling that even if some-
thing is worthwhile, performance can always be improved,
thus expectations are never fully met. More likely, though,
is the general tendency to rationalize the wisdom of a
decision that has been made, even where supporting facts
and figures are not clearly available. On the one hand,
it is interesting to realize that the police overwhelmingly
feel that the benefits of the computer justify the costs.
On the other hand, many police personnel find themselves
in the position now where a decision to spend the money
has already been made. Honestly speaking, the issue is
no longer one of questioning the benefits and costs, but
of justifying expenditures that have already been made.
It also should be pointed out that as phrased
in the I.C.M.A. questionnaire the meaning of the word
"costs" is somewhat ambiguous, therefore making a precise
interpretation of the survey results related to the
cost-benefit question very difficult. Costs are mentioned
in a general way, but the issue of "whose costs" is never
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clarified in the survey form (see Appendix A, Part A,
Question 3). In other words, the federal government is
responsible for supporting many of the police computer
efforts around the country. The importance of the LEAA
as a financial resource in stimulating computer use has
already been documented. If approved by the LEAA, the
implementation of computer technology is done according
to a 75:25 federal to local share formula. 75% of project
costs are paid by the federal government and 25% by the
state and/or the local police department. This means
that when queried about benefits vs. costs a local police
department may be encouraged to respond affirmatively
because the large majority of the costs are really not
their own; for example, they do not require a departmental
budget decision to purchase or rent a computer instead of
hiring more men. If more local money were actually involved,
perhaps police response to the I.C.M.A. questionnaire
would have been less affirmative.17
16In fact, the actual local "cash" contributions
have been far less than 25%, since according to past
policy much of the local share could be in the form of "in
kind contributions" of current police and civilian staff
resources that were assigned to work on the project. In
fact, according to the estimate of one staff person in the
New England Region LEAA office, 99% of the local share in
the past has been in the form of "in kind contributions."
However, as of the 1972-73 fiscal year which began July 1,
1972, this policy has changed somewhat. Now, 10% of the
local share must actually be contributed in the form of
cash. Whether or not this will alter the pattern of LEAA
projects remains to be seen.
17For example, while the author was riding patrol in
Kansas City, one patrolman was asked whether he felt the
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Still, although interpretations of response must
be qualified, the overall rating of performance of the
computer by the police was higher than originally expected,
particularly when considering that the use of such tech-
nology is still quite new and a panacea should not be
expected overnight.
The questionnaire went on to ask if the informa-
tion provided by the computer system was felt to be
accurate (Table II-13), if the system provided the chief
with the information which he needed to make decisions
(Table II-14), and whether or not the response received
from the computer was fast enough (Table II-15).
Regarding the accuracy of information, three out of
four (76.4%) felt that the data in the computer system
was accurate, and less than one out of ten (8.6%) felt
that it was not. Better than half of the police chiefs
responding (55.4%) indicated that the computer system
provided them with information which they needed to make
decisions, and an additional third (31.7%) indicated that
it did some of the time. Again, only one out of ten (9.4%)
indicated a lack of decision making information obtained
from the computer system.
benefits of the computer justified the cost. His response
was strongly affirmative. However, when he was told that
in Kansas City the annual cost of the computer would
probably be enough to hire 30 new police officers, his
opinion switched. To ask a general question of benefits
vs. costs brings one response. To clarify that question in
the form of an actual budget choice may bring an entirely
different reaction.
87.
Interestingly enough, speed was the area where
the computer systems received the comparatively lowest
rating by police chiefs. Only four out of every ten
(41.6%) gave an unqualified yes to the question as to
whether or not the response of their computer system
was fast enough to meet their needs. On the other hand,
three out of every ten (28.5%) indicated that it was
not. (Another three out of ten said sometimes.) In the
site visits some explanation was found for responses
along these lines. Speed is one of the primary reasons
for installing a computer. However, in some cities due
to a variety of operating procedures, an overload of use,
or excessive time when the computer is not operational, it
was found that policemen were dissatisfied with the
response speed of their automated system. From looking at
the I.C.M.A. survey about a third of the police departments
in the country probably are suffering from these same
dissatisfactions in one way or another.
Problems that Hinder Computer Operations. In the
mailed survey, departments were asked whether any of
eleven specific problems of computer implementation were
bothering them now and which, if any, had caused diffi-
culties in the past. In the site visits to individual
departments, questions were also raised about the most
pressing problems encountered. The striking conclusion
from both sources is that it is not technical difficulties
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that are holding back development but rather behavioral
and people-oriented difficulties. However, enough depart-
ments are having success that even these sorts of
problems do not seem insurmountable. In fact, the results
of the mailed survey indicate that in the eyes of
respondents overall problems are decreasing (Figure II-8).
The two most significant problems seem to be in
determining priorities for computer use and in integrating
the computer operation and quantitative decision making
with the rest of the department. In the mailed survey,
the number one difficulty expressed was scheduling and
the determination of priorities. What is more, the
magnitude of this difficulty has increased over time
(Figure II-8). Visits to the police uncovered the same
difficulty in several departments. In one city, nine
officers out of the eleven interviewed volunteered that
their primary problems were with agreement on priorities.
The city data processing personnel, they claimed, were
not giving police systems sufficient attention, and
further, when time was spent on police work, they were
implementing the wrong applications first. Instead of
concentrating on those applications that would aid police
operations, such as resource allocation or better feedback
for investigations, the EDP personnel gave priority to
applications that would raise revenue, such as more
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efficient parking ticket and traffic citation systems.
On the other hand, the EDP people who were interviewed
in the same city felt that the main problem was a lack
of understanding of computer operations on the part of
the police. Both sides were sincere, but an obvious
gap existed.
Such a situation highlights what was perhaps
the greatest difficulty discovered when visiting police
departments--communication between police and data
processing personnel and the overall integration of the
operations of the computer with the rest of the depart-
ment. Two of the departments included in the site visits
seemed to have particularly smooth running computer opera-
tions. In both, not a single person felt that there was
a gap between EDP and operating personnel. On the other
hand, in one of the departments visited that was having
problems, more than seven out of every ten officers
interviewed said that there was such a gap. Difficulties
revolved primarily around policemen feeling that data
processing personnel did not understand their problems or
how the police system operated, and in turn, around data
processing staff believing that the police were unwilling
to understand and evaluate computer applications. Training
sessions were regarded as essential since in most depart-
ments there was a widespread lack of understanding
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regarding what the computer could do and how it could
improve police work. The use of "User Committees" of
police and civilian personnel to determine the utility
and priority of various applications also were found to
help. Perhaps even more important was an honest commit-
ment on each side to understand the position of the other.
Another problem which seemed to be significant
was "oversell." This was particularly true in the depart-
ments that seemed to be having problems in implementing
computer use. When the computer was initially introduced
extensive promises were made by both salesmen and police
personnel as to the benefits automation would bring.
Interviews with department personnel showed that expecta-
tions were not always met. Implementation of computer
applications almost always takes longer than expected,
and if too much is promised initially, disappointment
will result. In fact these very factors--initial oversell
and longer than anticipated time for implementation--seem
to be the reasons for the unmet expectations regarding
computer use in the St. Louis Police Department which
were discussed several pages earlier in this report.
Other problems mentioned in visits to police
departments were the design of forms and reports that
were difficult or impossible for operations people to
read or use, computer systems that were too slow and
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inaccurate, and problems with the computer being "down"
or out of order. In part, the difficulties expressed
over "down time" reflect expectations. Once a police
officer has become used to receiving information in
thirty seconds, it becomes a major imposition when the
computer is down to have to revert to a manual back-up
system, if one exists, that might take from fifteen to
thirty minutes. Still, comparatively speaking, such
technical problems as equipment performance, reliability,
and maintenance seemed to be of only moderate concern,
and according to the mailed survey, are generally
declining (Figure II-8).
In conclusion, then, it seems that the use of
the computer by the police has come a long way in a
relatively short period of time since the early stages
of implementation about a decade ago. Use has evolved
from structured and routine applications to more creative
unstructured approaches to applying technology to police
situations. And although a number of issues and problems
still remain, the computer has unquestionably become a
part of current and future law enforcement technology.
The questions now are not will the computer be used, but
how and with what implications.
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AVERAGE PERCENT OF COMPUTER USE
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STRUCTURED AND UNSTRUCTURED POLICE COMPUTER APPLICATIONS
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Police patrol inquiry - - -
Traffic applications - -
Miscellaneous operations -
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Police Administration - 4Allocation
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THE INFLUENCE OF CITY SIZE ON
CURRENT AND PROJECTED
USE OF COMPUTERS BY
POLICE DEPARTMENTS
100.0
WILL
rSE IN USE OF
COMPUTER IN THE
THREE YEARS
58.4
40.4 USE A COMPUTER
IN 1971
25.7
17.3
FIGURE 6
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
cn
w
a.
0
CL)o
CnzU,C)
A.zww
0
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
25,000- 50,000- 100,000- 250,000- OVER -
50,000 100,000 250,000 500,000 500,000
CITY POPULATION CATEGORY
100.
THE PERCENTAGE OF MAYOR-COUNCIL AND
COUNCIL-MANAGER CITIES USING
COMPUTERS AS INFLUENCED BY CITY SIZE
69.2
(9 OF
'N\1. 92.3
' (12 OF 13)
71.7
(33 OF 46)
36.0
(9 OF 25)
23.81
(5 OF 21)
15.0
(9 OF 60)
I I I I I I
OVER 500,000-
1,000,000 1,000,000
250,000- 100,000- 50,000- 25,000-
500,000 250,000 100,000 50,000
CITY POPULATION CATEGORY
*- FOR EXAMPLE, THIS MEANS 9 OF 13 POLICE DEPARTMENTS WITH A MAYOR-COUNCIL
FORM OF GOVERNMENT RESPONDING TO THE SURVEY WERE USING A COMPUTER.
FIGURE ' 7
100.0
(9 OF 9)
100%
90%
I0
(6 C
N1%
N11
80%
70%
60%
50%
w
a.
00C)
-Cnz00Z
a.)
0
0
:I-
40%
\ .COUNCIL-
MANAGER
CITIES
\
30%
20%
10%
'9)
0
14.58
(7 OF 48)
101.
PROBLEMS HINDERING COMPUTER
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TABLE II-7
REASONS FOR NOT USING A COMPUTER
Reasons for Not Using
Number
Indicating
(A)
Per cent of
Total Number
Responding
(N=223)*
Department too small 48 21.5%
Unable to afford 167 74.9
Cost outweighs the benefit 41 18.4
Present methods are satisfactory 20 9.0
Do not feel will be useful 0 0
Would have unfavorable impact 0 0
Other 33 14.8
TOTAL 309t 138.6t
*Of 230 departments mt using the computer, 223 responded to this question.
tTotal greater than 223 and % greater than
were allowed.
100% since multiple responses
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TABLE II-11
HAS THE COMPUTER MET EXPECTATIONS?
Number
Indicating
(A)Response
Yes, in fact, has exceeded
Yes, has met
No, has not met
No, and major changes
required
Reactions mixed
Too early to tell
15
63
13
Per Cent
of Total
Responding
10.4%
43.8
9.0
8 5.6
11
28
7.6
19.4
6
TOTAL RESPONDING
Other
144
114.
TABLE II-12
DO THE BENEFITS JUSTIFY THE COSTS?
Response
Yes
Maybe
Too early to tell
Number
Indicating
(A)
85
8
28
Per cent
of Total
Responding
59.0%
5.6
19.4
Not now, but will
No
Other
TOTAL RESPONDING
17
3
3
11.8
2.1
2.1
115.
TABLE II-13
IS THE INFORMATION IN THE SYSTEM ACCURATE?
Number
Indicating
(A)
107
16
12
Don't Know 5
Per cent
of Total
Responding
76.4%
11.4
8.6
3.6
TOTAL RESPONDING
Response
Yes
No
Sometimes
100.0%140
116.
TABLE II-14
DOES THE COMPUTER SYSTEM PROVIDE YOU WITH
INFORMATION YOU NEED TO MAKE DECISIONS?
Number
Indicating
(A)
77
13
44
Don't Know
TOTAL RESPONDING
5
139
Per cent
of Total
Responding
55.4%
9.4
31.7
3.5
100.0%
Response
Yes
No
Sometimes
117.
TABLE II-15
IS THE RESPONSE FAST ENOUGH?
Number
Indicating
(A)
57
39
37
Don't Know 4
Per cent
of Total
Responding
41.6%
28.5
27.0
2.9
TOTAL RESPONDING
Response
Yes
No
Sometimes
137 100.0%
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CHAPTER III
A FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS
It is possible to assess the benefits or impact
of computer use at a number of levels. In an article in
the Public Administration Review in 1967,1 Anthony Downs
discussed the payoffs2 of urban data systems. He
distinguished between two types of payoffs: technical
payoffs and power payoffs. Technical payoffs were
defined as benefits resulting from "technical improve-
ments from data inputs, processing, and output." In
essence they are technical improvements provided through
automation which help to bring better information, for
example, greater speed of processing, greater consistency
'Anthony Downs, "A Realistic Look at the Final
Payoffs From Urban Data Systems," Public Administration
Review, September, 1967, pp. 204-210.
2
"Payoff" is the term used by Anthony Downs to
refer to the benefits or impacts of urban data systems.
It is realized that in the law enforcement community
"payoff" has a different connotation (as in a "payoff"
provided for police corruption), and as a consequence
may be a somewhat confusing word choice. However, since
the question of police corruption is not dealt with
at any length in this report, and since "payoff" will
be used only as expressed by Downs, the term will still
appear.
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of outputs, and wider distribution of information.
Downs goes on to list eight potential technical benefits
brought about by urban data systems:3
1. Lower operating costs of data processing.
2. Faster availability of information.
3. Wider distribution of information.
4. Generation of new information never before
observed, recorded, or reported.
5. Greater consistency of reporting data.
6. Reduced distortion of data reported to top
levels.
7. Eventual development of a giant data
inventory. This could ultimately be used to
formulate, test, and modify theories about
causal relationships in the urban environment
which we can now only guess at.
8. Greater freedom from routine record keeping.
Power payoffs are defined as "gains in one person's
decision-making effectiveness made at the expense of
another person's."" They are redistributions of the
benefits of decision-making. They arise because every
change in organizations, techniques, or decision-making
processes shifts the relative power of the individuals
involved. Some people will gain and others will lose,
and usually their perception of the value of the change
3Ibid., p. 205.
4Ibid., p. 201.
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will depend on self interest. At a general level,
seven potential power shifts which may result in urban
decision-making as a consequence of the implementation
of urban data systems are hypothesized:
1. Lower and intermediate-level officials tend
to lose power to higher-level officials and
politicians.
2. High-level staff officials gain power.
3. City and state legislators tend to lose power
to administrations and operating officials.
4. The government bureaucracy as a whole
gains power at the expense of the general
electorate and non-governmental groups.
5. Well-organized and sophisticated groups
of all kinds, including some government bureaus,
gain power at the expense of less well organized
and sophisticated groups.
6. Within city governments those who actually
control automated data systems gain in power at
the expense of those who do not.
7. Technically educated officials within city
governments gain power at the expense of old
style political advisors.
In reviewing the payoffs outlined by Downs, Myron
Weiner contends that there is a third even more important
level of benefitsservice payoffs. He defines these
benefits as the degree to which taxpayers are serviced by
municipal information systems so that their quality of life
can be improved.5 These then are improvements in the service
SMyron E. Weiner, Service: The Objective of
Municipal Information Systems, Institute of Public Service,
The University of Connecticut, 1969, p. 29.
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to the public provided as a result of, or in connec-
tion with, the use of the computer.
TECHNICAL, POWER, AND SERVICE PAYOFFS AS THEY RELATE
TO POLICE COMPUTER USE
Chapter II explained how the police use of the
computer has evolved over the last ten years. From
initial applications in the area of traffic and crime
reporting, the cur-rent focus has moved to speed for
real time police systems for the rapid retrieval of
information. In the future it seems that emphasis will
be in such areas as automated resource allocation, com-
puterized criminal investigation, and machine aided
command and control. Using the distinction drawn in
Chapter II between structured, routine applications and
unstructured more "innovative" applications, the focus
in the past has been on the structured; the emphasis in
the future will be on the unstructured.
Regarding structured police computer applications,
it is the conclusion of this study that the primary
benefits to date are technical improvements. Particularly
in the site visits, it was found that structured com-
puter uses bring such technical gains as faster availa-
bility of information (e.g., response to inquiries from
the man in the field in less than seven seconds), wider
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distribution of data with greater consistency than ever
before (e.g., better reports more widely available), and
the development of data inventories providing valuable
historical sources for reporting and analysis. In some
cases increased revenues have even resulted as a conse-
quence of structured police computer applications.
Naturally, the actual impact of such applications has
varied widely from police department to police depart-
ment. On the whole, though, it can be said that such
technical benefits have brought increased effectiveness
to certain police operations (as long as effectiveness is
somewhat narrowly defined).
The next chapter of the thesis, Chapter IV, will
examine the use of the computer in structured, routine
application areas. The purpose will be to further
explain and define the state of the art pertaining to
such uses, and more importantly, to begin to assess
their benefits and effectiveness. At the outset, effec-
tiveness will be somewhat narrowly defined to refer to
increased police output or performance brought about as
a result of computer applications. Since information was
collected in a wide variety of police departments, each
with slightly different computer uses, no single measure
or standard of output will be set forth. Instead
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a variety of criteria such as the following will
be used:
... increased number of arrests, particularly
arrests for outstanding warrants.
... increased amount of stolen property recovered,
e.g., stolen automobiles.
... time saved (and therefore dollars saved) for
both the police and citizens who have been
stopped by reducing the waiting time required
for record checks (response can now be almost
instant as compared to ten or twenty minutes
before).
... faster response to calls for police services.
... increased revenues to the city through a rise
in the collection of fines due to an increase
in the number of arrests on outstanding warrants
(both traffic and criminal), improved billing
procedures, etc.
All of these measures are indicators of the
"first order" influences of computer use, but pieced
together through a variety of illustrations from the
various cities visited, they will begin to give some
idea as to the effectiveness of police computer use,
particularly pertaining to structured applications.
As to the impact of computer use regarding
service impacts or payoffs--improvements in the quality
of service to the public--the measures of performance
referred to above will begin to give some feeling as to
the benefits (and costs) of automation in providing police
services. Where possible some small effort will be given
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to determine the relationship between such services
and the actual impact on the community (e.g., reduction
in the crime rate, reduction in the number of traffic
accidents, overall satisfaction of citizens with police
service, etc.). However, trying to establish causal
relationships between the use of the computer and, say,
a reduction in the crime rate is difficult if not im-
possible, and will generally be considered to be beyond
the scope of this study.6
Chapter V will be devoted to examining unstruc-
tured computer applications, non-programmed applications,
where an attempt is made to begin to use the computer as
an innovator and a "thinker." These include such uses
as resource allocation, command and control, and computer
aided criminal investigation. In general it is the
conclusion of this study that such applications are
still at an early stage of implementation so it is
difficult to fully assess the influence which they will
6The crime rate is influenced by a wide variety
of factors such as the composition of the population,
the political climate of the nation, the environment of
the geographic area under consideration, the influence
of the news media, the quality of schools, etc. Since
all of these variables cannot be held constant, to try
to trace the influence of one factorssuch as the use
of a computer, is a very tedious task with data require-
ments beyond the scope of this thesis. Even with
extensive data, though, the task still may be an
impossible one.
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eventually have. In many respects, only suppositions or
refined hypotheses can be made. Still, it can be said
that unstructured applications have generally been more
difficult to implement to date than structured ones,
primarily because of additional behavioral and political
considerations which are involved. It also seems that
unstructured applications have a greater potential for
eventual power benefits or payoffs, and a greater poten-
tial for eventual impacts on police structure, task,
and personnel. Chapter V, then, will review some of
the primary illustrations of unstructured police computer
applications to date, and will begin to examine some of
the benefits, costs, and difficults of implementation
which were found.
A discussion of power payoffs for both structured
and unstructured applications will be deferred to
Chapter VI, where the general impact of the computer on
police structure, task, and personnel will be considered.
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CHAPTER IV
AN EVALUATION OF STRUCIIRED APPLICATIONS: THE USE OF
THE COMPUTER AS A ROUTINE PROCESSOR OF INFORMATION
Police departments process large amounts of information.
A great number of events transpire under the jurisdiction of the
police, and detailed reports are prepared concerning many of them.
Records are kept of the type and number of crimes conmmnitted, and
reports of aggregate statistics are required at the state and
national level (e.g., FBI uniform crime reports). Some of the
information gathered serves a self protecting function by docu-
menting police behavior. If a citizen calls two months after an
incident has occurred and complains of police brutality, investi-
gators must be able to go back to original records and reconstruct
the occurrence. Other information is essential for investigation
and prosecution. The police are only one part of the criminal
justice system along with the court and correction systems. However,
since it is the action of the police which usually commences the
process of criminal justice, records must be initiated at that point
which will be relied upon later on in the trial and correction
proceedings.
Administrative and routine operations also often require a
large amount of detailed data processing. Needs in this area include
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such things as keeping track of paid and unpaid parking tickets,
sending out warrants on traffic and parking citations, meeting
payroll conmitments, keeping inventories of equipment and vehicle
status, and preparing and updating personnel records.
The policeman in the field also has strong information
needs. Since his job requires quick judgement and decision-making,
any data which will inform him or provide justification for his
action can be of significant help. To know within seconds that a
car is stolen, or that a person is wanted, or that an address may
be dangerous, is of real benefit to the patrolman in the field.
For years police departments have been keeping records and
processing information, largely without automation. Such activities
will certainly continue in a department which is not using the com-
puter, although because of the massive volume of information, large
portions of the data, once recorded, will never be used again with-
out more efficient processing techniques. As was noted in
Chapter I, the computer is ideally suited for many of these processing,
storage, and retrieval activities. It is able to process large
amounts of routine, often detailed information rapidly, precisely,
in multiple copies, and without fatigue. Many departments have
taken advantage of these computer strengths and have automated
these routine, structured information processing activities.
The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to evaluate the
use of such structured computer applications by the police. Three
parts will be included: (1) an analysis of the benefits and costs
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of structured applications in general, primarily focusing on
three particular illustrations in Tulsa, Oklahoma; Wichita Falls,
Texas; and Denver, Colorado; (2) an evaluation of computer
applications for police patrol and inquiry, the most publicized
structured use; and (3) a discussion of the varying effectiveness
of computer use among police departments.
STRUCTURED APPLICATIONS IN GENERAL:
AN EXAMINATION OF THREE CASES
Computers receive a wide variety of uses within police
departments. Many of them are oriented to routine or structured
operations. Since the introduction of computers in police depart-
ments, crime statistical files have been one of the most important,
widely utilized applications. Further, a larger number of depart-
ments are using the computer to meet their reporting requirements at
a state and national level. As a consequence, the information in
such reports is more accurate and consistent, is available in less
time, receives greater distribution, includes new information never
before reported, and provides a valuable data bank to use as a
resource for research and planning.
A variety of structured applications have achieved success.
It is worthwhile to illustrate this fact by describing three sample
cases found during the site visits throughout the country. In the
description which follows, all three will be shown to be computer
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uses which have demonstrated or promise to demonstrate a positive
ratio of benefits to costs.
The Traffic Citation System in Tulsa, Oklahoma. In July,
1970, the Tulsa Management Planning and Systems Department of the
Office of the Mayor working in connection with the Police Depart-
ment and the Court Clerk for the city implemented a new automated
traffic citation system. The result was a total increase in
traffic income for the first year of operation of $260,000,
$32,000 of which was from backlogged citations.
The basic purpose of the automated traffic citation system
is to keep track of all parking and moving violations and to provide
administrative control. The system has five basic parts:
1. All tickets for both moving and parking violations are
numbered. Data regarding the nature of each citation,
date, officer making citation, etc., is key punched, and
overall record and data base is identified according to
the use and disposition of each citation.
2. Whereas the Court Clerk's office in Tulsa used to have
four men making phone calls regarding outstanding traffic
tickets, the computer system has now replaced this process,
and notices are automatically sent regarding traffic
violations. The automated system records dates when
notices are sent and identifies payments not made. After
an appropriate period of time, a bench warrant is issued
with the computer preparing all the paper work. Special
mailings are also made every three months notifying all
offenders of overdue parking ticket payments.
3. When payment is made and rung into the cash register
a computer paper tape is automatically punched so that the
information in the system can be updated automatically
without delay and without excessive expenditure for man-
power and keypunching.
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4. Daily cash reports and monthly statistics are regularly
tabulated by the computer and distributed to the appropriate
parties. For example, the Department of Public Safety is
furnished each month with a list of all moving violations
paid and appropriate totals.
5. Activity reports on the work of patrolmen are printed
out on a regular basis. The reports are known as "week to
date activity reports" and they include information on the
parking and moving traffic citations issued by each patrol-
man on a weekly basis.
The system provides a number of benefits. When asked what
the main utility of the system was to him, the Court Clerk replied
that "Administrative Control was the greatest advantage." In essence,
the system keeps him informed as to what is happening. However, not
only does the system inform the Court Clerk of what is happening
concerning one of his primary responsibilities of overseeing the
collection of revenues from citations, but it also provides informa-
tion to police administrators regarding the activity of their men.
This data can be a valuable aid in evaluating work and in allocating
resources more efficiently. The system therefore has brought
major administrative advantages. In and of themselves these would
probably justify the costs of the use of the computer in this case.
However, there have also been major financial returns.
Prior to the implementation of the traffic citation system
in July, 1970, four men were employed to notify motorists by phone
of outstanding bills for traffic citations. The monthly cost of the
salaries of these four men was $3,400 (an annual average of $10,200
per man) and their efforts realized an average of $5,000 collected
per month. When the new system was implemented the phone calling ceased
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and notices were automatically sent by machine. Three people in
the Court Clerk's office were still involved in the processing of
information (keypunching, recording payments, etc.), but because
the nature of the task had changed, the salary requirements per
month decreased from $3,400 to $1,400 (an annual average of
$5,700 per person). During the first month when computer notices
were prepared, $34,000 was collected (as compared to the previous
average of $5,000), and in the first six weeks of operation
$46,000 was collected. The average now is around $31,000 collected
per month. With the new system of computer notices, the back-up of
outstanding, unpaid warrants was reduced from $86,000 to $52,000.
An additional reduction is expected with a new police computer
aided dispatching system which is scheduled to be implemented in
the summer of 1972.1
An increase was also seen in the dollars collected for
parking tickets. Before implementation of the traffic citation
system in July, 1970, the income from the first six months of opera-
tion in 1970 was $15,000. In the next three months after the
system was installed $32,000 was collected.
It is estimated that the total overall increase in traffic
income for the first year of operation of the new traffic citation
system was $260,000.2 Naturally, some of this increase must be
1Letter to author from R. C. Klewer, Management Systems
Analyst, City of Tulsa, April 20, 1972.
2Ibid.
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attributed to normal average rise in dollars collected. However,
it is probably quite safe to equate most of the increase to the
utilization of the new computerized system. Figure IV-1 plots the
increase in revenues collected pertaining to traffic from January,
1970 to April, 1971. (The system was implemented during the month
of July, 1970.) Note that the increase between the first four
months of 1971 compared to the first four months of 1970 was by
itself an increase of $167,295.
It is now important to look at the costs incurred in
order to achieve these benefits. The costs are really divided
into two basic parts: costs to establish the systemand maintenance
and operating costs.
The basic costs to establish the system are estimated as
follows:
Personnel
1 computer systems analyst for
approximately one year $12,000
1 comaputer analyst/programner for
approximately 4 months $12,000/yr. 4,000
Miscellaneous other personnel time in
establishing system 4,000
Computer Time (approximate) 10,000
Equipment 12,000
(The equipment was to purchase two
validating-paper tape punching machines
so that payments of citations could be
recorded directly onto computer paper tape.
It is estimated that these machines "paid
for themselves" in a year due to the reduc-
tion which they brought in key punching
costs, costs of keypunch cards, etc., saved
from the old system.)
TOTAL $42,000
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The operating costs to run the system for a year from a
technical point of view are as follows:
Personnel
1/6 of a computer operator/analyst's
time of approximately $12,000/yr $ 2,000
Computer Time (approximate)
30 min/day x 5 days/wk x 52 wks = 130 hrs
1 hr/month x 12 months = 12 hrs
1 hr/wk x 52 wks = 52 hrs
200 hrs
Total 200 hrs x $100/hr = 20,000
TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS $22,000
Taking only financial benefits and costs into consideration,
we see that benefits (increased revenues of $260,000) clearly
outweigh costs ($64,000). These figures should be considered as
rough estimates (for example, a detailed accounting is not included
of personnel utilized in the Court Clerk's office before and after
the system, although this would actually increase the benefits
achieved). No effort has been made to quantify such benefits as
the increase in administrative control mentioned earlier or perhaps
the costs of any resistance to implementing the system. However,
this simple analysis illustrates how one structured computer
application benefited the traffic citation system. In addition,
the beneficial ratio of the Tulsa system ($260,000 in increased
revenues vs. $64,000 in costs, or a ratio of 4 to 1) can be
expected to increase with time because the traffic citation system
is only one part of the effort in Tulsa towards computer applica-
tions both in the police department and in the entire municipal
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government. As other applications are implemented, they will com-
pliment the traffic citation system, and with minimal additional
costs in running the traffic citation system, further increases in
revenues can be expected.
Denver Parking Citation System. The computerized parking
system for Denver City and County is another illustration of a
successful structured computer application in the traffic area.
The system differs from the Tulsa system in that it involves real
time retrieval of information and is oriented solely to parking
citations. (Another related system has been developed to process
moving traffic violations.) The system was established to provide
a more efficient and accurate means of processing an increasing
volume of parking citations. Initial system design began in
February 1970, and the system was implemented on April 20, 1970.
According to a system overview prepared by the Denver Data
Processing Division, the "system replaced a cumbersome, costly and
antiquated punch card system that left much to be desired in areas
of accountability and control of parking citations."3
Basically the system keeps track of citations issued and
payments made. Police copies of the parking citations are
delivered to the Traffic Violation Bureau daily for entry into the
system by means of computer video terminals. Payments are entered
3Tom Johnson, Systems Analyst, City and County of Denver
Parking Citation System, System Overview, City and County of Denver
Data Processing Division, November, 1970.
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by terminal on a real-time basis (that is, whenever they are
received). Citations and payments are recorded and "matched" on
the Parking Citation Master File. This file is read daily, and
post card notices are prepared by the machine and mailed to all
defendants who have not paid their parking citations within a
period of 20 days after the date of issuance. Based on the data
in the system, monthly reports are prepared on such terms as
listings of paid citations, statistics regarding number of cita-
tions added each month, type of violation, etc.
Also, a weekly identification listing is prepared for police
of all automobiles that have accumulated three or more unpaid
parking tickets. This list is then used by the police to identify
vehicles which fit into this category. If any are found, a
"Denver Boot" is used to demobilize the vehicle until parking
violations are paid. (A boot is a metal device that is attached
to the wheel and axle of a vehicle for demobilization purposes.)
Since such a tactic is used, it is important to update the system
instantly when payment for outstanding parking tickets is received.
Hence, the need for the real-time entry of information on payments.
Usually before a "boot" is applied, law enforcement officers will
call in to make sure that the vehicle in question is indeed still in
violation of the three outstanding ticket clause.
The benefits of the system are many. First, there is the
advantage of real-time updating thereby eliminating the possibility
of duplicate payments and the improper demobilization of a vehicle.
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As soon as payment is made, instant credit is received so that a
vehicle which is no longer in violation does not get "booted." The
use of the computer, though, does provide Denver with the oppor-
tunity for a very efficient parking collection system. Other
benefits include the daily, weekly, and monthly reports that
derived as a by-product and the overall administrative control of
the parking ticket operation which the system provides.
Exact data regarding the actual benefit cost ratio of the
system was not collected, but in discussions with both police and
city data processing officials it was unanimously felt to be
positive. According to sources in both the police department and
in the data processing division in Denver, one of the primary
reasons of implementing the system was to increase the parking
citation revenues of the city. Again according to these sources,
that objective has been fully achieved. In fact, if there is a
problem as far as the police department is concerned, it is that
perhaps too much priority has been placed on computer applications
which will help raise revenue as opposed to those that will be of
greater benefit in "fighting crime." This conflict will be discussed
later on in the paper, but at this time it is sufficient to conclude
that in and of itself, the parking citation system in the city and
county of Denver has proved to be a beneficial one.
The Wichita Falls Complaint Processing System. A third
example of a structured police computer application is the Wichita
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Falls complaint processing system, a system designed to monitor and
recall the various complaints and calls for service received by
the police in Wichita Falls. (The design of this application is
only one small part of an effort to develop an overall municipal
information system in the city.)4 At the time of the site visit
to Wichita Falls in 1971 the complaint processing system which
will be described below was still in the final stages of planning
and had not been implemented. An analysis as to the expected
benefits and costs of the system had just been completed. A telephone
conversation has indicated that some changes have occurred in the
system since that time,5 but the type of analysis performed in
evaluating the system still seems worthwhile to report.
4Wichita Falls is one of six cities that has been chosen
to participate in a federal project on the establishment of
municipal information systems. The project is known as the
Integrated Municipal Information Systems (IMIS) program and it
is funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) and several other federal agencies. The agencies form
the Urban Information Systems Interagency Committee (USAC) chaired
by HUD. Wichita Falls and Charlotte, North Carolina have been
selected to implement complete urban information systems while
the other four have been selected to implement particular sub-
systems of a total urban information systems program. The
other four cities and the subsystems they are developing are as
follows: Dayton, Ohio, public finance; Long Beach, public safety;
Reading, physical and economic development; and St. Paul, human
resources development.
5Telephone conversation between Kent W. Colton and
Floyd R. Shear, Systems Analyst, Wichita Falls, Texas, April,
1972.
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There were five primary objectives in designing the
complaint processing system:6
1. To maintain a record of each complaint and to follow
it through from initial call to resolution.
2. To provide a new process of record keeping tied to a
microfilm system.
3. To reduce clerical time.
4. To establish an automated real-time stolen property
file as one of the aspects of a complete complaint
processing system.
5. To generate a variety of reports including not only
the required FBI and Texas Department of Public Safety
Reports, but summaries and statistical information that
would be particularly useful to the department in evaluating
needs and work load requirements.
The basic purpose of the system was to be able to maintain
and recall all police complaints and their outcomes through the
use of the computer and microfilm records. Within the computer
was to be filed a real-time index to the microfilm records along
with specific retrieval files on such data as stolen property,
policemen assigned to various cases, etc.
Before deciding whether to implement the system or not, an
analysis was done by the staff of the municipal information systems
project in order to evaluate the constraints, benefits, and costs.
6Irnformation describing the complaint processing system
is taken primarily from the following document: draft, "System
Overview Police C omplaint Processing System," Mu nipal Informa-
tion Systems Project, Wichita Falls, Texas, April 14, 1971.
However, other materials obtained in the site visit to Wichita
Falls have also been utilized in describing the system.
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The primary constraints considered were legal, organizational, and
financial, and it was found that although difficulties existed,
none were so great as to "pose an appreciable problem during sub-
sequent phases." Further, according to their documentation the
benefits would justify the costs.
The primary legal constraint was that there is no specific
provision in the state of Texas for the introduction of microfilm
as evidence in a Court of Law. Since it was felt that such provi-
sions would probably come in the future, an interim solution was
developed. Microfilm was to be used for internal use, and all
originals were to be stored for reference only when a case went
to court. Upon the acceptance of microfilm by the courts, the
manual file could be destroyed.
The analysis of technical constraints indicated no major
difficulties, but it was found that implementation of the police
complaint processing application would probably result in several
organizational changes. First, the police department would no
longer be the sole processor of police complaint reports since such
reports would now be forwarded to data processing in order to update
the file. By some this would be perceived as lessening police
department control. Second, complaint processing activities would
be going from a manual operation to an automated one utilizing
video display terminals and microfilm. A redefinition of work tasks
would therefore be required. Finally, the new system would require
new forms and procedures in order to meet the more specific data
format requirements of the computer and the possibility of resistance
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to such changes clearly existed. However, after discussing each
of these factors with police department personnel, it was determined
that none would be insurmountable. In particular it was felt that
police officers and the personnel of the central records section
would be willing to accept the new procedures since the results
would provide more accurate information in a more timely fashion.
With the proper implementation and training pertaining to the new
system, the negative impact of any organizational constraint could
be minimized.
The analysis also found that although financial constraints
might exist, the overall savings in dollars from the system
exceeded the costs, at least on a daily operations basis. The
current manual processing of complaints consisted of such activities
as typing complaint reports, creating index cards, tallying complaint
statistics, retrieving complaint information, producing required
reports, and producing complaint files. The itemized clerical costs
of these various activities were $201.00 per day (see Table IV-1).
Under the proposed complaint processing system the costs
each day were estimated at $119. The proposed procedures for the
automated application were expected to significantly reduce the
amount of clerical time required to file and retrieve complaint
processes. The processing features were scheduled to be altered
somewhat drastically to include such activities as adding codes to
selected data elements, typing complaint reports, microfilming com-
plaint reports, retrieving information from computer and automated
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TABLE IV-1
PRESENT DAILY COMPLAINT PROCESSING COSTS
Activity
Complaint Dispatching
Complaint Report Typing
Complaint Master Report
Typing
Complaint Reports
Filing
Index Card Filing
Retrieval - Index Card
Retrieval - Complaint
Report
Generation of Reports
Purging Files
24 hours x $2.25 = $ 54.00
40 reports x 10 min.= 6.66 hr. x 2.25=
20 reports x 10 min.= 3.33 hr. x 2.25=
40 reports x 5 min. = 3.33 hr. x 2.25=
40 cards x 3 min. = 2 hr. x 2.25 =
300 inquiries x 3 min. =15 hr. x 2.25=
300 inquiries x 5 min. = 25 hr. x2.25=
8 hours x 2.25 =
2 hours x 2.25 =
TOTAL DAILY COST
15.00
7.50
7.50
4.50
33.75
56.25
18.00
4.50
Cost
$201.00
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microfilm storage, etc. However, it was found that assuming the
same number, of new and supplemental complaint reports and using
the same number of inquiries as a base, the cost of the automated
system on a daily basis would be significantly less (see
Table IV-2).
This increase in savings is noteworthy, but because the
primary savings forecast were savings in personnel costs, it is
possible that the projected savings will simply be "paper profits."
In order to really save money certain people will have to be
released from jobs and this usually does not happen. Instead,
people are reassigned to other tasks, possibly tasks that are
not being done currently. Thus, although more work may be done
for the same cost, it is not likely that an actual absolute cost
reduction will occur.
Besides the monetary benefits of the automated application,
though, it was also found that there would be a substantial increase
in benefits in terms of faster inquiry response time, more complete
and detailed reports for crime analysis, etc. For example,
although it was estimated that the costs of converting from a
manual to an automated system would probably be between $16,554 and
$18,220, it was also felt that by automating the stolen property
file the system would be instrumental in helping to bring an in-
crease in the recovery rate of stolen property by twenty-five per cent.
If true, this would result in a savings of approximately $50,000
annually to the citizens of Wichita Falls. This $50,000, although
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TABLE IV-2
PROJECTED DAILY PROCESSING COSTS
Activity
PERSONNEL
Complaint Dispatching
Complaint Report Coding
Complaint Report Typing
Microfilming Complaint
Reports
Index Retrieval
Complaint Report
Retrieval
Complaint Report Purge
Keypunch Reports
24 hours x $2.25/hour
40 reports x 1 min.= .67 hr. x 2.25=
$ 54.00
1.50
40 reports x 10 min.= 6.67 hr. x 2.25= 15.00
40 reports x 5 min.= 3.33 hr. x 2.25= 7.50
300 inquiries x 1/2 min.=
2.50 hr. x 2.25 = 5.62
300 inquiries x 1 min. = 5 hr. x 2.25= 11.25
1 hour x 2.25 =
40 reports x 100 char.= 4,000= 1 hr. +
1.05 hr. verification = 2.05 hr. x 2.50
TOTAL PERSONNEL COSTS
2.25
5.12
$102.24
PROCESSING
Complaint Inquiries
Batch Processing
300 x 1/2 min. = 2.50 hr. =
.08 hr. computer time x $60/hr. =
.05 hr. x $60/hr.
TOTAL, COMPUTER COSTS
STORAGE
On-Line Disk Storage
Microfilm Storage
TERMINAL
Rental of 2 terminals
(shared between 3
applications)
2.5 million char. = 1/10 disk
capacity x 600/mo-. + 30 days =
Daily cost for $25,000 investment
for 10 years 3 applications
2 x $200/mo..-3 applications 30 days=
TOTAL DAILY COST
$ 5.00
3.27
$ 8.27
$ 2.00
2.28
Cost
$119.23
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an indirect benefit to the police department,would more than cover
the $16,000-$18,000 costs of starting up and converting to an
automated system.
A Brief Comparison of the Case Illustrations. The three
cases presented above are illustrative of structured computer
applications in police departments. Their benefits are primarily
technical (e.g., faster availability of information, lower
operating costs of data processing, wider distribution of informa-
tion, etc.), and have for the most part proven to be worth their
cost of implementation.
Naturally, the actual utility of such systems varies from
department to department depending upon approach, specific environ-
ment, etc., so it is difficult to reach more than very general
conclusions regarding the advantages of such uses. In general,
though, people seem to be happy with such structured applications.
The major criticism was the one that was mentioned in Denver.
There,personnel in the police department felt that such uses were
nice, but since there were only limited resources regarding the
implementation of computer applications, they would have preferred
the priority to be placed elsewhere. To them applications which
will help "fight crime" are more important than those which will
increase revenue.
It also seems clear that where implemented properly such
applications can increase police efficiency--for example, the
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increased number of paid traffic citations in Tulsa, Oklahoma. In
general the response of the public tends to be positive to such
increased efficiency, but it should be remembered that sane citizens
will disapprove. Their feeling is that efficiency and strict
enforcement are great as long as it doesn't hit "their pocketbook."
It is doubted that such public sentiment will ever be so great as
to preclude computer implementation, but it should be remembered
that it might exist.
It is also worth noting in conclusion at this point that
organizational shifts will result in police departments as a result
of the implementation of such structured computer applications
as discussed above (e.g., the changes anticipated in Wichita Falls),
but it seems that the impact of such shifts will be small. This
subject will be discussed in greater depth, though, in Chapter VI.
COMPUTER APPLICATIONS FOR
POLICE PATROL AND INQUIRY
As was indicated in Chapter II, the application area which
currently receives the greatest use by the police is police patrol
and inquiry. This application is usually real-time, and it is
established to provide the patrolman with the rapid retrieval of
information important to his work. Although advanced computer
technology is often utilized, the task performed is a straight-
forward retrieval of information and the application is therefore
still considered to be a structured one.
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A number of cities throughout the country have had great
success in using the computer in this area. Two excellent
illustration are Kansas City, Missouri, and Los Angeles, California.
Kansas City. In Kansas City, Missouri, a city with a
population of 507,000, the police department has established a
regional system for real-time inquiry of information which links
more than 40 law enforcement agencies. This system was established
with the primary objective of aiding the patrolman. According
to the Kansas City Chief, Clarence M. Kelley, "We must turn to
machinery to augment the man in the field."7
On July 1, 1968, the telecommunications systems became
operational and action was initiated to furnish information to
officers in the field. Less than a year later, on May 5, 1969,
the telecommunications services of the police department computer
were made available to all regional area law enforcement agencies,
and those civil agencies involved in the Criminal Justice process.
These real-time applications of the Kansas City facility are
known as the ALERT System (Automated Law Enforcement Response
Team). When the system was established, the primary objective
was that information requests of officers in the field receive
a response within ten seconds after a question is asked.
7Quoted from Bill Ellingsworth, "K. C. Computer Does
Its Thing," Kansas Citian, June, 1970.
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An officer calls by radio to the communication center with
a request for information. Each dispatcher has a video display
CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) terminal in front of him. The dispatcher
makes an inquiry of the system which queries not only the Kansas
City computer, but the FBI's National Crime Information (NCIC) com-
puter in Washington, D.C. A response is received, and a report
is radioed back to the officer. According to the Assistant Chief,
James Newman, the entire process now averages about three to four
seconds. (The experiences of this author while riding patrol
with the Kansas City police confirmed his estimate.) Previous
to the computer it took about 35 minutes to retrieve and relay
this data.
Basically there are three categories of information about
which the patrolman can inquire:8
1. Wanted information--warrant, pickup, stolen vehicles,
stolen property.
2. Criminal index, abstract, and status--current address,
status, organized activists.
3. Information forewarning of probable danger from
individuals (armed, dangerous, mental, suicidal, expected
to resist arrest), or at a particular address (history of
previous disturbances at a certain address.
The computer system now provides service to more than 40
law enforcement agencies which serve a population of 1.5 million
citizens across 9,000 square miles and eight counties in Kansas
and western Missouri. Over 80 local and remote data communication
eThis categorization is found in Ellingsworth, "K.C. Computer,"
p. 19.
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terminals are operational and linked into the automated network.
During November, 1969, the police computer was interfaced directly
to the FBI computer in Washington through a high speed microwave
communications system.
As of April, 1971, about 13,000 inquiries and update
actions were processed each day, at an average of better than one
transaction every seven seconds in a 24-hour day. In 1969, the
first full year of computer use, a total of 21,700 "hits" or
identifications were made, the three largest categories being
city traffic warrants, stolen cars, and parole violators. In
1970, 230,000 instances were recorded where quick response of a
positive nature was furnished to those tied into the computer
network. The police computer system in Kansas City is considered
to be one of the best in the country; and so is the system in
Los Angeles.
Los Angeles. In Los Angeles, the Automated Want/Warrant
System (AWWS) was established through the joint efforts of the
Los Angeles Police Department and the City Data Service Bureau,
and has proven to be a great success. Prior to the computerized
system, the Los Angeles Police Department had several thousand
outstanding warrants and wanted persons entries on hand. The
problem was that these warrants had to be accessed manually, and
this process could take 15 minutes per warrant or even more under
unusual circumstances. Although the system worked quite well
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regarding the apprehension of important criminals, many minor
warrants were never served, partially because police officers in
the field were understandably reluctant to keep persons they stopped
waiting for an extended period of time only to find that in many
cases they were "clean." The result was that the files continued
to grow, manual searches took longer, and officers continued to
be reluctant to detain people they stopped in order to make a
warrants check.9
In 1965 the Los Angeles Police Department initiated an
in-depth study of its want/warrant files in order to remedy this
situation. It soon became apparent that the ever-increasing warrant
load was fast overtaxing the limits of the existing manual system.
An extensive survey of both support and field personnel revealed
that there were six major problem areas related to the police
department's response capability pertaining to warrants:10
1. The lengthy response time necessary for a manual
search tended to increase the jeopardy to a field
officer unknowingly involved in a contact with a
dangerous person.
2. Each inquiry required an average of 8 minutes
processing, which materially reduced the officer's
ability for active patrol and generated a reluctance to
make want/warrant inquiries. These delays in some cases
had a detrimental effect on officer/citizen relationships.
9"Is Angeles Police Department Automated Want/Warrant
System," Datamation, June 1970, pp. 242, 243. No author listed.
l°Los Angeles Regional Automated Want/Warrant System,
document published by the Los Angeles Police Department,
approximate date 1971, p. 4.
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3. File maintenance tasks were extremely involved and
cumbersome.
4. The warrant load was increasing at a rate greater than
could be adequately handled manually.
5. Storage space for cross-index files and hard copy
warrants was becoming critical.
6. Because of limited time, the requesting officer could
make use only of Los Angeles Police Department warrants.
Further, discussion with other law enforcement agencies
in Los Angeles County revealed that these problems were not
unique. Numerous "wants and warrants" were not being served
because each agency maintained its own file of warrants for its
own jurisdiction separately, and a routine check was confined to
that particular agency's file of their own warrants only. According
to a Los Angeles Police Department report," it was not unusual
for a citizen to be arrested and serve a sentence and be released
in one jurisdiction while law enforcement agencies in other parts
of the county still had outstanding "wants or warrants" for the
person.
In response to these problems the Los Angeles Regional
Automated Want/Warrant System (AWWS) was developed. It became
operational on September 2, 1969. The average time now for a
response to the field with AWWS is eight seconds, a significant
improvement from the previous time of fifteen minutes. In capsule
"Ibid. , p. 4.
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form, the system was designed to perform the following functions: 
1. Allow each field and station officer to search a
centralized file for all outstanding wants/warrants
in the system.
2. Allow inquiry from either a visual display device
(CRT) or Teletypewriter.
3. Respond to an inquiry in seven to ten seconds.
4. Allow a requester to specify a terminal to which a
printed output would be sent.
5. Allow on-line file maintenance and record update
capability from any of the terminal devices.
6. Provide a built-in expansion capability to accomodate
law enforcement agencies in the county.
7. Operate reliably on a 24-hour basis, 7 days a week,
with minimal interruption.
In most cases these objectives have been met and even
exceeded by the Automated Want/Warrant system. Working in a
manner similar to Kansas City, the system can be used to check for
such items as outstanding warrants (traffic and criminal), stolen
cars, other stolen property, motor vehicles with excessive parking
violations and wanted persons. AWWS also follows the suspect beyond
arrest. When a man is booked and processed, the booking information
is sent to the police departments records division. A search based
on fingerprints is made, and if an arrest record is found any aliases
are also checked against the AWWS files and any additional warrants
are transferred to the concerned jail facility.
The AWWS is also tied to other related computer systems.
They include the California Highway Patrol "AUTO STATIS" system
nIbid., p. 6.
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(a statewide auto theft system), the California Department of
Motor Vehicles (used to check vehicle registration information,
determine owners, etc.), and the FBI National Crime Information
Center (NCIC).
When first begun in 1969, the system was utilized solely
by the Los Angeles Police Department. However, plans were made
right from the beginning to expand the utilization of the system
to other law enforcement agencies in the region. This was done,
with the Long Beach, California police department being the
first municipal police jurisdiction to gain access to AWWS. 13
As of April, 1971, there were 49 jurisdictions using the system
(including the Los Angeles City Police Department and the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department).
In the context of a narrow definition of success, the
AWWS has been very helpful. For example, the number of arrests
made on outstanding warrants in the first quarter of 1970 was
over 75% more than the first quarter of last year.l4 No specific
financial figures were obtained to conclusively demonstrate the
benefits of the parking warrant aspects of the system, but just
one example helps to demonstrate the utility in such an area. In
the first part of 1970 when the system was fairly new, a patrol
'
3The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department was really the
first jurisdiction besides Los Angeles itself to utilize the system.
14"Ios Angeles Police Department," Datamation, p. 242.
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car stopped a car for a traffic violation. The arresting officer
ran a routine check on the man and on his license plate number
using the AWWS system and in seconds was notified of a backlog
of 45 outstanding parking tickets. The man was taken to the
nearest station, and by the time they arrived a warrant for his
arrest was waiting. This is just one illustration, but in general
the Automated Want/Warrant System has been successful.
ACCEPTANCE AND BENEFITS OF POLICE PATROL AND INQUIRY COMPUTER
APPLICATIONS
Computer use by the police to provide rapid response to
inquiries from policemen in the field has been well received by
police departments and policemen throughout the country. This
is demonstrated by the fact that in every police department
visited there had been a definite increase with time in the use
of such systems by the men in the field. In other words, once
policemen discovered that the system was available and would
benefit them by providing better information in a greatly reduced
amount of time, they began to use the system. The number of
policemen had remained relatively constant within most cities,
but within a year's time, the average number of inquiries per
man doubled or even tripled in some cases.
Figure IV-2 illustrates this increase in Kansas City,
Denver, and Los Angeles. Since the exact definition of "inquiries"
varies somewhat substantially from police department to police
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department, these charts should not be used to make direct com-
parisons amng these four cities. However, they do indicate
very strikingly a general phenomenon in all four: an increased
use over time by policemen in the field of real-time police patrol
and inquiry systems.
There are a number of both technical benefits and service
benefits stemming from this type of rapid retrieval which help to
stimulate further use.
Technical Benefits. Regarding technical benefits--benefits
resulting from improved data inputs, outputs, and processing--three
seem to be of greatest importance: (1) benefits due to better
information, (2) benefits resulting from time saved, and
(3) benefits providing the patrolmen with increased safety in the
uncertain tasks of his work.
First, let's examine improvements in the type and
availability of information. In order to make data entries into
an automated system, precise forms and a series of regular procedures
for data entry and verification are necessary. Hence, the quality
of information improves. In Kansas City, for example, each item of
information is key punched twice in order to verify input data.
Such care leads to greater accuracy and consistency. Also, it is
relatively easier to maintain automated computer files than
manual ones, particularly for large cities. For example, it
has already been indicated that one of the primary problems in
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Los Angeles prior to the introduction of AWWS was that file
maintenance tasks were extremely cumbersome and storage space
for cross-index files and hand copy warrants was becoming critical.
Police patrol and inquiry applications lead to access to
information which was never available before and to a much wider
distribution of information. A number of police departments now
have instant access to regional, state, and national law
enforcement information where such data was only available before
at the cost of hours and sometimes days. A police department with
an automated system can often now have direct computer access to
the files of a state department of motor vehicles in order to
obtain registration information on automobiles. Before this data
was only available over the phone or through the mail. With new
information technology, not only is it possible to provide infor-
mation to the man in the field, but terminals can be placed in
a number of the administrative and investigative offices of the
police department (such as the auto theft section, the records
section, or the detention section), thus providing rapid inquiry
capability to those sections where such information was never
available, at least without the cost of time and inconvenience.
The second major benefit is that real-time computer systems
for inauirv are great time savers. Not only do they save the
time of police officers thereby allowing them to spend more time in
preventive patrol or responding to calls, they save the time of the
citizen who has been stopped. Instead of a fifteen or twenty
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minute wait for a records check to be run, now, it can be done
instantly and innocent people can be sent on their way. This has
the potential of improving police/public relations or at least
it reduces the negative potential of an innocent irate citizen
being required to wait twenty minutes, thus leading to deteriorating
officer/citizen relations.
Since inquiry systems save a great deal of time, the old
adage "time is money," is directly applicable in trying to assess
the benefits of such computer systems. An effort will not be made
to place a specific dollar value on the time saved by the citizen
who is stopped, although certainly some savings do exist. It is
somewhat easier to place a monetary value on the policeman's
time saved, so an illustrative attempt will be made.
In Kansas City it was estimated that in 1970 $735,000 was
spent to run the computer facility. This included the cost of the
entire computer operation, not just the cost of the real-time
inquiry portion of the system. However, the $735,000 figure will
be used as an illustrative number to represent costs in this example.
In 1970 there were a total of 1,369,27015 inquiries
for infornELtion made to the computer facility in the Kansas City
15This number will be used as a basis to determine the
amount of time and consequent dollars saved as a result of the inquiry
aspects of the computer system. As the paper has already pointed out,
the number of inquiries made of an automated system is far greater
than the number made of a manual one. Therefore, it is probably
slightly exaggerated to use the inquiries of the automated system
as the sole basis for determining benefits since before the computer
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Police Department. If it is assumed that each one of these
inquiries saves the policeman eight minutes,l6 then a total of
182,569 hours of police service time was saved through the use
of the inquiry aspects of the police computer system.
Based on the Kansas City salary schedule for 1970, an
average policeman makes approximately $9,000 per year or about
$4.50 an hour.17 If one assumes that the 182,569 hours which
were formerly potentially spent waiting for responses to inquiry
are now devoted to police patrol or responding to calls, then the
Kansas City community now receives approximately $821,560
(182,569 hours x $4.50/hour) worth of additional police services
as a result of the time saved by the use of the real-time inquiry
aspects of the police computer system (see Table IV-3). If such
is the case, more benefits are achieved each year through the use
of the inquiry aspects of the computer system ($821,561 in police
services) than the entire computer operation costs on an annual
basis ($735,000).
Naturally, this illustration is a rough one and focuses
on only one very narrow criterion of performance. However, the
the number of such inquiries was far less, thus making the amount
of potential time saved far less. However, the example is simply
illustrative, and such assumptions as this will be made for the
purpose of demonstrating a point.
16 A reasonable assumption based on response time before
and after automation.
17Kansas City, Missouri Police Department Annual Report,
1970, p. .- 
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TABLE IV-3*
Annual Costs of the Kansas City Computer Operation:
$735,000 (Estimated costs of the
computer operation for 1970)
Annual Benefits in Additional Police Services as a result of using
the real-time inquire aspects of the Computer Operation:
1,369,270 total inquiries/year
x 8 minutes estimated time
saved/inquiry
10,954,160 minutes saved
182,569.33 =
60 ) 10,954,160.00 182,569 hours saved
x $4.50/hour approximate hourly wage of
the average Kansas City
Patrolmant
$821,561.85 Additional police services per
year as a result of time saved
*Although these numbers are actual figures, this example should be
considered as only an illustrative one to demonstrate a point. Because of
this,assumptions have been made, and both 1970 and 1971 numbers have been
used without any effort to achieve "constant dollars."
p. 8.
tSee Kansas City, Missouri Police Department Annual Report, 1970,
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example is offered to demonstrate a point, and it does so rather
forcefully. A great deal of police time is saved through the use
of real-time inquiry systems, and this time saved represents
additional police services. In turn, this additional police ser-
vice represents dollars. Whether or not the actual dollar benefits
of such services really equal or even exceed the costs of the
computer operation as in the illustration above is not important.
The point is that such benefits are significant. Alone they
may not justify the use of the computer, nor should they have to.
However, time saved is time applied to other law enforcement
services, and it should clearly be realized that the time saved
by the police because the use of the computer has increased inquiry
response time and decreased waiting time does represent a major
benefit.
The third area of major technical benefits resulting
from computer systems for police patrol and inquiry are those which
provide the policeman with greater safety in performing uncertain
tasks. Police work involves a great deal of uncertainty and with
uncertainty comes risk. To the extent that the use of the computer
can help reduce this uncertainty, it will provide a valuable
service in the performance of law enforcement work.
Computers are used to reduce uncertainty pertaining to stolen
automobiles and other property, pertaining to suspicious persons,
and in some cases pertaining to dangerous locations. Regarding
automobiles, whenever a vehicle appears suspicious or is stopped for
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a moving violation it is now possible with rapid inquiry to
check that vehicle and in a matter of seconds to know if it is
stolen or considered dangerous. This means that it is possible
to notify a policeman whether a car has been stolen or the
owner is wanted before the officer approaches the driver of a
stopped car, thus letting him know what to expect. The same
principle applies to dangerous persons. In some cities if a
particular car is known to have been used for criminal activity
it will be flagged so that if the car is stopped and a check
is made, the persons within the automobile will be treated with
special precaution in order to meet the potential danger. Further
if persons are stopped or interviewed a name check may be made.
This will accomplish several things. First, if the person is
wanted an arrest can be made. Second, though, it may alert the
patrolman to the fact that the man or woman should be considered
dangerous and may be armed or have maniac or suicidal tendencies.
Because the information is rapidly available in seconds as opposed
to minutes, it means that the policeman will be informed instantly
and as a consequence will have less time when he is uninformed
or when the suspect can catch him off guard. This information
will allow the patrolman to behave in a more appropriate manner,
particularly if he has received proper training or gained effective
experience in the past. Greater information in a situation like
this reduces uncertainty and helps to achieve more effective performance.
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Regarding address checks, some systems have now gone so far
as to allow the officer or the dispatcher to check a particular
location to see if any problems have occurred at that address
recently, thus providing a safety warning for cars that might be
dispatched. In Kansas City such an application was installed at
least in partial response to a tragedy which occurred in the
department. Several years ago an officer was sent to a house early
in the day in response to a disturbance complaint. The situation
seemed to be settled, and the officer left. Later in the day another
call went out for the same location, but this time a different
patrolman was assigned to respond. Not knowing that there had
been any previous trouble, he approached the house with little
precaution. This time, though, the persons involved had obtained
a gun, and the responding officer was shot and killed. The feelings
in the Kansas City Department were that if the second policeman
would have known of the previous complaint he would have probably
approached the situation entirely differently and his life might
have been saved. Naturally, it is exceedingly difficult to place
a dollar value on this type of benefit.
Service Benefits. Real-time inquiry systems not only
provide technical benefits to the police, but they improve
patrolman efficiency and increase apprehension ability. The pre-
cise improvement will vary sharply from police department to
police department, but such a statement can be readily documented,
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and several examples will be provided below.
First, with rapid inquiry systems police officers make a
greater number of inquiries regarding stolen property and suspected
persons. Figure IV-2 demonstrates this fact in four specific
police departments. If an inquiry can be made in a few seconds,
policemen are willing to make checks, whereas before with manual
systems there was reluctance to inquire and then "waste time"
standing around waiting for a response. Further, with regional,
state, and national networks for rapid inquiry it is possible for
different law enforcement jurisdictions to coordinate operations
and to make arrests for each other. In order to illustrate the
improved efficiency and apprehension ability which results from
police patrol and inquiry systems, it is useful to look at the
results of such an application in one specific police department,
the department in the city of Long Beach, California.
The Long Beach Police Department became a part of the Los
Angeles Regional Automated Want/Warrant System (AWWS)/, in March,
1970. That meant it could have access to all information within
the system regarding wanted persons, stolen vehicles, outstanding
warrants, etc., and on June 8, 1970 the department also began to
enter data into AWWS regarding their own outstanding warrants. To
test the changes in efficiency and apprehension ability which
resulted from the use of AWWS it is useful to examine the change
in the number of warrants served which resulted. This can be done
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best by examining three separate tables. Table IV-4 on local
warrant arrests, Table IV-5 on foreign warrant arrests, and
18
Table IV-6 on arrests of Long Beach warrants by other agencies.
Table IV-4 compares the number of arrests made of Long
Beach warrants by members of the Long Beach Police Department
prior to the system in 1969 and after the system was implemented
in 1970. At first examination, the results are somewhat surprising.
In most months of 1969 there were a greater number of arrests in
1969 than in 1970. Further, there was a decrease of 154 local
warrants arrests for 1970 (2,484) over 1969 (2,638). Does this
mean that the implementation of the AWWS was a failure? A more
detailed examination of the remaining data indicates not.
Table IV-5 compares arrests made by Long Beach Police
officers in 1969 and 1970 on "foreign agency warrants" or
warrants issued by other law enforcement jurisdictions. The
chart illustrates a significant rise in foreign warrant arrests
after the implementation of AWWS in March,1970. The number almost
doubled from 1969 to 1970 going from 484 to 829 for an increase of
345. When this total is added to the local warrant factor previously
discussed, it indicates that there was a slight increase in the
18
The data to develop these charts is taken from The
Automated Want/Warrant System from Conceptualization to Implemen-
tation, Long Beach Police Department, a report prepared by Sargeant
Jerry Lance, Research Department, Long Beach Police Department,
March 1, 1972.
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TABLE IV-4
ARRESTS ON LOCAL WARRANTS 1969 vs. 1970
Included within this report are all local warrant arrests on
local warrants comparing 1969 with 1970. Following is a graphic
demonstration of this listing.
Month 1969 1970
January 226 253
February 225 200
March 229 190
April 233 216
May 234 266
June 216 155
July 210 183
August 236 242
September 223 222
October 201 186
November 211 201
December 194 170
TOTAL 2,638 2,484
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TABLE IV-5
ARRESTS ON FOREIGN WARRANTS 1969 vs. 1970
Included in this report are all local arrests on foreign
warrants comparing 1969 with 1970. It should be noted that the
Want/Warrant System through the computer has only been available
since February 1970 for inquiry. The Long Beach warrants were not
added until June 1970. Following is a graphic demonstration.
Month
January
February
1969
40
39
March
April
May
June
40
57
34
42
38July
August
September
October
November
December
33
31
35
42
53
1970
39
28
63
87
71
94
82
64
41
88
91
81
TOTAL 484 829
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total number of warrant arrests made by the Long Beach Police
Department: 3,122 in 1969 and 3,313 in 1970. However, it is
in Table IV-6 that the real success of the system is demonstrated.
Table IV-6 compares the number of warrant arrests made by
other law enforcement agencies on Long Beach warrants in 1969 and
in 1970. This increase can be attributed directly to the
implementation of AWWS. The Long Beach Police Department began
entering their outstanding warrants into AWWS June, 1970, and
from that month on there has been a steady increase in the number
of arrests made by other agencies of Long Beach warrants. Prior
to June, 1970 no precise information was kept regarding arrests
made by outside jurisdictions but the Warrant Detail Supervisor
estimated that between 30-40 warrants a month were cleared by
other agencies. Based on this estimate, it has been assumed
that there was an average of 35 warrants per month prior to June,
1970. This means that for a six month period prior to AWWS there
would have been 210 warrant arrests by outside agencies, and
if calculated for an annual period, there would have been 420 such
arrests each year. Now, comparing 1969 and 1970, there were 1,343
warrant arrests during the seven-month period of AWWS operation in
1970 (June - December). During that same period in 1969 there was
only an estimated 245 warrant arrests. This means that there was
better than a 550% increase for the first seven months period of
operation compared to the previous year.
In summnary, then, the use of the Los Angeles Regional
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TABLE I- 6
ARRESTS ON LONG BEACH WARRANTS BY OTHER AGENCIES
This report will show the number of arrests by other agencies of
Long Beach Warrants. This covers only the period of June through
December as these are the only months our warrants have been in the
system. Prior to this time there was no record kept of this information.
However, an estimate made by the warrant detail prior to the system going
into operation was approximately 30-40 bookings a month by other agencies.
As will be shown by the figures, this is the area in which the increase
in warrant service was most beneficial.
1970
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
SEVEN MONTH TOTAL
Plus Estimated
January
February
March
April
May
71
150
189
199
192
263
279
1,343
35
35
35
35
35
175
1969 Estimates
35
35
35
35
35
35
35
245
35
35
35
35
35
175
ESTIMATED TOTAL FOR YEAR
Month
1,518 420
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Automated Want/Warrant System by the Long Beach Police Department
has proven to be highly successful from an apprehension point of
view. In total, there were 3,542 warrant arrests in 1969 compared
to 4,831 for 1970, an increase of 1,289 or 36.4% over 1969. When
warrant arrests by Long Beach officers on foreign warrants are
deducted the totals indicate 3,058 arrests on Long Beach warrants
for 1969 and 4,037 for 1970, an increase of 979 or 32.0%. This
rise can indeed be viewed as a substantial improvement. Finally,
it is important to note again that the significant benefits of
AWWS to Long Beach did not come from an increase in the number of
arrests they made on their own warrants, but from the fact that
with the AWWS system, officers in other jurisdictions could now
identify and arrest individuals wanted in Long Beach. In fact,
the Long Beach warrant squad soon discovered that instead of spending
most of their time serving warrants, they were now spending the
majority of their time picking up people who had been arrested in
other jurisdictions due to outstanding Long Beach warrants.
Regarding the costs of utilizing the AWWS by the Long Beach
Police Department, the cost-benefit ratio also appears to be
favorable. Specifically, the costs of the system were estimated
to be $50,000 per annum including equipment and "service fee" paid
to Los Angeles. (The costs for the first six months of use in
1969 were budgeted at $25,192 (see Table IV-7), and the costs for
1970 were budgeted at $50,844 (see Table IV-8). On the other hand,
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TABLE IV-7
AUTOMATED WANT/WARRANT SYSTEM COST 1969-70 BUDGET
1969-70
EQUIPMENT Monthly Yearly
Scantlin:
1) C.R.T. Terminals (3) $ 153.00 $ 918.00
Model 830 Keyboard
Model 836 Display Unit
One time Installation @ $130 each 390.00
2) C.R.T. Controller Model 820 (1) 275.00 1,650.00
One time Installation $350 350.00
3) Line Terminators Model 812 (2) 90.00 540.00
One time Installation No Charge
4) Maintenance 41.00 246.00
Sub-total 559.00 4,094.00
Mohawk Data Recorder:
1) Data Recorder Model 6401 (1) 161.00 966.00
Maintenance 20.00 120.00
One time Shipping cost $100 100.00
Sub-total 181.00 1,186.00
Pacific Telephone Co.
1) Data Phones at Voice Grade 202.00 1,212.00
Phone line (2)
One time Installation $220 220.00
Sub-total 202.00 1,432.00
PERSONNEL
Los Angeles
Fee to Los Angeles $5 per police officer at
1969-70 Budget, 616 personnel 3,080.00 18,480.00
TOTAL $4,022.00 $25,192.00
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TABLE IV-8
AUTOMATED WANT/WARRANT SYSTEM COSTS 1970-71 BUDGET
Following is a breakdown of the Automated Want/Warrant System cost in
the current (:L970-71) Budget.
EQUIPMENT
Scantlin
C.R.T. Terminals (3)
Model 830 Keyboard
Model 836 Display Unit
C.R.T. Model 820 Controller (1)
Line Terminators Model 812 (2)
Maintenance Cost
Monthly Yearly
$ 153.00 $ 1,836.00
275.00
90.00
41.00
Sub-total 559.00
3,300.00
1,080.00
492.00
6,708.00
Mohawk Data Recorder
Data Recorder Model 6401 (1)
Maintenance
Sub-total
Pacific Telephone
Data Phones on Voice Grade Line (2)
PERSONNEL
Fee to Los Angeles based on $5 per police
officer at current level of 659. 3,295.00 39,540.00
GRAND TOTAL
161.00
20.00
1,932.00
240.00
2,172.00
2,424.00
181.00
202.00
.$4,237. 00
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it was estimated that the annual revenues received from various
warrants for 1971 were around $375,000. (The actual revenue for
19
January 1, 1971 thru June 30, 1971 was $187,575). Based on
an increase in Long Beach warrant arrests, of 979 or 32%, this
20
would indicate increased benefits of somewhere around $90,750.
The use of the Automated Want Warrant System, then, resulted in a
positive benefit cost ratio of approximately 9/5, $90,750 in
benefits compared to $50,000 in costs. Not only was the appre-
hension capability of the police increased, but it was done at a
reasonable cost considering the benefits achieved.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPUTER USE
The introduction of a computer is the introduction of a
technological change. With it comes uncertainty. Certain people
in the organization will gain, others may lose. Resistance is
primarily a function of whether or not people view such a change
to be to their benefit. The dynamics of change are vital in
understanding the impact and implementation of computers. Before
19
Memorandum dated July 18, 1971 to William J. Mooney,
Long Beach Chief of Police, from Officer S.R. Eakin, AWWS Coordinator.
Subject: "Semiannual Automated Want/Warrant System Statistics."
20
979 warrants (increase from 1969 to 1970 4,037 (total
Long Beach warrant arrests in 1970) = 24.2% (% increase from 1969
to 1970 was of total 1970 warrants). Therefore, 24.2% x $375,000
= $90,750.
174.
proceeding, it is important to comment briefly on the dynamics
of organizational change and how they seem to relate to the
implementation of computer use by the police.
A number of studies have been done to try to determine the
circumstances that surround the successful implementation of
change. Kenneth C. Knight has argued that the recent experience
of the organization is the most important determinant of how
receptive the members of that organization will be to a proposed
change. If they perceive past efforts of the organization to have
been successful, their willingness to change will be low. However,
if they perceive that past efforts have failed, their receptivity
21
will increase.
In police departments this implies that people will be
more receptive to computer use if they perceive the need to improve
their basic operations. Although the principle has not been tested
scientifically, interviews with police officers around the country
seem to confirm it. One of the primary reasons that patrolmen or
detectives stated that they felt their department should use the
computer was to improve effectiveness, to move from an operation
with which they were dissatisfied to one with which they were more
pleased.
A study by Dalton, Barnes, and Zaleznik on the introduction
of change into an organization also seems appropriate to the dynamics
21
Kenneth C. Knight, "A Descriptive Model of the Intra
Firm Innovation Process," Journal of Business, Volume 40, No. 4,
October, 1967, pp. 478-496.
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of change and to the introduction of computer use among the police.
It was their conclusion that two prior conditions were essential
to the initiation of change.
(1) the presence of some sort of tension, (this would tie
in with Knight's conclusions. Past failure would be one
of the major causes of tension); and
(2) a powerful influencing agent, with ultimate power and
authority drawn not only from position, but from expertise
and experience, and personal characteristics and reputation
(e.g., the strong influence of a powerful police chief).
In addition, they outlined four further conditions which
they felt were necessary if initially implemented changes are to
be maintained:
(1) movement from an external motive of change to an
internalized motive (e.g., movement from the police
chief's desire to set up an information system to designing
a system that will provide benefits to the operating
patrolman and detective as well);
(2) movement from more generalized goals and objectives
to those that are more specific and concrete (e.g., move-
ment from the objective of better information in law
enforcement work to the goal of rapid retrieval of infor-
mation regarding outstanding warrants);
(3) movement of those involved from a feeling of self-
doubt and a lower sense of self-esteem to a heightened
sense of self-esteem (e.g., the type of esteem people
feel when they are given new responsibilities and partici-
pate in new decision areas); and
(4) movement from former social ties built around previous
activities to new relationships which support the intended
22
Gene W. Dalton, Louis B. Barnes, Abraham Zaleznik, The
Distribution of Authority in Formal Organizations, Harvard University
Graduate School of Business, Boston, 1968, pp. 100 - 147. They dis-
cussed a structural change, but their basic concepts are applicable
to technological change as well.
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changes in behavior and attitudes. (e.g., the integration
of those involved in implementing computer operations
with the rest of the police department. Social ties and
relationships are important to lasting change, and sometimes
it takes time and effort for a civilian "computer-type"
to cut into the sometimes closed social order of the
police.)
Each of these conditions are important when implementing
computer use in a police organization. The dynamics of change
play an essential role in the application of information technology.
To try to achieve successful implementation without the careful
consideration of behavioral dynamics, is doomed to problems and
unmet expectations. Police departments vary in their effectiveness
in implementing computer applications, and some of these organi-
zational change factors seem particularly important in understanding
such differences.
In fact, it was found in the site visits to police
departments that some departments are far more effective than
others in implementing computer use, even in the area of police
patrol and inquiry where the application is a relatively straight-
forward, structured one. In St. Louis, for example, a real-time
computer system for police patrol and inquiry has been in operation
since 1965. As of the time of the site visit in April, 1971, though,
due to several complications such as having a "second generation"
computer and having only a limited number of terminals available
in the dispatch center (this will be discussed in more detail later
in the chapter) the department had not been able to achieve the
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rapid response time it desired. Instead of being ten seconds,
the average time required to get information back in reply to an
23
inquiry from a policeman in the field was as much as ten minutes.
As a result, slow response had lead to a certain disenchantment
with the system. Only six of fourteen policemen interviewed felt
that the computer had met their expectations.
In Kansas City, on the other hand, a city of similar
size, the computer system was established in 1968. From the
beginning, the major emphasis was placed on the "man in the field"
and in achieving a rapid response to his requests for information.
The objective was achieved, and now replies to inquiries are consis-
tently returned in less than ten seconds. According to the
Assistant Chief of Police the average response may be as low
as three or four seconds. As a consequence, the attitude towards
the computer in Kansas City is remarkably positive. Of twenty-two
policemen interviewed, not a single officer felt that his expectations
had not been met, and in fact, fifteen volunteered their feelings
that the computer had exceeded their expectations.
The effect of the different computer inquiry response time
between the two departments, though, is not only demonstrated
23
Ten minutes was the most often quoted time of response
by the patrolmen that were interviewed and was the average response
time of a small sample of personal test cases while riding patrol
in St. Louis.
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in the attitude of the policemen, but in how often they use the
inquiry potential available to them. In Kansas City the
average number -of inquiries per patrolman on the force was more
than three times as great as the number of inquiries in St. Louis
24(see Figure IV-3). Because the Kansas City Police Department
uses a broader definition of "inquiry" (it includes in its inquiry
count some administrative and demonstration requests) the figure
may be biased slightly upward. However, the difference between
the two departments is still significant. Based on the data
available for the first few months in 1971, the average number of
total operational inquiries per month in St. Louis per policeman
was 33.2. In Kansas City the average number of "operational
inquiries" (in other words not counting any administrative or
demonstration inquiries) per patrolman per month was 76.2, more than
twice as many.
It is useful to examine the factors which seem to be
most important in accounting for such disparities among departments.
In understanding such variations the organizational change factors
discussed above will be particularly relevant.
First, it seems that there is no "school solution" to
successful computer implementation. Each city and police department
24
In 1970, Kansas City had only 959 sworn police officers
while St. Louis had 2,037. However, the policemen in Kansas City
made 1,369,270 real-time inquiries while the policemen in St. Louis
made more than a third less, 818,398. When a determination is made
as to the average number of inquiries per sworn policeman, the dif-
ference is even more striking: 1,427.8 inquiries per policeman in
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must adopt and modify to fit their particular situation and need.
Similarities do exist, however.
Among the nine police departments visited actually using
the computer extensively or having plans to do so in the immediate
future, an evaluation was made of the overall acceptance of computer
implementation, the attitude and understanding of the police
towards computer use, and the problems encountered both past
and present. The purpose was not to evaluate the overall success
of computer use, but simply to identify those departments which
seemed to be particularly effective in implementing the computer
and in achieving the acceptance and use of technology by their men.
The evaluation suggests that the departments can be classified
into three basic groups: two that were unmistakably effective
in terms of acceptance and use as rated by policemen in the
department; four that were performing adequately but for which it
was still too early to determine the ultimate outcome; and three
that were definitely having difficulties by their own admission of
one sort or another.
Based on an analysis of the ICMA survey and interviews and
information from the site visits, six variables seemed particularly
St. Louis compared to 401.8 inquiries per officer in Kansas
City.
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important in determining effective computer use:
(1) The involvement and quality of leadership at the top;
(2) The involvement of other police personnel (and the
ability to bridge the gap between EDP and police);
(3) The emphasis placed on human-computer interaction.
(4) The basic approach and establishment of priorities;
(5) The caliber of computer systems and technical staff; and
(6) The technology available.
A closer examination will indicate that many of them
relate directly to the factors outlined earlier by Dalton, et. al.,
and Knight.
The Involvement and Quality of Leadership at the Top. Police
departments tend to be fairly rigid organizations with well-established
and precise chains of command. Thus, understanding, support,
and involvement of leadership are essential if computers are to
be used to their full potential. When asked in the ICMA survey
who had made the initial proposal to use the computer, more than
half indicated it had been the chief, and seven out of ten said either
the chief or the assistant chief (Table IV-9). However, it is not
sufficient just for the chief to make the initial proposal or
to be in favor of computer use. Dalton's research indicated that
a powerful influencing agent was essential in achieving organi-
zational change. Visits to computer users confirm this conclusion.
The chief (or, at minimum, a very capable top assistant) must fully
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TABLE IV-9
WHO MADE THE INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR COMPUTER USE?
Response
Chief of Police
Asst. Chief or ChiefTs Direct Staff
Data Processing Manager
Planning, Research Director
Other Administrative Officer
Office of Mayor or City Manager
Outside Consultant
Other
Number
Indicating
(A)
60
23
11
15
12
24
9
9
Per cent of
Total Number
Responding
(N=118)*
50.8%
19.5
9.3
12.7
10.2
20.3
7.6
7.6
TOTAL RESPONDING
WHAT STIMULATED THEIR INTEREST?
Professional Meetings
Journals or Wr:itten Reports
Activity in other Cities, States
Computer Salesman
Outside Consultants
FBI Crime Reporting
IACP Department Surveys
Federal Assistance
Other
TOTAL RESPONDING
*Of 146 departments using computers, 118 responded to
tMultiple responses possible.
AOf 146 departments using computers, 111 responded to
this question.
this question
163t 138.0t
42
29
72
8
14
19
17
16
15
232t
(N=lll)A
37.8%
26.1
64.9
7.2
12.6
17.1
15.3
14.4
13.5
208.8t
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understand and be involved in the operation and implications of
computer applicatons. In the most effective police departments this
understanding and involvement was obvious.
For example, in Kansas City, two thirds of the patrolmen
interviewed (sixteen out of twenty-four) felt that the involvement
of their chief and assistant chief had been so crucial that they
volunteered their opinion on this subject without direct question-
ing. The civilian manager of the department's computer system
strongly believes that if the computer system is judged a success,
all credit must go to the two top administrators of the depart-
ment. His words are "never in my twenty-five years of experience
in data processing have I had such strong support. The depart-
ment's computer program could not have been successful in the face
25
of many tribulations, without their backing."
The Involvement of Other Police Personnel. Involvement
of the chief is a necessary condition for success, but it is not
sufficient. Police at the operating level must also be involved
in the design and development of computer systems. As Dalton
maintained there must be movement from an external motive of change
to an internalized motive, and new social ties and relationships
must be established. In Dayton, Ohio, the data processing manager,
25
"The Kansas City Missouri Police Department", an unpub-
lished statement by Alan Westin, Columbia University, on the Kansas
City Police Department Computer System, 1971. Westin's statement
was given to the author by Mr. Mel Bockelman, Manager, Kansas City
Police Department computer facilities.
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who was also a policeman, put it this way: "You can train a
policeman to be a programmer, but you can't train a programmer to
be a policeman." Police officers can be suspicious of outsiders
and change, so methods must be divised to bridge the gap between
EDP and police and to effectively merge the data processing opera-
tion with the rest of the department . When the computer operation
was instituted in Kansas City, eight policemen were selected through
a series of special tests to become programmers and systems experts.
In order to cultivate and maintain their interest, a special
technical pay scale was introduced. Throughout the department,
sworn personnel would refer to the involvement of these eight
policemen as one of the keys to success.
In St. Louis, the situation was somewhat different. Efforts
had been made to try to involve policemen in the computer operation
but in general they had not met with success. Some of the "systems
staff" within the department felt that one of the reasons they
had not succeeded was because the St. Louis department had not
authorized a special technical pay scale for police data processors
as they had done in Kansas City. As a result, they found that
once policemen were trained in data processing, they would realize
that their earning potential was somewhat higher and would begin
to think about looking elsewhere for work. For example, one of
the patrolmen who worked in data processing eventually gave up his
commission as a policeman in order to earn a higher salary. He
186.
design by the police and programming by civilian personnel, has
proven to be a very viable one.
The Emphasis Placed on Human-Computer Interaction. Sometimes
people will think of the computer as a replacement for man. This
is both unrealistic and inefficient. One of the most critical
variables for the efficient and effective operation of any computer
system is the development of a proper balance in the interaction
between man and machine.
For example, in St. Louis the real-time system was established
to provide rapid response to the man in the field. However, the
method established for retrieving information from the computer
was inefficient. The patrolman would call in to the dispatcher
and make a request for information, say, on whether a car was
stolen. The dispatcher would write this down and hand it to a
terminal operator who would query the computer. The time taken
for the operator to get a reply from the computer was seldom more
than thirty seconds, and often faster. However, the terminal
operator was servicing several dispatchers, so a line or queue
would often form and a delay would result. Once the terminal opera-
tor received a response he would write it down and hand it back to
the dispatcher, who in turn would contact the patrolman. The
result- -a ten minute wait and sometimes more for the patrolman
in the street. To him the system was not much better than the
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still remained on working in the data processing section of the
St. Louis police department, but as a civilian employee earning a
higher salary than he had been earning as a commissioned police
officer. This switch was looked on with disfavor in the eyes of
many policemen, and actually probably added to the gap in the
raltions between EDP personnel and the police.
This is not to say that the only way to succeed is for
policemen to become programmers. Clearly the actual technical
task of programming can be performed by a civilian or someone who
is unfamiliar with police work. However, the full potential of
the computer in police operations may not be realized until
sworn personnel are intimately involved in the design and develop-
ment of computer application (and as Dalton said, there is a
movement of those involved from a feeling of self doubt and lower
sense of self-esteem to a heightened sense of self-esteem).
In Los Angeles the Police Department has evolved a very
successful working relationship with the City Data Service Bureau.
The city owns the computer, but a number of police officers work
in what is called the Advanced Systems Development Section of the
Police Department where the major systems analysis and design of
computer applications is carried out. In turn, the Data Service
Bureau appoints a "task force" of technical people who work with
the Advanced Systems Section and are responsible for the programming
and technical aspects of each application. This combination of
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manual operation the department had before.
In direct contrast to this are the systems in both Kansas
City and Los Angeles where the dispatcher has a video terminal
directly in front of him. While a request is being made he is
entering the information into the computer. Response is almost
instantaneous, and the dispatcher relays it immediately to the
officer in the field. The result- -a five to ten second response
and an extremely satisfied policeman (to say nothing of the
citizen who only has to wait for ten seconds instead of ten
minutes).
The machine will not replace the human element in police
operations, and just because something can be automated it is not
a clear sign that it should be. If we are to utilize the computer
fully as an aid in law enforcement work, more time must be spent
on working out the best relationship between man and technology
to obtain the optimum performance from both.
The Basic Approach and Establishment of Priorities. The
basic approach to computer applications and the process of deter-
mining priorities plays an important role in achieving success.
The most effective formula for those who want to implement a
computer is to start with a specific definable product which has
not been oversold, do a good job, and from that point add from one
item of success to another. As Dalton explained, there is a
need to move from general goals to those that are more specific
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or concrete. For example, once beginning computer use, Kansas
City and Los Angeles both set out early to move from general compu-
ter goals of efficiency and effectiveness to the more specific
task of helping the "man in the street" by providing almost instant
response to inquiries on wanted cars, property, persons, dangerous
suspects, etc. Because this first step was accomplished so well,
the atmosphere in both departments is now conducive to major
technical innovations in administration and management; and numerous
other applications are under way.
In St. Louis, on the other hand, one of the initial
efforts of the computer operation was to establish a real-time
capability. However, due to the various complications discussed
earlier, retrieval time remained in minutes rather than seconds,
and the expectations of the patrolmen were not met. The priority
was placed, but the objective was never quite accomplished.
Other departments have put their initial focus more on
housekeeping details (e.g., payroll, personnel) or on areas that
have less direct positive utility for the patrolman in the field
(e.g., resource, and patrol allocation). As a result, the
enthusiasm about the computer in these departments has seemed to
be far lower than in Kansas City and Los Angeles. For example, in
Denver there was initially a great enthusiasm for the computer
among the police department. However, according to many of the
policemen interviewed, the city seemed to emphasize use of the
computer for administrative and housekeeping applications,
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particularly those that would increase the city's revenue. This
city/police department relationship was a disappointment to the
police, and for some of them had resulted in a major dampening
of their original enthusiasm.
The Caliber of Computer Systems and Technical Staff. A
good data processing man makes an important difference, whether
the computer is controlled by the police department or by the city.
He must be an individual with technical skills and a perspective
broad enough to allow him to communicate with the police department
and to envision the uses and impacts of various applications. In
order to obtain such individuals, a city or police department
must be willing to pay competitive wages.
As in mst of the other factors, though, this condition
for success seems to be a necessary, but not sufficient one. In
most of the cities visited the data processing people were qualified
and hard-working. Some were more effective or farther along
than others, though, primarily because of the circumstances
surrounding the other five factors currently under consideration
in this portion of the report.
The Technology Available. It was found that the technology
utilized affected performance, although this may seem like a state-
ment of the obvious. It makes sense that a third generation
computer with integrated circuits would perform with better speed
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and precision than a transistorized second generation machine with
a tendency to break down often because of age. Beyond that, though,
it can also be demonstrated that better technology can lead to in-
creased use. This does not mean that expensive harcare is
always best in every situation, or that it will pay to purchase more
machinery. What it does mean, though, is that only a careful
benefit/cost analysis can suggest the appropriate level of tech-
nology for a given department.
St. Louis is a striking example of the change which can
occur through the use of new technology. When the site visit was
made there the police department was using a second generation
computer (an IBM 7040). However, they were in the process of
shifting to a third generation machine (IBM 360/50) and to switching
from using "teletype" and "typewriter" terminals to video display
CRT terminals which are faster, easier, and more "fun" to use,
and naturally more expensive. Conversion turned out to be more
difficult than expected, but by the fall of 1971, the system was
operational. In a six week period after the system was first
operational (from Octcber 6, 1971 to November 17, 1971) there was
a remarkable rise in the number of inquiries made of the St. Louis
real-time computer system. Figure IV-4 plots this climb from
6,008 inquiries in the week of October 6, 1971 to 18, 744 inquiries
in the week of November 17, 1971, a three hundred percent increase
in a matter of six weeks. After that time the number of inquiries
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made of the system each week has seemed to level off, increasing
slightly from 18,000, but at a much slower rate.
One point of clarification should be made regarding these
numbers, though. In the first part of 1971 the average number of
inquiries made of the system was 33.2 per man per month. During
the process of converting from the second generation to the
third generation computer system, this average rate must have
slipped. During the week of October 6, 1971 there were only
6,008 inquiries as mentioned earlier. If this rate of inquiry
would have continued for an entire month there would only have
been 12.5 inquiries per policeman per month, well below the average
in the first part of 1971. By the week of November 18, 1971 the
number of inquiries had climbed to 18,744 or calculated on a
monthly average basis 38.9 inquiries per patrolman per month.
Therefore, in order to really determine the rise achieved through
the introduction of more advanced technology, the average inquiry
rate as of November 11th, 38.9, should be compared not only with
the average as of October 6th, 12.5, but with the average during
the first part of 1971, 33.2. In that case, the rise from 33.2
inquiries/man/month to 38.9 inquiries/man/month, or a rise of
17.2%, is not nearly so dramatic. Still a 17.2% increase is
significant, and it does demonstrate that benefits can be achieved
through the use of improved technology.
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SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURED COMPUTER APPLICATIONS
As we have seen, the primary benefits from structured
police computer applications are technical ones as defined by
Anthony Downs- -technical improvements from better data inputs,
processing, and outputs which bring such advantages as improved
information, greater speed of processing, greater consistency of
output, and wider distribution of data. From a benefit cost
perspective, specific illustrations have been shown where these
technical improvements have resulted in monetary returns which
exceeded their costs, although the utility of such applications
varies from police department to police department, and a number
of organizational behavioral and technical factors influence the
successful implenmentation of automation. It has even been shown
that some structured applications- -particularly applications for
police patrol and inquiry- -can improve the law enforcement capability
of the police. If one is willing to measure improvements in police
service to the public in terms of number of arrests, number of
apprehensions, number of record checks, number of traffic tickets
issued, etc., then we may say at this point that computer use
can improve police service.
However, as discussed in Chapter I, there is still a great
deal of question regarding what the task of the police should be.
In the eyes of many, the emphasis should be on the enforcement
of the law, and to them the indicators listed above are appropriate
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measures of police activity. For others, though, the task of
the police should be redirected from law enforcement to order
maintenance and to carrying out such soft activities as improving
relations with the community and serving as a social agent. To them
the use of the indicators above fall short of being appropriate.
To the extent that the use of the computer reinforces those indi-
cators, then such technology may also have a similar biasing
influence on the police. True, if the computer saves the police-
man time in carrying out law enforcement activities, it is possible
that he then will be able to spend the hours that have been freed
working in non law enforcement functions. However, the fear is
that additional time will not be used in this manner, but will
simply serve to reinforce a direction which has already been
overemphasized.
In other words, then, it is appropriate to say that the use
of the computer in structured applications such as police patrol
and inquiry improve police service as long as one believes that the
service which the police are presently performing is the appro-
priate one.. Computer applications may improve such services,
but they do not change the basic assumptions upon which police
departments operate. Whether or not they should and what their
impact may ultimately be will be one of the subjects of Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER V
AN EVALUATION OF UNSTRUCTURED APPLICATIONS:
THE USE OF THE COMPUTER AS A "THINKER"
Chapter IV has been devoted to a discussion and evaluation
of computer use by the police in application areas which tend to
be of a routine or structured nature. There is another group
of computer applications, though, where use tends to be more
complex. In this "unstructured" area attempts are made to use
the machine as a tool for decision-making, strategic planning
and for man-machine interaction. Examples of this type of application
are computer resource allocation, criminal investigation, and
police dispatch.
In the unstructured realm it is far more complex to program
a response that will be appropriate to changing life situations.
Each situation is slightly different and needs vary. The decision
as to which police car to dispatch varies depending on type of
crime, the location of available cars, and the street patterns be-
tween the incident and the car to be assigned. Programming a
computer to recognize criminal patterns is a complex process requiring
large amounts of background information. The allocation of police
resources must be based on some formulation of criteria, but the
appropriate criteria varies depending upon the aspects of the police
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task chosen to be emphasized.
In order to computerize an unstructured problem, determining
factors and alternatives must be made explicit and some value must
be placed on each. An attempt must be made to so well define and
simplify an unstructured situation so that it can be treated as
a structured one. However, it must always be remembered that the
situation still remains unstructured. In order to program the
machine assumptions must be made, and naturally these assumptions
will bias results. Further in unstructured areas such as allocating
police resources, investigating crime and in dispatching patrolmen,
there are a number of behavioral and organizational factors that
must be considered. These factors will complicate the process of
"structuring the unstructured", and in some cases it must be
realized that every decision cannot be programmed, at least in the
short run.
As this chapter will show, the use of the computer in such
unstructured areas has sometimes fallen short of expectations. One
of the reasons for this is "oversell". The state of the art as
portrayed in the literature or in written reports is often more
sophisticated than it is in real life. In other cases (and this
really applies to practically all unstructured applications)
experimentation is still underway, and it is still simply too
early to tell what the actual benefits or ultimate potential might
be.
Unstructured applications differ from more routine or
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structured uses in the type of benefits they may have. Recalling
from Chapter III, Anthony Downs distinguished between two types of
payoffs, technical and power. Technical benefits were defined as
improvements in the processing of data inputs and outputs, thus
resulting in greater speed precision, consistency, wider distri-
bution of information, etc. Power benefits refer to a redistri-
bution of the advantages of decision-making, a shift in one person's
decision-making effectiveness made at the expense of another's.
With this in mind, the benefits of routine uses are primarily
technical. Unstructured uses also provide technical payoffs- -for
example, better information for investigating crime, distributing
policemen, etc. However, there is a greater potential for
unstructured applications to result in power payoffs than structured
ones. Real-time systems result in rapid response and are widely
accepted in police departments, but they do not alter the basic
operations and decision processes of police organizations. On the
other hand, new methods of allocating resources may have a much more
significant impact by bringing greater control to the top levels
of police organization. In fact, automated allocation tied to some
advanced forms of computer aided dispatch which have been proposed
could conceivably have a strong influence in altering the entire
process of delivering police services if they ever come about. Such
influences will not be felt immediately, but the potential is there.
One of the primary topics of Chapter VI will be to discuss
the potential of these power payoffs. The remainder of this chapter
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will be devoted to describing some of the unstructured computer
applications underway in various police departments around the
country and in making an initial evaluation. In particular, the
chapter will deal with whether or not such applications really
work, discuss how well they are accepted, explain some of the
major problems and conflicts of their implementation, and evaluate
the possibility of improved police efficiency (narrowly defined).
Applications to be examined will include criminal investi-
gation, computer aided command and control, and police resource
allocation.
THE COMPUTER AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
The use of the computer for criminal investigation is a
relatively new application. To date there has been little use in
this area, but according to the ICMA survey this will change
dramatically in the future. Only 3.8% of all computer applications
reported in response to the ICMA questionnaire were in the area of
criminal investigation. In fact, departments were given the
opportunity to indicate if they had installed applications in any
of three possible investigative areas- -automated field interrogation
reports, modus operandi files, or fingerprint files. Only 13.9%
of the police departments reporting computer use indicated they
had automated field interview reports, only 9% that they had any
sort of modus operandi system, and only 4.9% that they had any
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computerized fingerprint search capability.
However, according to estimates by these same departments
as to applications that will be installed in the next three years,
there will be a remarkable switch in the situation by 1974. 47.5%
of the police departments surveyed predicted they will have automated
field interview reports, 51.6% will have nmodus operandi capability,
and 30.3% will have some type of fingerprint search system.
(See Table V-1.) The overall increase in applications is
particularly dramatic, a rise of 464.7%. The percentage of all
computer applications being in the criminal investigation area will
climb from 3.8% to 14.2%.
In the visits to police departments three general applica-
tion areas related to investigation seemed to be most significant:
field interview reports, modus operandi files, and applications to
directly aid the process of detective work and the management
of investigation. Each will be covered in turn.
AUTOMATED FIELD INTERVIEW REPORTS
Police use field interview reports (FIR's) as a means of
collecting information or people or groups of people who are stopped
and "interviewed" by policemen in the field. The idea is that this
information may someday be helpful in locating a wanted subject
by having access in the field interview report file to such
information as his address, where he is employed, his habits and
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his associates.
When a policeman is on patrol, he may stop a person or
a group of people behaving suspiciously or suspected of committing
a crime. After talking to them the officer may decide not to make
an arrest. Nevertheless, he will fill out a field interview
report with as much information as possible to indicate that a
particular person was in the area, what he was doing, etc. This
report is often on a card with multiple parts. Under a manual
system one copy is usually filed at the local police station and
other copies are sent to the central headquarters. If it is later
learned that a crime was committed in that same area at around the
same time, this person or group of persons will become possible
suspects, particularly if a description matches or if they have
a previous record indicating a tendancy towards the type of crime
committed. Such field interview report files have been automated
in order to provide far more rapid retrieval and for inquiry based
on a wide variety of variables.
In the site visits it was found that both St. Louis and
Los Angeles have automated field interview report (FIR) systems,
and both departments seemed to be well satisfied. For example,
St. Louis's system became operational March 4, 1968. Prior to the
use of automated file the department had utilized a 5 x 8 three-
part form prepared by the officer in the field. One copy was filed
in the local section and the other two were taken to the central
office where one was filed according to the location where the
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interview was held and the other alphabetically. In essence
there were only two ways to access the file, by name and by
location. With the automated system forms are filled out in the
field and then sent to the Department Data Processing Division
to be checked for completeness, coded, keypunched, and entered
into the automated file. Whereas there were only two ways to
access the FIR file under the manual system, name and location,
now there are many. For example, such items as name, geographic
area by either block or larger region, age, height, physical
description, striking features, clothing attire, etc., can all be
used as indicators to query the file. A disk file is used to
keep the most current three months of information for immediate
access, and after three months, field interview reports are re-
moved from the disk file and placed on magnetic tape. Access to
the disk file is on a real-time basis with terminals in each of
the precinct police stations to use for inquiry. If an officer
wishes to query the older FIR's on magnetic tape, he may initiate
a background check.
Initial success seems to be an important factor in helping
to stimulate widespread use of the FIR file. In St. Louis, the
Homicide Division of the police department highly praised the
computer on the grounds that it had helped tremendously in per-
forming their investigative work, particularly through the use of
the FIR file. The lieutenant in charge of the Homicide Division
reported that prior to their first success, they were really
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uninterested in the computer. However, soon after the FIR file
was automated an elderly lady was murdered during the evening. As
the criminal was leaving the premises, her son came into the house
and caught a glimpse of a man with an army jacket slipping away.
After several weeks of investigation, every clue seemed to
disappear. Finally, they decided to check the FIR file, with
the only indicator for inquiry being the description of a man
in an army jacket. As luck would have it, a field interview report
had been taken from a man in an army jacket in the same area
several nights before. With nothing else to go on, they decided
to check it out, and gradually things began to fall into pace.
Eventually, after several months of investigation, the man who
had been in the area admitted to the crime. To the detectives
in the Homicide Division this was a real indication that the FIR
file could help them in their work. Naturally, every case did
not work so smoothly, but the automated file had provided them
with a place to go to look for clues when all else had failed.
A somewhat similar situation was found to be the case in
Los Angeles. An interview with one of the detectives responsible
for establishing the department.'s on-line AFI file (Automated
Field Interview file) indicated that the initial proposal to
establish the system was not approved immediately by the administra-
tion in the department. Only after several attempts was the system
finally approved. Further, once the system was established,
better than ninety days passed without any positive results.
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People began to wonder whether it would work or not. Finally,
the automated field interview file was instrumental in providing
the lead in solving a "bank job". From then on, the use and
credibility of the system increased. In his estimation and in the
estimation of several Los Angeles police officers, the AFI had
exceeded their initial hopes and expectations. Once a resevoir of
information was established, regular "hits" became the rule rather
than the exception.
MODUS OPERANDI FILES
Modus operandi files are related to field interview
reports, but they are far more intricate and complex. The basic
idea is that when people perform crimes time and again they will
often follow the same pattern of behavior. They will break in a
window the same way, will steal only certain items, etc. If
the characteristics of various crimes committed can be recorded
in an automated file, it may be possible to ask the computer to
search for common patterns. If such patterns are discovered,
crimes may be. liked to the- same- person or the same. group of persons,
and additional clues may be gathered. If a certain pattern of
crimes begins to occur, that pattern may be traced to see if it
had appeared before. If so, the same person may be responsible
for the current outbreak who was arrested a few years earlier for
a similar set of offenses. Further, if a person admits to one
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crime, a modus operandi file may be utilized to see if there were
any similar crimes conmritted earlier in different locations. When
presented with the appropriate dates and places, the suspect
may admit to additional infractions, thus providing the means for
clearing unsolved cases.
In the law enforcement community there is some disagree-
ment over the potential of such automated modus operandi systems.
A number of people are skeptical, at least at the present time.
For example, one official of the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration who was interviewed after spending several months traveling
to various state and local police departments to examine computer
systems, was generally pessimistic regarding such computer use.
Based on his experiences, the efforts which had been attempted so
far had been underway for several years, but very few results
had been achieved. Naturally, it takes several years to build up
a necessary backlog of information, but even then, the subtleties
and intricacies are so great that to go beyond the obvious is
difficult. Certain kinds of crimes seem to attract similar
behavior, for example, sex offenders. However, the recognition
of these patterns is usually fairly simple, certainly not requiring
a computer.
The only police department visited that had modus operandi
files in operation was Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment (LAPD) have been working on their PATRIC System (Pattern
Recognition and Information Correlation) for a number of years,
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but real testing and experimentation just began in 1971. Working
with a consultant, they had just started to test the system on
an experimental basis at the time of the site visit for this paper.
The basic purpose of the system is to provide tactical information
derived from crime and crime-related reports for use by the investi-
gative and patrol personnel of the department.
"The basic information within PATRIC will include:
the suspects and their trademarks; the premises attached;
weapons used; the date, time, and day of week; and the
suspect's physical description; personal oddities; and
any vehicle descriptions. PATRIC will correlate these
crime-event components to isolate crimes which seem
to be committed by one person, then list potential
suspects. Planned comparisons of the description of
stolen property records with pawn shop records will also
bolster the Depart ent's capability to recover and return
stolen property. "
Most people within the Los Angeles police department
were enthusiastic towards the PATRIC system. In fact, the civilian
director of the Los Angeles Data Service Bureau, perhaps one of
the best municipal computer operations in the country, felt that
the PATRIC system in the long run had a greater potential for
impact on the way police operations are performed than any of
the other computer operations which were currently being installed.
Since the evidence is still not in, only time will show whether or
not his feelings are valid.
1
LAPD and Computers, publication produced by the Los
Angeles Police Department, Advanced Systems Development Section,
Advanced Planning Division, 1970-71, p. 31.
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COMPUTER 'USE 'FOR'DETECTIVE WORK AND THE MANAGEENT OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION
As indicated earlier, greater emphasis will be placed on
the use of the computer for criminal investigation over the
next few years. However, Tulsa, Oklahoma is an illustration of a
police department that is already putting primary stress on
criminal investigation computer applications. In an interview
with the police lieutenant responsible for data processing in the
department, he made it clear that one of the department's main
focuses was to develop a real-time, on-line system to aid police
investigators so that the detective could sit down at a video
terminal and have rapid inquiry and access to past arrest records,
field interviews, current records of stolen property, crime patterns,
etc. In keeping with this emphasis, when the Captain of the
Detective Division was asked what he felt the greatest impact of
the computer would be, he replied without hesitation, "as an
investigative aid."
Many of the applications in Tulsa are still being designed
and/or implemented, so it is too early to determine what the outcome
of their focus will be. Still, it is interesting to briefly
describe some of their proposed applications. First, they have
already transferred to a complete microfilm system for keeping
their basic arrest records. Hard copies of reports are maintained
for some time before being destroyed, but primarily for court and
short term transitional purposes. If a detective is interested
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in examining an arrest record in the future, he will utilize a
microfilm machine with search capability operated from various
remote locations. Records from within the microfilm system will
be displayed on video terminals, and if hard copies are desired,
they can be made. The eventual idea will be to use these microfilm
records along with the computer in order to provide a very valuable
technological aid to the investigative function. At the time
of the site visit, arrest records dating back to 1913 were being
coded and keypunched in order to be placed in the computer file,
so that the investigator would have rapid access to their contents
based on a number of different retrieval parameters. Perhaps going
back to 1913 is too much due to excessive time and dollars ex-
pended, but the basic idea is to provide a valuable data base of
information which can be made available for rapid inquiry and
search. With this system implemented, search will not only be
along narrow lines as to whether a particular car has been
stolen or if a particular person has an outstanding warrant. Instead,
this would provide for a search of an investigative nature and would
include such inquiry as to whether a person was accompanied by
associates when arrested, whether those associates had a previous
criminal record, and whether a male with dark hair and a scar
above his left eye had been arrested in the south part of town
within the last six months, etc. Just as the computer now has been
designed in a number of cities to provide rapid inquiry to aid the
man in the street, efforts are being made in Tulsa to design the
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system so it will have a main benefit for police investigation.
Long Beach, California is another city where thought is
being given to use of the computer for police investigation.
There it is envisioned that automation may eventually change the
whole way cases for investigation are assigned and followed up
on. Both the lieutenant in charge of the detective division and
a sergeant in the research and planning department who was very
heavily involved in the computer operations in the department
referred to the fact that it was their eventual goal for cases
to be assigned to investigators through the use of the computer.
The idea was that all available information regarding the case
would be placed into the machine. Then based on the nature of
the crime, the probability of solution, and the current workload
within the department, priorities would be assigned, and specific
cases would be allocated to each detective. Also, it might be
possible to have a tentative number of hours assigned for a
preliminary investigation. If nothing was turned up within that
time, then active pursuit would be dropped. To some this may
sound a bit extreme, but to the head of the detective division it
provided hope that someday the means would be available for
"assigning cases on a truly professional basis". Currently, detec-
tives have to decide themselves which cases will receive priority.
A number are followed upon primarily for political reasons. Use
of the computer would provide a management tool for criminal
investigation that would "allow us to tell others just exactly what
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we were doing and why". In a paper prepared by Sergeant J. E. Lance
2
and C. N. Lloyd, "Proposed Investigative Information System" a
flow chart comparison is made between the existing investigative
process and the one which they propose using a computerized infor-
mation system. The differences are shown between Figures V-1 and
V-2.
Although the Long Beach Police Department had no actual
plans to automate the process of allocating criminal investigation
cases, efforts were underway to provide an effective automated
field interview system which would tie into former arrest records
and to provide rapid inquiry access to information in traffic
citation files as a means of investigative support. (In other words,
if the location of a man by the name of John P. Jones was desired,
past traffic citations would be searched to see if a John P. Jones
had ever received such a ticket, and if so what type of a car
had he been driving and what was his address at the time.) Such
improvements should be fully implemented within the next few years,
and then perhaps more dramatic innovations will be made.
In conclusion, then, a number of ideas have been proposed
and are being developed to use the computer as a tool for criminal
investigation in the future. However, any sort of an evaluation
of the efforts so far is almost impossible since most of them are
still in conceptualization or experimental stages. Field interview
2
Paper prepared by C. N. Lloyd and J. E. Lance for a univer-
sity course which they had taken.
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reports have received fairly wide use and in general are reported
to be quite effective. Still, their application is really fairly
routine, particularly compared to some of the more "innovative"
ideas which are proposed. In general, this author is skeptical
about the use of the computer for modus operandi activities, at
least in the near future. However, other investigative uses such
as applications for more widespread investigative search (as in
Tulsa), and uses for administration and control seem well on
their way, and it seems that the potential exists for the computer
to have a fairly major impact in the area of criminal investigation,
although it is still five or ten years in the future.
COMPUTER AIDED DISPATCH FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL
The term command and control stems from military termin-
ology and stands for the planning, direction and control of
operations. In the context of police work, the term applies to
the process of identifying required service (either through
citizen calls or through detection by a policeman) and in allo-
cating and dispatching patrol officers to respond. In the broad
sense, the term applies not only to controlling and directing
current operations, but to planning for future operational needs
as well. The computer has been identified as a possible tool to
aid in the command and control process and in dispatching police-
men to respond to calls for service. This section of the paper will
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introduce some of the applications which have been started in this
area and will discuss some of the primary considerations which
such computer uses raise. However, it first seems appropriate to
briefly elaborate on the present command and control operation of
the police and how this relates to the basic process of apprehending
suspects.
The apprehension process can be viewed as a sequence of
actions which are taken in response to the supposed commission
3
of a crime:
(1) The crime is detected either by a policeman, a patrol,
an alarm device, and/or a victim or another citizen.
(2) Information about the crime is communicated to the
police, usually by telephone, or if the crime is
spotted by a policeman the information is transmitted
via radio to central communications center.
(3) An appropriate police response (e.g., choosing a
patrol car to send to the scene, or sending additional
cars) is selected.
(4) The assignment or "dispatch order" is communicated
to the patrol force, usually by voice radio.
(5) The appropriate patrol cars travel to the scene.
(6) A search is conducted for the perpetuator of the
crime (either a "hot" search at the crime scene, a
"warm" search in the general vicinity of the crime,
or a "cold" investigative search by officers or
plainclothes investigators).
3
For a similar listing of the steps involved in the appre-
hension process, see Task Force Report: The Police, The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 58. The
listing in this paper does not follow the one in the task force
report exactly, but it is similar.
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(7) Throughout the search, suspects appear and have to be
checked out.
(8) If the search is successful, the criminal is captured
and evidence to support a charge is assembled.
This sequential process is depicted graphically in Figure V-3.
The current police conmand and control operations relate
closely to this apprehension process. In most police departments,
the focal point is a central communications center. Here citizen
calls are received usually by a complaint clerk who answers phone
calls in the order which they come in. If the clerk decides that
a car should be dispatched, he writes the information down on a
complaint card (often an IBM card designed to be keypunched later
for data processing purposes), and sends it on to the dispatcher.
Some method usually exists to indicate real emergency cases, and
often the dispatcher is advised directly by switching him into the
telephone conversation (although this happens only on rare
occasions). The dispatcher then determines which car to assign,
dealing first with those cases where some indication of high priority
has been placed on the dispatch card. In making such an assign-
ment the dispatcher must determine the precise location of the
call, the status of patrol cars in the vicinity, and the actual
location of these cars (under current technology the dispatcher
knows the beat to which a car is assigned- -generally a radius of
1 to 4 miles- -but he does not know where within the assigned
beat the car is located or if the car is actually even within that
beat at that moment). Since the dispatcher doesn't know the
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precise location of each car, in an emergency situation, the
call may be broadcast to all units so that all those within a
suitable distance will go to the announced call, thus providing
a method of bringing the closest car to the call as quickly as
possible. However, the result is often to also divert additional
cars unnecessarily. Once the dispatch order is acknowledged by a
car in the field, the dispatcher will time-stamp the card and
update the status board, often by simply placing the dispatch card
in the appropriate slot in the "active call tray".
Realizing that a number of variations exist in each
department to the operations of the communications center des-
cribed above, it is still clear that a number of problems exist
in current police command and control operations:
- A great deal of information flows through the information
center, but it is difficult to rapidly retrieve this
information when it is needed.
- The location (and sometimes status) of cars is only
crudely identified.
- It takes time to process a call through the communications
center; the delay caused can be significant. (For example,
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice studied the response time to calls for
service in the city of Los Angeles. It was found that it
took 1.5 minutes for a priority call and 5.9 minutes for
a nonpriority call to be processed through the communi-
cations center. It was further found that patrol cars take
an average of 3.8 and 6.8 minutes to reach the scene of
priority and nonpriority calls, respectively. Thus, the
communication center accounts for 28.3% to 46.7% of the
time involved between when the police receive a call and
and actual response arrives at the scene. )4
4
Task Force Report: Science and Technology, The President's
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- Radio spectrum congestion problems exist in most large
cities.
- Great variability of command and control is found between
police departments, no guidelines for improvement exist,
and little or no research to obtain such. guidelines to de-
sign and operate a communications center seems to be under-
way.
As a result of these problems suggestions for computer
applications to help provide aid in this command and control pro-
cess of assigning and dispatching cars have been favorably
received by many people in the law enforcement community. Based
on a preliminary examination, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended that "an
experimental program to develop a computer-assisted command-and-
5
control system should be established with Federal support."
The commission also reported on a preliminary survey of
over 4,700 calls for service in Los Angeles. In that study it
was found that of 1,905 crimes examined 482 (25% resulted in
arrests or other clearances with 50% of the 482 actually involving
arrests. More than half of these arrests were made within eight
hours of the crime, and almost two-thirds within the first week.
Further, if an arrest was not made at the scene of the crime, it
was found that identification of the suspect at the scene was
almost essential to making an arrest. "Of the 482 cleared cases
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 22.
5
Task Force Report: The Police, Op.Cit., p. 28.
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63 percent involved 'named suspects'. In the 1,556 cases without
named suspects, only 181 (or 12 percent) were solved later by
6
arrest." The Commnission concluded that although additional
studies were needed to establish the relationship between response
time and apprehension rate, the data from the survey seemed to
indicate that response time was an important factor in apprehension.
Thus, the use of the computer to help speed this response time
7
was recommended.
Answers by police departments to the questionnaire sent
out by the ICMA indicate that a significant increase in such
computer application will occur in the next three years. In
1971, 10 of 122 police departments or 8.2% indicated that they
had some form of computer aided dispatch. According to police
department estimates, by 1974 this number will rise to 61, an
increase of 610%. Although it is difficult to interpret this
6
Task Force Report: The Police, Op. Cit., p. 58.
7
See also, Task Force Report: Science and Technology, Op. cit.,
p. 93. After comparing data relating overall response time in
minutes to percent of arrests, the report made the following state-
ment of conclusion: "while this evidence does not imply that
faster response time will result in more arrests, (only a controlled
experiment designed specifically to test this hypothesis would be
conclusive proof) it does appear to support the view and tends to
reinforce our intuition about rapid response time being significant
in police effectiveness. The results of this analysis seem to
imply that both communication center delay and field response
delay should be minimized."
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prediction exactly since no precise definition was given in the
survey of "computer aided dispatch", it does clearly indicate that
the use of the computer in the command and control operations of
the police is on the rise.
However, just because police departments indicate a growing
use of computer aided command and control, it does mean that the
potential and impact of such applications is all positive. First,
response time is the sum of the times for all of the factors in
the apprehension process illustrated in Figure V-3. Although the
data obtained by the President"s Commission indicated that
processing time in the commrrunications center accounted for 28.3%
to 46.7% of the time involved once a call was received by the
police, it must be remembered that time is also involved in
detecting a crime and reporting it to the police. This means that
dispatch time is only one part of overall response time. To
automate this dispatch process will result in a number of both
monetary and behavioral costs. Whether the benefits really justify
this cost still remains to be seen, particularly until the rela-
tionship between response time and apprehension rate is more
fully established. Further, automated dispatching does not
automatically result in more rapid response time. In fact, in
at least one city, Tulsa, just the opposite is predicted (see
the discussion which follows). Finally, before an ultimate con-
clusion can be reached regarding the actual utility of computerized
command and control, a number of technical and behavioral issues
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must be resolved. Sometimes there is a tendancy to introduce
technology just because the mechanical capability to do so
seems to exist. In the view of this athor,this temptation
should be resisted, particularly when it comes to accepting
computer aided dispatching as being an a priori good.
SOME ILLUSTRATIONS OF COMPUTER AIDED COMMAND AND CONTROL
Based on both the site visits and the literature, there
seems to be a wide spectrum in the actual applications and pro-
posals which exist for various computer aided command and control
systems. The range varies from systems which simply keep track
of and provide rapid recall for various decisions which are still
made by a human dispatcher, to systems designed to mechanically
track the location of each patrol vehicle and to entirely automate
the dispatch operation. Examples will be drawn from the site
visits of proposals at various points along the spectrum. It
should be made clear at the outset, though, that although a
quick review of the literature might at first glance indicate
that progress was farther along, practically all such applications
in the United States are sill in the conceptual, experimental,
or developmental stages.
The "Conservative" End of the Spectrum. Perhaps the best
illustration from the site visits at the more conservative end
of the spectrum (as opposed to the fully automated, "space age"
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end), is the system which is currently being established in the
Tulsa police department. The system is known as TULCAD (Tulsa
Computer Assisted Dispatching). Its objective is "to improve
the effectiveness of law enforcement by providing a centralized and
integrated information center for the deployment and control of
8
police manpower and vehicles."
The system will operate in the following manner. A call
for service will be received and if a response seems warranted,
it will be passed on to the dispatcher. The dispatcher in turn
will have a computer video terminal in front of him. He will
type in the complaint address on the terminal and will enter
this and other necessary data into the computer. Based on a
geocoding system or "map in the mind of the computer", the
computer will look up the location of the complaint and will
determine which patrol car beat is the closest. It will then
indicate the prime unit to be assigned to respond to the call,
and the four best alternative possibilities. The system does not
have a mechanical car locator; therefore, the computer will simply
choose the prime candidate for dispatch by looking for the
car from the closest beat where a car is available. The four best
alternatives will be determined in a similar manner. The dis-
patcher will then assign a car, either following the "recommendation"
of the computer or making a selection of his own. Once the car
TULCAD System Design, prepared by the Police Department
and the Management Planning and Systems Division of the city of
Tulsa, March 24, 1971, p. 1.
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has been dispatched, he will type the number of the unit
assigned to the complaint on the terminal, thus putting that
vehicle in an unavailable status. At the same time the computer
will automatically assign a complaint number, a number that will
remain with the case permanently. When the call has been com-
pleted, the dispatcher will make a status change on the vehicle.
Naturally, if at any time the dispatcher desires to retrieve
any information regarding the status of a particular car, the
length of time a car has been on call, the type of complaint,
etc., such a request can be made with immediate response.
The system also has several interesting safety features
for the patrolman in the field. For example, if a patrolman
sees a crime and gets out of his car in pursuit, the dispatcher
can "key" a "26t" on the terminal which will start an automatic
timer in the computer. If the patrolman is too long, a message will
come back on the video display reminding the dispatcher to check
on the officer, and if necessary, to assign another vehicle to
survey the situation.
The TULCAD system will provide great benefits to the
police department and its men in the form of extensive infor-
mation for analysis, reporting, investigation, etc. Further, the
entry of data by the dispatcher will serve as the initial point
of data entry into the police departmnent's automated record files.
In other words, dispatch cards will no longer need to be key-
punched.
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However, it is interesting to note that the department
has also discovered that on the average it will probably take slightly
longer to dispatch a car using the new automated system than it
does utilizing their current manual system because of the time
required to input all the pertinent data before a response can
be obtained. Tremendous gains will be made in terms of new
information available, safety, convenience, etc., but compromises
must also be accepted, particularly when considering that the
primary reason which is usually sited for computer aided dispatch
is to speed the process of dispatching patrol cars to a given call.
It also should be rememberd that in implementing applications
such as this, a great deal of time and work is involved, and
efforts often lag far behind initial hopes and expectations.
For example, the Boston Police Department was one of the first
police departments in the nation to point to the need of some
type of automated command and control system. In 1968 a document
was published by the Boston Police Department and the Office of
Law Enforcement Assistance in the Department of Justice reporting
on the first phase of a longer-run "analysis and action" program
on the information needs of the department. Among other things
the report mentions that some system is required to handle
complaints and to aid in the dispatch process. The report goes
9
The publication was entitled "Reports, Records and
Communications in the Boston Police Department; A System Improvement
Study", and it reported on the initial phase of the study which was
funded in 1965 and was completed in 1967.
228.
on to recommend some type of command and control system. "It
is now technically feasible to make a command and control system for
police field operations which will: allow the dispatcher to see
at a glance the status of car operations in any District; allow
District supervisory personnel to know what its cars are doing;
provide data on daily operations in a machine-useable form
for the preparation of daily operational statistics; provide the
basis for a District control log to be prepared at Headquarters for
transmission to the Districts; and provide the machine-useable data
10
base for a name and location index."
Interestingly enough, this very report was mentioned as
one of the initial stimulants to the Tulsa Police Department in
getting them started with some sort of command and control system.
The efforts in Boston were also referred to by police personnel
during the site visit to the Denver Police Department.
However, even though work in Boston to establish the
command and control system began shortly thereafter and has been
underway for more than three years, the system still seems to
be some distance away from becoming operational. When site visits
were being conducted in the spring of 1971, a prototype of the
10 "Reports, Records and Communications in the Boston Police
Department: A System Improvement Study", by the Boston Police
Department, assisted by Arthur D. Little, Incorporated, LEAA
Project Report, Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, U.S. Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C., May, 1968, p. 17.
229.
system was to be up and running at any moment. By January 1972,
the prototype was working, but the system itself was not
operational and would not be for about another year according
to police department estimates. With the delays that have occurred
in the past, though, even the estimate to be operational within
the year may still be an optimistic one.
This is not to belittle the work that has been done by
the Boston Police Department. (Severe contractual difficulties
have particularly hampered progress in this instance.) It is
simply to point out that such computer efforts take time,
problems inevitably occur, and efforts often lag far behind
initial time estimates and expectations. The reasons are usually
a combination of technical, behavioral and institutional factors,
and they are particularly prevalent in the establishment of
unstructured applications such as in the area of command and
control. Not only do systems have to be designed to react with
speed and precision without technical flaw, but police personnel
both in the communications center and in the field must be
satisfied and successfully retrained in order to avoid obstructive
resistance. All this takes time, and naturally in some departments,
the process and resistance is more difficult than in others.
The Middle Range of the Command and Control Spectrum. Efforts
which are underway in two police departments will serve to illustrate
the middle range of the command and control spectrum: (1) planning
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and development efforts which are underway in the Oakland, California
Police Department and (2) a system which is in operation in
Dorchester, England. (There are undoubtedly other illustrations,
and perhaps some which are better than these, but unfortunately,
the author is not aware of them. )
The basic purpose of the system in Oakland is to provide
the means whereby a police unit can be directed to a desired location
as quickly as possible when a call for service has been received.
In the view of the Oakland Police Department, the speed with
which a unit will arrive at the scene depends upon its location
relative to the location of the call. The travel time will be
a function, at least in part, of the distance between the car and
the place of the call. Therefore, they have devised a system to
aid them in keeping track of the more precise location of their
patrol vehicles. Then, when a car has to be dispatched, instead
of trying to assign the car patroling in the closest beat (a method
which pinpoints the location of an available car in Oakland only
to within a one to five mile traveling distance of any point within
the beat), they will have each car more accurately located and will
assign the closest one.
The system is known as LOCATE (Location of Oakland Cars
via Telecomnlunications), and it is based on a map-like car locator
devise known as digimap. Digimap is a vehicle location sensor
with a pressure-sensitive map of portions of the city of Oakland.
A digimap corresponding to the area in which that vehicle usually
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patrols is placed in each car. As a policeman travels around
within his beat, he presses that portion of the map where he is
located, thus indicating to the central communications center
where he is at at any point in time. Typically the location of a
vehicle can be determined within 500 feet if the area covered by
the map in the vehicle is less than or equal to 5 square miles
(2.0 miles by 2.5 miles). Maps in downtown areas may be larger
scale (covering, for example, 1 mile by 1.25 miles) to gain greater
detail; whereas maps in more rural areas may be on a smaller
scale (covering, for example, 4 miles by 5 miles) where high
resolution is not required and normal patrol beats are larger.
With the location of each car displayed on video terminals
in central headquarters, it is hoped that a better determination
can be made as to which car is the closest to a call location so
that the most appropriate vehicles can be dispatched to the scene.
Figure V-4 pictorially demonstrates the conceptual operations of
the LOCATE system.
More complex technical sensing devices requiring no
manual effort on the part of the policeman have been proposed to
keep continuous track of location in other police departments.
1 The figure is taken directly from Proposal for Oakland
City Police Department LOCATE System, prepared by GTE Sylvania
ncorporated, Electronic Systems Group Western Division, March 15,
1971, p. 2-2. This manual also provides a more detailed explanation
of the LOCATE System.
12For a discussion of these alternative locator devices see
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However, the objective in Oakland as expressed by police depart-
ment personnel was to provide a relatively inexpensive way to
begin to assess the whole command and control concept. As a
consequence, the use of DIGIMAP was designed as a one year
experiment to be operational in September, 1971. The idea is
that the system would work in the field for 6 to 8 months and then
an evaluation would be performed. The evaluation proposed was to
look at such items as before and after response time, response
time between parts of the city with DIGIMAP and those without,
before and after apprehension rates, data on reductions or increases
in radio air time, etc. The results of the study should be
helpful in assessing car locator and computer aided comand and
control systems.
One of the obvious disadvantages of the system in Oakland
is that officers must manually update their location regularly by
continually pressing the map as they patrol around. Therefore,
the potential is there that they may simply forget- -intentionally
or unintentionally. According to the Oakland Police Captain
responsible for the effort, there are a lot of ways to "jog" the
memory of the patrolman in the field. First, units can be asked
to report their location either on a mass (all cars report) or
individual basis. Second, they can keep track of how often a car
Task Force Report: Science and Technology, Op.cit., chapter 3, par-
ticularly pp. 25-25, and Appendix E. For example, such a devise
is proposed for use in the suggested Los Angeles command and control
system which will be discussed later in the chapter.
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reports a change in location, and if it doesn't seem often enough,
they can follow-up with an inquiry and discipline if necessary.
Certainly it will be possible for a car to sit stationary while
taking a "refreshment break" and simply to simulate movement by
pressing the digimap. Whether or not policemen will be honest
with this system remains to be seen. Once again the Oakland
Captain was optimistic. He felt that most people in the depart-
ment were enthusiastic about the system. Although "goldbricking"
or "sandbagging" might be a problem in some departments (he
mentioned, for example, in the east), he really didn't think it
would be in Oakland. According to him, a "guy doesn't have time
to hide, and there really isn't anyplace good to go."
Oakland has a reputation as a "professional" olice depart-
ment (see Chapter I) throughout the country, and perhaps what
the Captain says is true. However, it is the sense of this author
that the same enthusiasm would not be found in departments
throughout the country. If a system of car locators and automated
dispatch was ever really installed, it would mean the ability of
those at the top to more closely monitor the behavior of those
below. "Big brother" would truly be watching, and some policemen
can be expected to respond negatively. For example, in Boston
a system was implemented several years ago with the idea of
providing for the greater safety of the patrolman in the field.
'Triggering devices" were put in each vehicle so that if the
patrolman was not in his car and central headquarters needed to
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get in touch with him or if the policeman had been gone responding
to a call for what appeared to be a dangerous amount of time
and central communications wanted to check to see if everything
was all right, then the siren in the car could be activated so
that the patrolman would know to call in immediately. These
devices were not well received by the Boston policemen. Within
a relatively short period of time all of them were "broken" by
going over rough roads or railroad tracks or other "unfortunate"
accidents. Since the devices seemed to be so susceptible to
13
accidental damage, the experiment was halted. If more techni-
cally advanced car locator devices were installed in cities such
as Boston, it is also possible that they would have a high pro-
bability of "accidental" damage. When it comes to the installation
of unstructured computer applications, behavioral responses must
receive careful consideration.
A system somewhat similar to the one proposed in Oakland
has already been in operation in Dorchester, England since October,
1970. Utilizing coded tone generators, each patrol crew can send
an 8-digit coded message giving their call sign, duty and location
by pressing six buttons on the central panel. This data, in turn,
appears on the console manned by the dispatcher in the control
room and is then transferred to an electronic map on the control
13Steve Waldron, Arthur D. Little, Interview, May 19, 1971.
I
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room wall where car locations are indicated by lights.
It is estimated that the use of coded tone generators
will reduce routine duty and location transmission "air" time
by 89 percent. The most important aspect of the system, though,
"is that the notification received from units as to their location
and status provides a continuous picture for operational command
and control purposes. The fact that the moving picture of police
work throughout each day is captured for subsequent analysis is
14
an automated byproduct."
It is difficult to evaluate the Dorchester system based
on the sparse material available. It is worth pointing out
primarily because it points to the use of computers by the police
on not just a national but an international scale. The concluding
paragraph by Assistant Chief Constable Green stresses this fact.
The concept upon which the system is built is one which
aims at complete flexibility and the use of manpower to
optimum effect by assigning and deploying police units
in relation to activity or potential activity. The
system is a practical example of how these objectives may
be achieved and is perhaps an indication of the dirTction
in which policing throughout the world is moving.
The Fully Automated, Space Age End of the Spectrum. Perhaps
the most technologically advanced and the most expensive command
14
H. Green, Assistant Chief Constable, Dorset and Bournemonth
Constabulary, Dorchester, England, "A Police Command and Control
System," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, May, 1971, p. 29.
H. Green, Op. cit., p. 30.
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and control system which was proposed in any of the cities visited,
was that of the Los Angeles Police Department.
On May 12, 1971, Mayor Yorty held a press conference to
propose the implementation of a unique, computerized Emergency
Communications System for the Police and Fire Departments to
provide citizens with faster and more efficient service and
protection. The system (if implemented) will take at least four
years to install and will cost $55 million, $41 million of which
Los Angeles is requesting to be subsidized by a federal grant
from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. According
to Mayor Yorty, the Emergency Command Control Communications
16
System (ECCCS), "will be the first of its kind in the nation."
The system has two primary objectives: first, to provide
for a more rapid, reliable response to emergency calls for police
and fire; and second, to reduce the heavy workload on overcrowded
radio communications channels, by replacing voice communication
where possible with digital messages.
The proposed Emergency Communications System includes five
basic elements:
1) A Centralized Dispatch Canter- -the center will process
all requests for services from citizens, officers, and
16
Mayor Sam Yorty, Mayor of Los Angeles, Press Conference
Statement, May 12, 1971.
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other agencies. It will utilize digital communications and
automate the functions of dispatching, car location,
status keeping, and map representations an video display
cathode ray tubes (CRT's). Complaint Board Operators
will enter the location and other basic information on
complaints using the CRT terminals. In turn the computer
will have the capability to automatically determine
proper jurisdiction, select the closest available field
unit(s), and digitally transmit the dispatch order, all
supposedly within four seconds. Sector coordinators
and Watch Commanders will be provided with CRT terminals
to mrnitor the dispatch operation and to accept and
respond to radio requests from field units. By the use of
digital communications only five additional radio fre-
quencies will be required over the next ten years instead
of the twenty new frequencies that would be required if
the current manual operation were to be continued.
2) Automated Division Headquarters- -A remote CRT display
will be located in each geographical division headquarters.
This will automatically display field activity and assign-
ment of division forces. A printer will also be used to
automatically print out reports that would have otherwise
been prepared manually, thus allowing field units to spend
time carrying out other activities.
3) Field Units- -Police vehicles will be equipped with
239.
two-way voice and digital radio data links. This will
enable officers to obtain information directly from
federal, state and local computer memory banks utilizing
a digital messagy entry device and a teleprinter for
transmitting and receiving. A car locator system will
automatically report on the status of each field unit.
The officer will also be provided with an emergency
switch to signal when emergency help is required.
4) Emergency Command Center- -This center is located next
to the dispatch center and will be activated in the event
of a major unusual occurrence.
5) Mobile Command Center- -This center will utilize from
one to three van type vehicles, which can be moved rapidly
to any location in the city to facilitate on-the-scene
control of any unusual occurrence.
If ECCCS is ever implemented, it will be the most elaborate
of the police command and control systems which are currently
being proposed. The question is whether or not the benefits will
justify the costs. The police department, of course, says yes.
They feel that the operation of the new system, when compared
with the costs of expanding the present manual communications
program to meet expected needs, will save the city of Los Angeles
$33 million over a ten-year period. Further, it is their estimate
that the savings will be much greater after the initial ten-year
period. It is estimated that the new system will cost about
240.
$5 million per year to operate while an expanded manual communi-
cations system would cost $12 million per year- -a savings of
$7 million annually.
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL
It seems inevitable that there will be an increased use
of automation in the area of computer aided dispatch and police
command and control systems in the future. Even if the 610%
increase which was predicted by police departments in their
response to the ICMA survey is somewhat high, it clearly indicates
a trend towards increased use as time goes on. At this point, though,
it is difficult to evaluate what the actual impact of more extensive
computer use in this area will be since most of the efforts are
still at such a preliminary stage. (When the site visits were
made, none of the police departments contacted had computer
aided dispatch systems which were operational, even on an
experimental basis, although Oakland was scheduled to begin their
experiment in September, 1971.)
Certainly there are benefits to be gained. The potential
for faster response, greater administrative control, additional
time saved, and improved officer safety all are real advantages
from such applications. Even the monetary costs do not appear
unreasonable. In the report of the President's Crime Commission
in 1967, Raymond Knickel estimates that the cost of a car locator
system at that time would range between $500 - $1,000 per car for
4
A
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initial purchase plus what would be a somewhat. lower annual cost
17
for operations and maintenance. Considering that a two-man
patrol car costs in the range of $100,000 - $200,000 per year to
man and operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, this seems to be a
relatively small cost in an undercapitalized area such as law
enforcement if the benefits discussed above can really be achieved.
On the other hand, implementation of command and control
systems will not come without problems and costs. With something
this new and untested the possibility of overselling the product
is very real. Further, it is often difficult to accurately
estimate anticipated expenses. For example, the monetary savings
discussed in connection with the proposed Los Angeles "ECCCS"
system sound impressive; however, it must be realized that at this
stage they are only "paper profits". Such projections are often
based on desired reductions in personnel which never seem to
come about (partially because a whole new set of personnel are
required to support an automated system) and estimations of
technical costs which are too low (sometimes priced that way so
that hardware and software vendors can make their proposed
product look good). Before a decision is made that a computer
assisted command and control system will a priori have positive
17
Raymond Knickel, "Electronics Equipment Associated with
the Police Car", Task Force Report Science and Technology, Op. cit.,
Appendix E.
242.
effects, a thorough evaluation needs to be made in each police
department where such an application of modern technology has
been proposed.
Further, such an evaluation must consider more than just
monetary benefits and costs, but behavioral factors must be examined.
Cormmand and control systems will probably result in greater
control on the part of administrative officers, but the psychologi-
cal impact of constantly monitoring the patrolman in the field is
still unknown. Arguments can be made that such computer applications
will improve the safety of police officers by virtue of the fact
that the command and control center will always know where they
are at and what they are doing. It is not clear, though, that
individual policemen will perceive the situation in the same
positive light (e.g., the sabotaged siren system in Boston).
With all of these factors still remaining to be evaluated,
it seems that the way to proceed is with experimentation in
selected cities, and thus the effort in Oakland should be care-
fully observed. Also, we are still far from being ready to totally
disregard the human element of dispatching and control. In fact,
it is the observation of this author that, at least in the short
run, the most critical question in command and control will be
obtaining the proper interaction between the human and automatic
elements. The human brain is still a far greater "computer"
than any mechanical or electronic device we have yet been able to
produce. As an alternative to complete automation, perhaps more
243.
consideration should be given to allowing a blend of responsibilities
between man and the computer, with each carrying out those activities
at which they are most skilled.
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The use of the computer for resource allocation is an
application of automation to aid in the decision making process,
an application in which the machine interacts with man through
the use of analysis to influence policy. In many ways it is
similar to the application of the computer to aid the police
dispatching and the overall command and control process. The
basic premise of both computer aided resource allocation and
command and control is to most effectively allocate and control
police forces. Resource allocation tries to do this by providing
for an initial allocation of police resources which best matches
the potential need. Computer aided dispatch attempts to improve
the efficiency achieved by these allocated forces by sending
the closest available unit to respond to a call, thus increasing
the effectiveness of the responding unit, the effectiveness of
the cars which are farther away and therefore are not called, and
the overall efficiency of the responding police force.
As earlier portions of the paper have already pointed out,
utilization of the computer for resource allocation is more than
just having the machine duplicate a manual process which is
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already being performed. The application is a far more innovative
one. Successful implementation must make careful consideration
of behavioral and organizational factors as well as technical
ones.
As Chapter II pointed out, the use of the computer for
resource allocation has been growing rapidly over the last few
years, and this growth is expected to continue. In fact, according
to responses to the I.C.M.A. survey, resource allocation will
become the dominant computer application in the years to come.
Almost half (45.5%) of the police departments that are using compu-
ters say they already have some sort of application related to
resource allocation and manpower deployment. By 1974, though, the
percentage is predicted to skyrocket dramatically. Of the
122 police departments that indicated in the survey that they were
using a computer, 121 of 122 responded that they plan to be
using the computer for patrol allocation and distribution and
police service analysis within the next three years. Experience
with visits to police departments seems to indicate that future
expectations are usually overly optomistic regarding the date
that implementation actually occurs. However, even allowing for
some exaggeration, the trend of future use for resource allocation
is both clear and striking. This trend is more fully reinforced
by the fact that police departments also feel that resource
allocation is the most important police computer use. In the
I.C.M.A. survey departments were not only asked not only what
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applications they had or planned to have within the next three years,
but also to indicate the three applications which they felt
were most important or would be most important in their department.
The applications related to resource allocation- -patrol allocation
and distribution, and police service analysis- -received the
highest number of positive rankings (see Figure V-5). Not only
will applications for resource allocation be found in practically
every department which is using a computer by 1974 if the predic-
tions in the survey prove to be true, but uses of the computer in
this area are and will continue to be felt to be of greatest
importance.
Still, the results of the use of the computer to date in
the area of resource allocation have been mixed. Of the fourteen
police departments visited in this study, most had some program
underway or in the experimental or planning stages in which the
computer was to be used as a tool in police deployment. However,
only four were really very far along, St. Louis, Los Angeles,
Dayton, and Kansas City. Even in those departments, it was still
unclear what the ultimate influence would be. In several cases,
use has fallen short of initial expectations. In part, this
has been the result of the interaction of behavioral influences.
Before going on to examine some of these efforts, though, it is
important to understand what is meant by resource allocation.
The demand for police services varies according to the
time of the year, the day of the week, the time of day, the
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geographic area, the socio-economic conditions of the community,
etc. The basic concept in programs for police deployment is to
utilize the computer and various forms of analysis to allocate
limited law enforcement resources more effectively so that the police
can meet these varying demands rather than constantly assigning
the same number of people to a set beat 24 hours a day, 365 days
a year. The procedure for achieving this varies from department
to department. This paper will discuss several of the procedures
for allocating resources found in the police departments included
in the site visits as well as several additional methods dis-
cussed in the literature.
HAZARD FORMULAS
One of the most widely used formulas for allocating police
resources is the "Hazard Formula or Plan." These procedures were
18
first introduced into police work in the 1930's by O. W. Wilson.
They provided a major breakthrough by giving police administrators
a systematic methodology for distributing forces whereas before
their introduction, commanders' discretion had been the primary
factor in determining the deployment of police units.
Where used today, this procedure identifies a series of
factors which are felt to be significant in determining the
demand for police patrol services. Significant factors may include
the number of crimes against person, total of all crimes, calls-for-
service, population, area, juvenile delinquency, accidents and
24L8.
aided cases, school crossings, and licensed premises. Each one
of these factors is weighed according to its perceived importance,
and totals are calculated in order to arrive at a single "hazard
number" for a particular area. This number is supposed to repre-
sent the "hazard" in a geographic district. The total number of
men will then be distributed to each geographic district based on
the "hazard number" for that district.
There are several problems inherent in the hazard formula
method. First, the determining factors for allocation are input
measures as opposed to output measures or indicators of police
performance. The factors may be indicators of need, but they
say nothing about how good or how effective allocative forces
have been, and do not attempt to distribute forces in order to
increase effectiveness. In keeping with this problem, hazard
formulas distribute a total police force, but they say nothing
about what the size of a police force should be in order to
meet a certain service level of performance. Second, hazard formulas
reflect conditions of the past rather than predicting future
conditions and allocating forces based on predicted needs. Third,
the system of simply adding the weighted importance of a number
of factors means that the interaction between each of them is
largely forgotten as is the significance of any one factor as a
18
O. W. Wilson, Distribution of the Patrol Force, Publi-
cation 74, Public Administration Service, Chicago, Illinois, 1941.
Also discussed in 0. W. Wilson, Police Administration 2nd edition,
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963.
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19
primary determinant of need.
As mentioned above, the use of hazard formulas is wide-
spread, and a number of police departments have devised variations
20
of the basic procedures (notably New York City and Phoenix,
21
Arizona ). Some provide innovative alternatives, but no system
of allocation has proven perfect.
-THE SYSTEM IN DAYTON, OHIO
In Dayton, Ohio, a system has been developed whereby the
police workload, represented by the total number of crimes, arrests,
19
For a critique of Hazard Formulas, see Jan M. Chaiken
and Richard C. Larson, Methods for Allocating Urban Emergency Units,
The New York City Rand Institute, R-680-HUD/NSF, May, 1971, pp. 13-
16.
20
Joel Edelman, Case Report: Police Resource Allocation
Methodology, unpublished case study on efforts of the Rand Insti-
tute to devise police allocation methodology for the New York City
Police Department.
21
James S. Kakalik and Sorrel Wildhorn, Aids to Decision
Making in Police Patrol: A Summary of Findings, a report prepared
by RAND, Santa Monica, California for the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, R-593-HUD?RC (Abridged), February, 1971, p. 7.
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and dispatches, is predicted on the basis of past experience for
various times of the year. These figures are then used by the
computer to build patrol beats with equal workload distributions.
The algorithm utilized is a simple one. An effort is made to
construct each beat in such a way so that it will have the same
workload as every other beat. The objective is to achieve such
a distribution so that the workload of a given beat is no more than
4% above or below the average.
The method avoids one of the basic problems of hazard
formulas in that distributions are made based on predictions of
the future instead of simply using past data. However, a number
of problems still remain. First, the significant factors used
to determine beat distribution are still measures of input
instead of output or performance. No attempt is made to determine
whether the selected beat distribution improves police service.
Further, only three factors (and often just one: number of dis-
patches) are used to determine workload. Little analysis has
been conducted to see if these are the most significant in deter-
mining demand for law enforcement resources. And finally, because
of the large numbers of interbeat dispatches, it is difficult to
22
determine workloads according to separate beats.
Nonetheless, the system has been a helpful one. Whereas
22
See, for example, Chaiken and Larson, Op. cit., p. 32.
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in 1965 Dayton had three generally equal patrol shifts, one of which
rotated every week, now the computer is used to determine equitable
beats, and a permanent shift system has been established to get
more policemen in the field at those times of the day and year
which are shown to be most critical. The computer, then, in
this situation is used primarily as a means of processing large
amounts of information. Relatively little quantitative analysis
is involved.
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the resource allocation
part of the computer system in Dayton, though, is the fact that
it has been well recieved in the police department. From a
mathematical point of view it is relatively simple; but the fact
of the matter is, it's used. Prior to the site visit a new
beat distribution had just been prepared utilizing the computer-
ized procedure. The old beat patterns had followed a natural
boundary, a river flowing through the city, and the result had
been to overload one district as opposed to the others. With
the new system "equal" districts and beats had been developed in
terms of workload, and the new patterns of distribution were
being implemented. The use of the computer has been relatively
low key, and the primary work in designing and programming the
system has been by police personnel without extensive technical
backgrounds. Still the impact has been felt, and with time the
influence of the computer operation in resource allocation will
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increase. In fact, it was the prediction of the police lieutenant
who was in charge of the data processing operation that the time
would eventually come when specific patrol beats would be discon-
tinued and replaced by a more "fluid" or moving patrol force.
Instead of reporting to patrol a particular beat each evening, an
officer would be assigned to patrol or answer calls in a different
area each night, the determination of the appropriate area being
made through the analysis of available information utilizing
quantitative analysis and computer technology. Naturally there
are pros and cons to such a scenario, and they will be discussed
later on in the chapter. The point here is that the use of the
computer for a rather simple system of resource allocation had been
effective enough in Dayton that the police personnel were opto-
mistic regarding the possibilities for the future.
RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN ST. LOUIS
According to some sources, St. Louis has one of the most
advanced operational methods of patrol force deployment currently
in use. A study by the RAND Corporation on aids to decisionmaking
in police patrol in six police departments around the country
stated that "the most advanced operational method of patrol
force deployment currently in use has been developed and applied
23
in St. Louis." In a recent book, Richard Larson concurs with
23
Kakalik and Wildhorn, Op. cit., p. 7.
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these sentiments. In a discussion on various approaches and
benefits in utilizing quantitative aids in police decisionmaking
Larson indicates that "perhaps the best example of a successful
24
implementation is found in the St. Louis Police Department."
After spending almost a week in a site visit at the St. Louis
Police department examining information and conducting a wide
range of interviews, though, it was apparent that the results
of the St. Louis effort are still mixed. Although benefits have
been achieved in some areas, some of the initial expectations have
not been met, particularly from a behavioral point of view.
The St. Louis police department began its initial experi-
mentation with resource allocation in 1966. One of the basic
aspects of the system was to experiment with concepts of split
patrol by distinguishing between two aspects of the police patrol
function: 1) Calls for service, or responding to calls or complaints
from the public, and 2) Preventive patrol, or all patrol activities
directed at the prevention of crime or apprehension of criminals.
The demand for police services, measured by the expected number
of criminal incidents, was then predicted by area and time of year,
week, and day. Information was also gathered on the distribution
of time required to dispatch patrol cars to service these criminal
incidents. Then, based on relatively simple mathematical
24
Richard C. Larson, Urban Police Patrol Analysis, M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972.
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techniques using queueing theory, an estimate was made of the
number of patrol cars needed in a given area or beat so that
a certain percentage of the predicated calls for police services
could be met without any dispatching delay. In other words, the
program could show the number of men that would be required if
the department desired to respond to 85 percent of the calls without
delay, 90 percent, etc. Men were then assigned to the two different
patrol functions, calls-for-service and preventive patrol.
Enough men were assigned to each beat to respond to calls-for-
services so that 85 percent of the predicted incoming calls could
be met without delay. The remainder of the patrol force was
assigned to preventive patrol.
Besides designating the allocation of specific beats,
information useful to police administrators was also provided
as part of the resource allocation system in St. Louis. For
example, a series of computer maps utilizing computer graphics
were prepared periodically indicating-:the number of calls for
services, crimes reported of various types, arrests made, etc.
These maps provided useful visual information for police commanders
in making final determinations in designing patrol beats and in
determining alternative law enforcement strategies.
Also, a number of additional ideas began to evolve and
be tested. At the first stages of experimentation in one of
the police districts, it was decided to use two-man cars where pos-
sible (two men riding in a single patrol car to provide greater
255.
safety) in preventive patrol and in cars assigned to respond to
calls for service. However, midway through the experiment the
desireability of using both one- and two-man cars became apparent-
-one man cars to be used for responding to calls for service of
a relatively minor nature which required the services of only
one police officer, and two-man cars to be held in reserve for
25
more serious types of offenses. As a result of this experience,
both one- and two-man cars were provided for operations when it
was decided to expand experimental use of resource allocation
concepts from one to four districts.
The idea developed into what was referred to as the stacking
of patrol calls. The basis of the idea was to make an increased
effort to more carefully screen calls requesting service as they
came into the police department. Those that were felt to be of a
lcw enough priority (and not to be of a dangerous nature) could
not only be assigned to one-man cars, but could be "stacked" or
delayed. In other words, one or two cars in a district could
be assigned to answer low priority calls, and if one of them was
not immediately available, response could simply wait or be "stacked"
up until such time as a car was available. Eventually the idea was
expanded further to include the development and implementation of
25
Allocation of Patrol Manpower Resources in the St.
Louis Police Department, Volume I, a report on the resource allo-
cation experiment conducted under the Office of Law Enforcement,
Grant Number 39, p. 75.
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a full-scale complaint evaluation program whereby police officers
screened calls in an effort to first reduce the fraction of calls
requiring dispatch, and second, of those calls actually requiring
dispatch, to increase the percentage that could be stacked.
Perhaps the greatest conceptual criticism of the St. Louis
effort is that it utilizes only one criterion in determining
the number of cars assigned to a beat to respond to calls for
services, the fraction or percent of calls that cannot be an-
swered without delay. Related to this, "requirements for preven-
tive patrol are not explicity considered when assigning cars and
the question of the relative value of a car on response and on
26
preventive assignments is not addressed." However, the accuracy
of the system in predicting workload has proved very successful.
For example, a detailed comparison was made between the predicted
and actual number of calls in the Ninth St. Louis Police District
for the police rotation period from March 6, 1967 to March 26, 1967.
It was found that the variation in the predicted number of calls
for service accounted for about 90% of the variations in the
actual observed values, a very strong correlation between predicted
27
and actual.
26
Kakalik and Wildhorn, Op. cit., p. 8.
27
For more detailed information and specific figures
demonstrating the prediction accuracy of the system, see Allocation
of Patrol Manpower Resources in the St. Louis Police Department,
Volume II, Op. cit., pp. 28-33.
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Based on the work and procedures in St. Louis, IM
Corporation has put together a computer program package known as
LEMRAS (Law Enforcement Manpower Resource Allocation System)
which is currently being leased to several police departments
around the country. The police departments in Los Angeles and
Kansas City were utilizing the LEMRAS system, and some comments
on the impact and success of their operation will be made later.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION EXPERIMENTATION
Additional experimentation is also underway to implement
several recently developed techniques. Richard C. Larson has
devised an allocation procedure and simulation model which is
28
designed to address the basic questions of police deployment.
The algorithm requires police administrators to specify a number
of policy objectives for each command area or beat. These are
stated in terms of constraints. For instance, average travel
time for urgent calls should not exceed four minutes. Other
objectives can involve preventive patrol, administrative considera-
tions, or any other factors deemed important. As a consequence,
some of the objections of the St. Louis and LEMRAS systems
that they do not consider enough factors have been overcome. The
procedure determines the minimum number of units required for each
28
Richard C. Larson, Urban Police Patrol Analysis, Op. cit.
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beat so that all objectives are fulfilled. If the total number
of units to be allocated is insufficient to satisfy objectives,
then the method computes the deficiency and requires a more modest
set of objectives. If there are additional units to allocate
beyond those needed soley to satisfy constraints, they are de-
ployed using a mathematical optimization technique known as
"dynamic programming" in order to fulfill some city-wide objec-
tives (for instance, minimization of average overall waiting time
for dispatch). This method has been applied to the New York City
Police Department and played a role in the efforts of the Mayor
and Police Comnissioner to obtain a fourth platoon which now
29
operates from 6 p.m. to 2 a.m. The model is also being
implemented in Boston and several other U.S. and Canadian police
departments.
AN EVALUATION OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
It is difficult to evaluate fully the success of many of
the resource allocation efforts. A number of variable s are involved,
both technical and behavioral, and in many cases it is still
premature to predict what the eventual impact and utility will be.
Critics are skeptical, but most departments still seem enthusiastic.
29
The New York City RAND Institute, First Annual Report,
October, 1970, p. 26.
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In analyzing the use and implementation of computer applications
a number of questions must be answered: Does it work? Is it
accepted and used by the men and women in the police department?
Has it accomplished the objectives originally specified? Has
it improved police efficiency and effectiveness (as narrowly
defined in Chapter III)? And, if simplifying assumptions are
required are the correct ones chosen? Is the application a
good simulation of reality? These questions, though, seem to
sort out into two basic dimensions: (1) Those which have to do
with achieving success in implementation (does it work, accep-
tance, use, etc.); and (2) those which have to do with the
quality and value of the computer application itself (improving
police service, effective simulation of reality, etc.). In
achieving success in implementation the factors outlined as
related to Dalton and Knight at the end of Chapter IV are particu-
larly important- -involvement of quality leadership at the top,
involvement of other police personnel, human-computer interaction,
proper priorities established, caliber of technical staff and
technology available. In achieving success in the second area,
the quality of the application itself, a different set of
variables are most significant- -proper qualifying assumptions,
worthwhile application, effectiveness in simulating reality,
technically valid, etc. Both areas of success or effectiveness
are important and are often intertwined. In many cases, "success"
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in one without "success" in the other will doom the computer
application to failure, or at least obscurity. If the application
30
is relatively straightforward it may be easier to implement,
but the final outcome may not be any better than the manual
operation which preceeded it. If the application is more complex,
the benefits achieved may be greater, but if there are difficulties
in implementing the project and it never really becomes operational
then the potential advantages will be lost. In evaluating
police computer applications, then, both dimensions influencing
effectiveness must be examined. As we begin to evaluate several
of the police resource allocation applications around the country,
the idea will be to take both into consideration.
First, it seems that in a general sense it is easier to
allocate resources to effectively respond to demands in the area
of traffic control than it is related to crime. This paper
will look briefly at one illustration of this where the computer
30
This is not stated as an axiomatic principle or hypo-
thesis, and in fact, the opposite is often the case. In Joel
Edelman, Op. cit., Edelman reports on an attempt by the RAND
Institute in New York City to work with the New York Police Depart-
ment in trying to allocate 3,000 new uniform patrolmen to the
most appropriate districts. A real-time modification of the hazard
formula approach was selected. Technically, the computer appli-
cation was very straightforward. However, the final result was
that their suggested innovation was rejected in favor of using
the results of the existing allocation method. According to
Edelman the primary reasons included tradition, too little time
available to convince officials of its usefulness, and the fact
that the allocations arising from application of their formula
often did not meet police officials' "intuitive standards" of
usefulness.
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has been used to aid in the allocation of a department's
traffic patrol. The focus will then shift to an evaluation of
resource allocation related to the law enforcement function of the
police, taking particular look at the efforts in St. Louis and Los
Angeles.
Resource Allocation for Traffic Patrol. At the time
of the site visits, Kansas City had been working for over a year
on a program of computer aided deployment related to traffic
enforcement. Before the institution of the system "wheel officers",
officers on motorcycles attached to the traffic patrol, would
be assigned to general work areas but the areas which were large
and overlapping. Further, officers roamed through the areas in a
random fashion. Now, each officer is assigned to a particular
beat, and each beat is determined through quantitative analysis
and the use of the computer. Various reports are also produced
indicating the level of enforcement (number of tickets) in each
beat, the work performed by each officer, the number of accidents
per beat, etc. Between 1969 and 1970 with this new program in
action the city experienced a 5 percent reduction in traffic
accidents even though there was a smaller number of men on
traffic patrol during that same period. The department did not
claim there was a direct correlation between selective enforce-
ment and reduced accidents because of the difficulty of isolating
causal relationships in such a case, but there were "strong
262.
suspicions" that a correlation existed.
However, resource allocation in traffic control is probably
easier than the allocation of manpower in the prevention and
response to crime. First, the nature of the task is more clearly
defined. As one traffic patrolman working in Syracuse, New York
told an interviewer:
"I was on patrol for nine years, and as far as I'm
concerned you can have it. You've got all those messy
details; you're called in on cheatings and stabbings,
family fights and quarrels; you're chasing kids. You
never know what's going to happen next, and not all of
it is very pleasant. When you get in a traffic enforce-
ment unit you know exactly what's expected of you and
what you hay! to do; then you can do your work and
that's it."
Second, since the task is clearly defined, measures of output
can be more clearly specified and sought after. If police adminis-
trators want to measure success or evaluate individual perfor-
mance, they will have something to start with. Third, traffic
problems seem more responsive to controls and programs to modify
their nature. It is often possible to isolate troublesome
roads and corners and to saturate those areas at critical times.
In Kansas City, as discussed above, this lead to a reduction in
traffic accidents. In an area such as traffic which is comparatively
responsive to such treatment the police department is more likely
31
Quoted in James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior,
Op. cit., p. 53.
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to be able to determine and maintain an overall approach to
traffic control than it is in most other areas of law enforecment
work such as criminal apprehension or investigation. As a conse-
quence, the use of computer analysis seems easier to implement
when related to the allocation of resources for traffic enforce-
ment.
Resource Allocation for Criminal Apprehension and Patrol.
On the other hand, allocation of resources for criminal appre-
hension and patrol is more difficult. Even in cases where efforts
have been underway for some time it is often hard to understand
the relationship between resources used and the effect which they
have. Because so many factors seem to influence the crime rate,
it is very difficult to predict what influence an increase or
decrease in the number of policemen in the field will have on
crime prevention. For example, the average number of police
officers for every thousand citizens in cities throughout the
country varies widely. In 1970 a survey by the Kansas City Police
Department of thirty-seven police departments in cities of 300,000
to 1,000,000 population indicated a range of a low of 1.17 police
officer per thousand in San Antonio, Texas to a high of 5.92 in
32
Washington, D.C. Other cities of interest included Atlanta,
Georgia at 1.56/thousand, Baltimore, Maryland at 3.83, Boston at
32
"1970 Survey of Municipal Police Departments", Kansas
City, Missouri Police Police Department, Clarence M. Kelley,
Chief of Police, November 1, 1970.
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4.48, Denver at 2.22, Kansas City, Missouri at 1.71, Long Beach
at 1.79, Newark, New Jersey at 3.70, St. Louis at 3.67, and San
Francisco at 2.59. The crime rate in Washington, D.C. should not
be expected to be half what it is in San Francisco just because
the number of policemen per thousand in Washington is more than
twice as high. Nor, if the number of policemen per thousand
were doubled in San Francisco, should the crime rate be expected
to be cut in half. As stated earlier, crime in our society is a
complex function of a number of variables. This means, then,
that the evaluation of any law enforcement program will be difficult
because of this complexity. Such is certainly the case with
trying to assess the impact of computer aided resource allocation
efforts. As a consequence, to try to look only at the impact of
such efforts as a means of reducing crime would certainly be a
mistake. The basic purposes of these concepts, the allocation
of manpower resources effectively according to police or societal
needs by time and space, should not be lost in wishful thinking
that the more effective utilization of resources will automatically
result in a lower incidence of crime.
In St. Louis resource allocation efforts began around
1966, and in 1970 the city began using this deployment program
city wide. In the evaluation of the program prepared for the
federal government, the conclusion was that "the resource allocation
model proved successful. That is, the System showed itself capable
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of generating output which could be used for effective allocation
of manpower resources within the test district in relation to
need, both by time and place. This, of course, was of chief im-
portance and represented the fulfillment of one of the prime
33
goals of the grant." Still, in the site visit to St. Louis
by this author, it seemed that the reactions within the department
and the actual impact on the department have been a mix of both
positive and negative aspects.
Quantitative analysis of a variety of project indicators was the
first place where both positive and negative aspects of evaluation
begin to emerge. According to the St. Louis final report, index
crimes and Part I crimes "increased rather steadily during the
life of the experiment and were, for the most part, substantially
higher during each month of the test period than for the same
34
month a year earlier." The increase in the crime rate does
not necessarily imply failure of the resource allocation system.
It is possible that without the resource allocation system a
greater increase in crime would have been experience in the
test district without the new techniques. Naturally, there is
no way to really know.
As shown earlier, though, the resource allocation system
33
Allocation of Patrol Manpower Resources in the St. Louis
Police Department, Volume I, p. cit., p. 75.
34
Ibid, p. 76.
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did prove to be a good predictor of workload and calls for services.
Further, the allocation method proved to be successful in influencing
the number of calls that could be responded to by the police depart-
ment without delay, one of the primary purposes of the model.
For example, during the testing stages of the system, the beats
for the first rotation period were designed so that the calls-for-
service units would handle virtually all calls without delay. Over
the next successive rotation periods the workload by beat was
gradually increased. As this was done, the percent of events
which call-for-service units could handle without delay declined
correspondingly, as was desired. Over the first six rotation
periods the percent of events handled by the call-for-service
units was 98, 95, 93, 90 and 92, respectively (with the remaining
calls being assigned to preventive patrol units). Essentially,
these response levels were the ones desired and predicted with
the corresponding workload, thus indicating the effectiveness
of the system in this respect of relating the number of officers
assigned to a beat and the corresponding ability to respond to
35
calls-for-service without delay.
In other areas, the success of the allocation system also
seemed mixed. In general, the officers in the St. Louis Police
Department felt that the resource allocation system had not met
35
Ibid, p. 80.
267.
their expectations (eight out of fourteen indicated this). A
mild negative response such as this, though, should not be
alarming. In fact, perhaps it shoud be expected. As discussed
in Chapter IV the implementation of innovation almost always
brings some resistance and problems.
In the course of the experiment, though, a number of
things have been learned. For example, after the project had
been underway for awhile the precise distinction between cars
for preventive patrol and cars responding to calls for service
began to come into question. According to one source in the
department it was discovered that policemen who were assigned
to cars answering calls for service felt they should do only
that, while those assigned to preventive patrol felt that their
activities should be limited to patrol. When the workload
demanded that preventive patrol cars should respond to calls, or
vice versa, the men were somewhat dissatisfied. In keeping with
this idea, the final report on the project cautioned against an
over-specialization in split patrol functions. It states that
in St. Louis there was some tendency in this direction by police
officers assigned to call-for-service units. "They would receive
and complete an assignment and then wait for the next one without
performing in the interim such routine police work as enforcing
moving traffic violations, or stopping pedestrian and occupants of
motor vehicles for legitimate questioning. They justified this
on the grounds that, since they were liable to receive another
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call for service at any time, they could not tie themselves up on
duties which would prevent them from handling their normal
36
assignments." Another source outside of the department indicated
that almost the opposite effect had resulted for police officers
37
assigned to preventive patrol. According to him, their main
problem was that they simply got bored in constantly just driving
around on preventive patrol. No direct mention of this was made
to the author while in St. Louis on the site visits, but it
certainly seems plausible.
As a result primarily of such behavioral factors, the
precise distinction between preventive and call-for-service
patrols was -cropped and a compromise method has developed. Now
a determination is made of the number of cars needed in a district
to respond to calls. This number is allocated, and where possible
extra cars are provided which can be used as the District Commander
desires (e.g., for preventive patrol). However, a precise
distinction is no longer made between cars for patrol and cars for
calls for service. In fact, the workload is often such that in
the busier districts at least, all cars have to be utilized to
respond to calls, patrolling on the side where possible. The
concept of using single man cars to respond to "stacked calls" of
lower priority is still in use, as is the complaint evaluation
36
Ibid, p. 78.
37
Interview with Steve Waldron, Arthur D. Little, Corpora-
tion, May 19, 1971.
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program.
Other reactions by the patrolmen in St. Louis have also
demonstrated the importance of behavioral influences on police
computer use. One of the basic ideas of more effective resource
allocation is to provide for more police manpower during the
times when the need is greatest. However, when changes were
proposed in the hours and rotation schedules of police officers
in order to meet this objective, resistance was encountered. It
was recommended that the rotation of police shifts be moved back
one hour so that watches would change at 8:00 a.m., 4:00 p.m., and
12:00 p.m. rather than at 7:00 a.m., 3:00 p.m., and 11:00 p.m.
in order to achieve more efficient use of manpower. In fact,
an attempt was made to implement this recommendation. It was
discovered that the resistance of the police officers represented
through their patrolman's association was so great, though, that
the change had to be discontinued. One of the greatest complaints
was that the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift put the patrolman
coming and returning to work during rush hour traffic, and they
didn't like it. The basic fact was that the policemen were used
to their time schedules, and they just didn't want to change.
Once again, such resistance is not alarming. In fact, in many
cases it can and should be expected. However, it does demonstrate
once again that behavioral considerations are important factors
in implementing computerized resource allocation. As mentioned
at the outset of this section there are at least two dimensions
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in evaluating the success of any computer application- -the
success of implementation and the system itself. In this case
resistance has hindered the overall implementation of computer
use, but it does not mean that the application has failed.
In fact, St. Louis continues to utilize the resource
allocation program, even if only in a limited fashion. Twice
a year "maps" outlining alternative and suggested beats for each
shift are prepared by computer and distributed to each district.
Whether or not these "maps" are used is a decentralized decision
left to the District Commander. (At one point control over
implementation of the resource allocation program was centralized.)
The key to use in St. Louis now depends on whether or not the
District Commander understands and likes the system. If he does,
he'll use it; if not, he won't. It's as simple as that. In
keeping with this, attitudes towards the system vary. As one
of the people who has been working on the project for some time
now put it: "Just tell me what you want to hear (good or bad)
and I can take you there (someplace in the department) and you
can hear it." Whereas several people in the department offered
glowing reports, including the police commander who was initially
responsible for the experiment, one district commander responded:
"Resource allocation? Oh, I thought we gave that up!" Clearly,
that District Commander was not using the system. Once again,
though, the reason for this may not be a problem with the
resource allocation application, but a matter of education or
271.
a failure on the part of the top command and the computer staff
to help assure that each District Commander has "internalized"
the mrtives for using the system.
However, whether or not the details are accepted, it
is clear that the overall philosophy of resource allocation has
caught on in the St. Louis Police Department. As the person
currently responsible for producing the resource allocation
"maps" put it: "The big thing that they've accepted is a variable
number of beats for a district, depending on time of day, week
and year." The basic approach has become a fact and way of
life. This in itself is a major change from when the project
began, and thus reflects a significant impact on the department.
Fluid Patrols: Improved Effectiveness or Depersonalization.
Some law enforcement people feel that the time may come when
specific patrol beats will be discontinued. Instead of going
to a set beat, an officer when reporting for duty will simply call
in and be assigned to patrol or answer calls in a particular area,
an area which had been designated through the analysis of availa-
ble information and the aid of computer technology, and an area
which may vary considerably from the one patrolled the day before.
Several of the police officers interviewed during site visits
felt that the effect of such a system would be positive. Other
law enforcement people, in contrast, feel strongly that such a
move would be a step backward, not forward. They believe it is
_ ______I_____ _I Y·LIIIYIY_----
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important for the officer to have a beat and to get to know the
residents in that area. An entirely "fluid" or moving force would
prevent, or at least hinder, the development of appropriate
relationships between the police and local citizens. Used in this
way they believe that the computer would result in a "depersonali-
zation" of the law enforcement task.
The resource allocation efforts to date in Los Angeles
gives some indication of this basic dilemma. The Los Angeles
Police Department has been using the IBM package, LEMRAS, (Law
Enforcement Manpower Resource Allocation System) which is patterned
after the program in St. Louis on an experimental basis in one
division over the last several years. In this division the
program is set so that 95% of incoming calls for service can be
answered without delay. Other cars are assigned to preventive
patrol. As opposed to St. Louis where the split patrol distinction
had basically been dropped, in the Los Angeles division experi-
mentation and use were still underway at the time of the site
visit.
Based on certain quantitative indicators the system
appears to have positive benefits. In one study of evaluation
it was found that forecasts predicting the number of calls for
38
service was 95.9% accurate. (Figure V-6 indicates the comparisons
38
"Evaluation of the Law Enforcement Manpower Resource
Allocation System" prepared by the Advanced Systems Development
section, Los Angeles Police Department, October, 1969, pp. 1, 3.
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between the actual event date and LEMRAS predictions for two
deployment periods, March 23 - April 19, 1969 and May 18 -
June 15, 1969.) It was also found that utilizing the LEMRAS
suggested manpower allocations units were assigned in.the
field in sufficient numbers to achieve the goal of 95% of incoming
calls being answered without delay. A communications survey
indicated that a 95.2% factor was actually attained, a fairly
39
positive record. Further, a study which compared crime
statistics for arrests before and after the introduction of
LEMRAS indicated an observable increase in "efficiency". It
was found that Part I crimes in the experimental division were
down when LEMRAS was used in 1969 by 2.3% compared to a decrease
in the surrounding area of 2.0% and a city wide increase of
3.4% (see Table V-2). Also indicating "improved" police service,
Part I arrests were up in the LEMRAS division in 1969 by 16.0%
over the 1968 figure, and this compared to an increase in Part I
arrests in the surrounding area of only 11.9% and a city increase
of 14.5% (see Figure V-7). The study goes on to note that this
observable increase in efficiency can be "directly attributed" to
40
LEMRAS. This author would contend, though, that although the
quantitative benefits achieved are interesting and perhaps indi-
cative of a positive effect by LEMRAS, there are simply too many
39
Ibid, pp. 1, 3.
40
Ibid, p. 3.
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TABLE V-2
1969 PART I CRIMES* COMPARISON
WITH 1968 AND JPL PREDICTIONS
Van Nuys Division
April
1968
JPL 1969
Actual 1969
1968
JPL 1969
Actual 1969
June Total
1,087 1,145 1,171 3,403
1,350 1,333 1,340 4,023
1,067 1,159 1,077 3,303
Four Valley Divisions
3,098 3,192 3,068 9,358
3,520 3,532 3,555 10,607
2,920 3,129 3,010 9,059
Sixteen City Divisions
1968
JPL 1969
Actual 1969
Sources: 1.
15,894 16,633 15,499 48,026
17,137 16,999 16,953 51,089
+ 3.4%
- 2.8%
16,520 16,697 16,418 49,635 --
Jet Propulsion Laboratory's "Three-Year Forecast of Offenses"
2. L.A.P.D. Monthly Reports for months concerned.
*Less Homicides
From Evaluation of LEMRAS, Ibid., Appendix A, Table No. 3.
1969
Variance
- 2.3%
-17.9%
- 2.0%
-14.6%
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1969 PART I ARRESTS *
PERCENT CHANGE FROM 1968
PERIODS = THROUGH =
+ 16.0%
+ 14.5%
+ 11.9%
Van Nuys
Division
4 Val ley
Divisions
16 City
Divisions
*FROM: EVALUATION OF LEMRAS, IBID, APPENDIX A, CHART NO. 4
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other factors involved which influence the crime rate to make
such a strong statement without qualification.
Quantitative indicators paint a positive picture, but
interviews held with police personnel in the division where LEMRAS
is being implemented also indicate that there were problems.
Time permitted interviews with only five patrolmen, so it is
impossible to reach any definitive conclusions. However, their
observations are interesting. Patrolmen pointed out that
although response to an average of 95% of calls could be
accomplished without delay, there were too many occasions each
day when backlogs of calls would occur, and citizens would have to
wait too long for police service. They felt that LEMRAS was
too inflexible and did not consider enough variables in arriving
at its predictions. Calls for services did not seem adequate
as the primary determinant; other suggested factors included
number of arrests, response to crimes observed by the police,
station calls for administrative business, and administrative
duties which make an officer unavailable for patrol (e.g., station
calls, court attendance, etc.).
The main problem cited, though, was that LEIMAS sometimes
seemed to conflict with the Los Angeles Police Department "Basic
Car Plan." The Basic Car Plan is a program under which one basic
car is assigned to a geographic area. Enough men are allocated
to the car to staff the vehicle twenty-four hours a day, and one
278.
officer is made responsible. The idea is to improve police-citizen
relations and to build a trust and pride in law enforcement
service. Officers assigned to the "basic car" meet with the
citizens in their area once a month. Presentations are made,
and people in the community are given the opportunity to ask
questions. By getting the people in the comrunity together with
the police officers who "work" their area it is hoped that people
will begin to communicate and that a personal touch can be added
to police work, perhaps even restoring some of the aspects of
the role of the policeman years ago when he would walk the beat
and serve as a social agent in his community. No attempt is being
made to evaluate the basic car plan in this study, but during
the site visit the author attended one of the monthly meetings
in an area, and the overall reaction seemed to be quite positive.
One important aspect of the basic car plan is that a car
is expected to spend 50% of its time working with the people in
the area. However, LEMRAS's seems to contradict that principle.
It was found in one rough survey in the division utilizing LEMRAS
that the Basic Cars were responding to calls outside their area
about 30% of their time, thus making it difficult for them to
spend half of their time working with the people in their area.
Although effective overall allocation was being provided
(as illustrated by the statistics in response to calls for service
cited above), for at least some of the men in the division this
meant a decreased opportunity to work with people and a deemphasis
279.
on the sometimes forgotten human side of police work. The solution
of one officer would have been to use LEMRAS, but to set the
program so as to respond to as close to 100% of calls without
41
delay as possible. This would mean taking most if not all
cars off preventive patrol and putting them into "basic areas",
thus allowing for smaller basic car beats and increase manpower
to respond to calls.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In conclusion, then, it should be clear that the benefits
and costs of computerized resource allocation are still mixed.
The reality does not live up to some of the glowing reports which
are sometimes made. However, at a minimum, planning and deploy-
ment efforts have already done much to show that there are more
ways to fight crime than simply to "get more men out on the
street". Naturally, most chiefs will continue to ask for more
men and in some cases rightfully so. However, this approach will
increasingly be supplemented by the concept of achieving a better
utilization of the men who are available. It may take time, but
as this type of thinking becomes more widespread, it highlights
a major impact and change in law enforcement philosophy. In fact,
41 n essence, it is mathematically impossible to set the
programs so the 100% of calls could be responded to without delay.
See, for example, Chaiken and Larson, Op. cit., pp. 16 - 22.
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according to the ICMA survey, resource allocation and deployment
was the area where police felt that the computer had had the
greatest effect to date (Figure V-8). Although site visits
show that this response is probably slightly overenthusiastic,
the fact that police departments perceive this to be the applica-
tion of greatest effect is of real significance. If policemen
believe that the use of the computer in resource allocation is
important, then they will behave as if it is, and the signifi-
cance will continue to grow in the future.
The use of the computer for the allocation of police
resources is also a good illustration of the complexities in-
volved in implementing unstructured, innovative computer uses.
Non-routine uses require creative approaches which meet the be-
havioral, organizational, and personnel problems which can be
expected to arise. Further, an assessment of benefits versus costs
is far more complicated. It is very difficult to pinpoint the
precise cause of a decrease or raise in the crime rate, and to
attribute such a change solely to a new system of deploying
manpower is probably overstating the benefit and simplifying
the causal relationship. Still, measures of effectiveness must
be attempted.
Perhaps one of the primary lessons to be learned from
observation of resource allocation applications may be that it
will not be the sophisticated, elegant mathematical model alone
that will assure the success of computer use. It is also essential
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that the factors which are important in implementing computer use
such as education and the proper involvement of police personnel
be given prime consideration. When the problems of computer
use by the police were discussed in Chapter II, one of the basic
conclusions was that it is not technical reasons that seem to
be holding us back, but instead behavioral and people-oriented
difficulties. Applications in the area of resource allocation help
to confirm that proposition. The allocation model in St. Louis
is heralded as the most advanced implemented to date, yet
because police commanders don't understand the potential for them,
in many districts the technology goes by the wayside. In contrast,
the sytem in Dayton is simpler and has conceptual difficulties,
but the fact of the matter is, it works. In this case, though,
simply working is not enough as a criteria for success either.
As stated earlier, both effectiveness in implementation and effective-
ness in design are essential to the overall success of a computer
application.
Finally, the analysis of resource allocation applications
suggests a conflict between the use of technology and the achieve-
ment of a "personalized" police force. The conflict between LEMRAS
and the basic car plan in the Los Angeles Police Department point
to this dilemma. This is not to say that this potential clash
cannot be resolved, but it should not be forgotten.
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CONCLUSIONS ON UNSTRUCLTURED POLICE COMPUTER APPLICATIONS
In this chapter the use of computers by police to aid in
the areas of criminal investigation, command and control, and
resource allocation have each been discussed in turn. It seems
too simplistic to conclude that the ultimate impact regarding
the use in these areas is still far from certain, and that both
implementation and evaluation are complex due to the organizational,
behavioral, and subjective issues which exist. However, such is
the case. Further, as has been discussed, the benefits and
costs in such unstructured areas are often difficult to value,
as some of the previous pages will attest. Still, given the
fact that police operations are highly labor intensive, it
would be surprising if these types of innovations in computer
technology could not be supported, at least on a cost basis
and in terms of effectiveness. Richard Larson argues that this
is probably the case. "Since one additional 24-hour two-man patrol
unit costs in excess of $100,000 annually, a new technology
that improves operation by the same amount as a given number of
additional patrol cars can be argued on cost grounds if its
annual cost is less than that number times the unit cost of
42
patrol."
Larson goes on to illustrate his point with a car locator
system, and since such locators have been discussed in this
42
Richard C. Larson, Urban Police Patrol Analysis, M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, p. 10.
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chapter it seems appropriate to refer to his illustration.
"Car locator systems have recently been justified on this
basis. Such systems would provide the dispatcher with
up-to-the minute estimates of the positions of all patrol
units, thereby increasing the chance that the most
appropriate unit is dispatched to the scene. Such improved
information leads to smaller travel times. By computing
the number of additional patrol units in the current
system needed to achieve equivalent travel time reductions,
one can compute the relative cost-effectiveness of the
car locator system. Thus, for instance, if a car locator
system reduces travel time in a city by the same amount
as six full-time two-man patrol units each costing
$150,000 annually than the car locator system is said
to be cost-effective if its equivalent annual cost is
less than $900,000.,'43
Larson goes on to state that in reality the analysis is
not nearly so simple as the illustration above implies. Changes
in operation involve a number of other "softer" improvements
such as increased officer safety, increased administrative and
management capability, and greater flexibility. They also involve
increased "softer" costs such as the depersonalization which may
result when assigned beats are eliminated because of increasing
cross-beat dispatching, and behavioral resistance to change. Such
softer variables must receive careful consideration, and in some
cases, they may be the most important factors.
It should be remembered that there is a difference between
simply generating better data and providing real law enforcement
benefits. People are still the most important element in utilizing
43
Ibid., pp. 10 - 11.
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any information acquired. New techniques can be devised, but
if the people are unable to use them, little substantive change
will occur. For example, a police officer in one of the cities
visited felt that computers would have little impact on decision-
making in his department, at least with the current administrators.
"They're used to making decisions based on their seat of the
pants judgement. Having a computer won't change that, not with
these people." Or, as another officer put it, the potential
is there, but there are only a few police departments in the
country where they are really ready to put the computer to use
in anything more than providing rapid retrieval of information.
The introduction of an information technology in a police
department is the introduction of significant organizational
change. With it comes uncertainty. Some people in the department
will gain in power and influence, others will lose. Resistance
is primarily a function of whether or not people view such a
change to be to their benefit. As pointed out and examined in
Chapter IV, the dynamics of change are vital in understanding the
impact and implementation of computers.
Finally, it should be remembered that in most cases
discussed in this paper, effectiveness has been defined in a
very narrow way- -the improvement of police service with respect
to a faster response time, a higher arrest rate, an increase
in revenues through the collection of outstanding warrants, an
increase in the number of tickets issued, and perhaps, a decrease
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in the crime rate. These; xieasures are related to a traditional
definition of the police task and in most cases they imply that
the things the police are doing are appropriate, that it is
beneficial for the police to use the computer in order to increase
their efficiency in carrying out these activities. Since these
basic assumptions can be questioned, the measured "effectiveness"
of police computer applications can also be questioned. This
will be done in Chapters VI and VII. Further, payoffs from
computer systems have not only technical implications, but power
and service impacts. To the extent impact has been discussed in
this chapter it has related primarily to the technical side.
Chapter VI will discuss some of the power and service aspects of
information technology and the influence of the computer on
basic police issues.
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CHAPTER VI
IMPACT OF THE COMPUTER ON THE POLICE
Our country is currently faced with a number of basic
issues regarding law enforcement and police work. Chapter I
identified three areas which seem to be at the heart of these
issues: structure, people, and task. What should be the organi-
zational and management structure of police departments? What
type of people should be recruited by the police, and how should
they be trained? What should comprise the principle task of
the police?
So far in the paper the primary focus has been on identi-
fying how computers are used in police departments and in trying
to assess some of their advantages and disadvantages in a rather
narrow way. Using Anthony Downs' definition outlined in Chapter III,
the primary "payoffs" that have been discussed so far have been
1
"technical" in nature. It now seems appropriate to turn to a
broader focus and to ask what impact, if any, the computer will
2 3
have regarding power" and "service" payoffs as well, particularly
as they relate to the basic issues which the police face.
As the analysis proceeds, though, a few basic qualifications
1
As discussed in Chapter III, Anthony Downs has defined
technical computer payoffs as technical improvements in data
input, processing, and outputs. Examples are greater speed of
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should be remembered. First, computer use is still in its infancy,
relatively speaking. In its early stages of development few
people imagined the widespread influence both positive and negative
that the automobile would have on modern society. Information
technology will continue to mature as did the motor vehicle
and those police departments which resist will not be able to do
so forever. It is therefore important to add a time dimension to
the examination regarding computer impact. The implications to
date will be discussed in this report, but the greatest "payoffs"
will not be in the short run, but in the long run. a As a con-
sequence, much of the information available in this chapter is
not only descriptive but predictive.
processing, greater consistency among outputs, and wider distri-
bution of information. (Anthony Downs, "A Realistic Look at the
Final Payoffs From Urban Data Systems", Public Administration
Review, September, 1967, pp. 204-210.)
2
"Power payoffs" are gains in one person's decisionmaking
effectiveness made at the expense of another person's. They
are redistributions of the benefits of decision making.
3
"Service payoffs", also discussed in Chapter III, are
defined as the degree to which the taxpayer is serviced by
municipal information systems so that their quality of life can
be improved. These then are improvements in the service to the
public provided as a result of or in connection with the use of
the computer. (Myron E. Weiner, Service: The Objective of
Municipal Information Systems, Institute of Public Service,
The University of Connecticut, 1969, p. 29.)
aPerhaps one of the greatest eventual impacts will be in
the area of privacy and influence on individual rights. Although
this question is not covered directly in the text, Appendix C
is devoted to a brief discussion of the issues of privacy as
they relate to the use of the computer by the police.
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It has also been demonstrated that the impact of computer
use will vary widely from police department to police department,
and this makes it more difficult to generalize regarding the
influence of automation, at least in the short run. It is the
feeling of this author, though, that eventually the greatest
influence of the computer will not be through the "technical"
improvements which they bring, but through the more subtle
impacts on police administration, management, and politics.
Naturally the subtle administrative "power" impacts of technology
will be harder to identify and longer in coming, but they will
come. For this reason it is important to begin to examine the
use of the computer on police structure, people, and task.
THE IMPACT ON STRUCTURE
In an article referred to earlier in the thesis Harold
Leavitt discusses organizations as complex systems with four basic
components: structure, task, technology and people. He goes
on to define the structural component as the "systems of
communication, systems of authority, and systems of work flow"
4
within the organization. Some of the most significant issues
the police face have to do with their structure and the subsequent
4
Harold J. Leavitt, "Applied Organizational Change in
Industry: Structural, Technological and Humanistic Approaches",
found in James G. March, Ed., Handbook of Organizations, Rand
McNally and Co., 1965, pp. 1144-1170.
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communication, authority and workflow. However, after considering
the research performed to date, it does not seem that the use of
the computer by the police will result in dramatic structural
changes, at least in the short run. Instead, the impacts will
be more subtle. Direct major organizational shifts are not expected,
but definite impacts of a different nature are contemplated. For
example, it is perceived that the use of the computer has resulted
and will continue to result in power shifts (raises in one person's
decision making power primarily at the expense of another's)
within the police bureaucracy. Trends of this nature which
seem to be occuring include:
1) A shift in the work activities of those doing routine
and recording tasks in police departments, but not a loss
of jobs.
2) An increase in influence and importance of those who
have technical backgrounds related to quantitative or
computer skills.
3) A movement towards greater power for those at the
higher levels of police bureaucracy.
4) A supporting and even stimulating effect for professional
police departments vs. more traditional style forces.
Each of these will be addressed below.
A Shift in Work Activities Related to Routine and Recording
Tasks. One of the earliest hopes and fears of those who contem-
plated the coming of automation was the possibility that people
would be replaced by machines. To those worried about loosing
their jobs the coming of the computer was a threat; to those who
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were concerned about reducing costs in both the public and private
sector there was a glimmer of hope that the use of the computer
to reduce manpower would help. Experience over the course of the
past decade, though, has generally demonstrated that computer
use does not result in a reduction in personnel, and the observations
pertaining to police departments clearly correspond. When asked
by the I.C.M.A. as to what the major influence of the computer
had been regarding the work activities of those doing routine
and recording tasks, not a single police department indicated that
people had been forced from their jobs by the introduction of
the computer (see Table VI-1).
Besides the fact that police departments are insulated
bureaucracies and would resist the "laying off" of men under
practically any conditions, there are other good reasons for
this reversal of earlier expectations. A large number of routine
activities are required to facilitate automated data processing.
People are needed to code information, key punch records, and
verify recorded data. Many police departments in the I.C.M.A. survey
(6 out of every 10 or 57.1%) indicated that the major influence
of the computer was not an elimination of jobs, but a shift in
work activities of those doing routine and recording tasks.
People continued doing work of a routine nature, but instead
of processing manual records, updating index file cards, etc.,
they were key punching, verifying, coding, etc. In fact, 30%
of the police departments responding indicated that computer use
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had lead to the creation of jobs when additional clerks were hired
in order to handle EDP needs.
Besides shifting the activites of people in order to
carry out computer data processing work, it also seems that increased
automation in some departments has lead to a freeing up of
people to do nonclerical and in some cases more creative work in
their police department. Better than one out of every three
police departments (34.8%) indicated that this had been the
case (see Table VI-1). Whereas the major overall effect of
computer use regarding routine work activities seems to shift
people from clerical work related to manual information processing
to clerical work related to automated data processing, in each
department the precise impact seems to vary. In some departments
people are simply retrained and additional people may even be
hired. In other departments people are still retained but some
are detailed to do computer clerical work while others are assigned
to carry out nonclerical activities.
An Increase in Influence of Those With Technical or
Quantitative Skills. As indicated earlier, power shifts will
occur as a result of police computer use bringing about informal,
subtle changes in structure. One such shift will be the increased
influence within police departments of those who work with quanti-
tative or automated methods.
In the I.C.M.A. survey chiefs of police were asked if
293.
TABLE VI-1
INFLUENCE OF THE COMPUTER ON ROUTINE AND RECORDING TASKS
Number
Indicating
Influence (A)
Per cent of
Total Number
Responding
(N=112)*
People are still doing
routine tasks 64 57.1%
Freed people to do
non-clerical work 39 34.8
Has led to additional
EDP clerical help 34 30.4
No significant effect 14 12.5
People have had to
leave department 0 0
Other 11 9.8
TOTAL 162t 144.6t
*Of 146 departments using computers, 112 responded to this question.
tTotal greater than 112 and 100% since multiple responses were
allowed.
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changes had "taken place in the amount of control or influence
exercised by different people or divisions in the police department
as a result of putting the computer into use?" Space was provided
to indicate whether the chief, the assistant chief, precinct
or division commanders, the planning-research division, the data
processing division or the patrolmen in the field had gained
or lost influence as a result of automation. In answer to this
question, responding departmnents pointed out that the greatest
gains in influence had been made by the research and planning
divisions and the data processing divisions within police units.
Six out of every ten responses (59.0% for data processing and
58.2% for research and planning) indicated that those divisions
had received more influence (see Table VI-2). This was compared
to only 43.6% indicating more influence for the chief of police
and 42.2% point to an increase in importance of precinct or
division commanders.
In further substantiation of this point, police chiefs
were asked if the computer had created pressure to use quantita-
tive or numerical information to justify decisions that were
formerly treated as "intuitive", "seat of the pants" or "quali-
tative". Eight out of ten responded "yes" or "partially", and
of those who did so, a large majority (81.3%) felt that this
emphasis on quantitative rather than the qualitative decision making
was about right (see Table VI-3). Not only is the quantitative
approach becoming increasingly important, it is not being met
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TABLE VI-3
HAS THE COMPUTER CREATED PRESSURE TO QUANTIFY?
Number
Indicating
(A)
Per cent
of Total
Responding
57
52
25
38.8
18.7
TOTAL RESPONDING
Response
Yes
Partial:ly
No
134
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by major resistance at least by those police chiefs answering
the I.C.M.A. survey. It only stands to reason that those who
have a greater understanding of computers and quantitative techniques
will continue to gain in power as the importance of such methods
in police work grows.
Still, greater control for those at the top and a more
quantitative approach to police problem solving will not come
automatically with the introduction of the computer. People are
still people, and the personalities and individual styles
involved will have a major influence in determining the impact
of computer use in each department. Speaking frankly, the
computer will probably do little to alter these styles of approach
in the short run if they are firmly entrenched. For example,
in one department a patrolman working in data processing was
asked if he felt that the computer would bring about a more
quantified approach to decision making. His response was, "No,
not with the current administrators. They're used to making
decisions by the seat of the pants, and the computer is not going
to change that." In the long run, though, it is felt that the
computer will be an important influence in bringing about subtle,
but significant shifts in the focus of police personnel and how
they approach the solution of law enforcement problems.
Greater Power for Those at the Higher Levels of Police
Bureaucracy. Police departments tend to have fairly rigid
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bureaucracies with the chief playing a central, controlling role.
The chief is usually responsible for rule-making and final decisions
regarding innovation. Below the chief is a definite hierarchy
with well-defined upward reporting relationships. Although the
question remains complicated, first impressions are that computer
use will tend to increase the power of the chief or at least to
pass influence in an upward direction along the police department
hierarchical ladder. It was found in the I.C.M.A. survey, for
example, that respondents indicated that in half of the police
departments around the country (50.8%) the chief made the initial
proposal for the use of the computer (see Table VI-4), more than
twice as often as the next highest proposer of computer use.
It is possible that this figure is simply a reflection of official
department "crediting" policy, but other indicators also point
to the computer leading to an increase in control of those at
the top. Of those interviewed by the author in the various site
visits, 96% said that they felt that better information provided
by the computer would lead to increased control of the police
department by those at the middle and top management level.
Still, because the task of the patrolman on the street
is so discretionary, it is impossible to dictate all police
behavior, no matter the power of those at higher levels. The
computer will not change this basic fact of police work. In fact,
by providing rapid and accurate information to the patrolman, the
computer will serve to increase his capability and effectiveness
TABLE VI-4
299.
Note: This table is
identical with
IV-
WHO MADE THE INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR COMPUTER USE?
Response
Chief of Police
Asst. Chief or Chief's Direct Staff
Data Processing Manager
Planning, Research Director
Other Administrative Officer
Office of Mayor or City Manager
Outside Consultant
Other
TOTAL RESPONDING
Number
Indicating
(A)
60
23
11
15
12
24
9
9
163t
Per cent of
Total Number
Responding
(N 118)*
50.8%
19.5
9.3
12.7
10.2
20.3
7.6
7.6
138.0t
WHAT STIMULATED THEIR INTEREST?
Professional Meetings
Journals or Written Reports
Activity in other Cities, States
Computer Salesman
Outside Consultants
FBI Crime Reporting
IACP Department Surveys
Federal Assistance
Other
TOTAL RESPONDING
42
29
72
8
14
19
17
16
15
232t
(N=1ll) A
37.8%
26.1
64.9
7.2
12.6
17.1
15.3
14.4
13.5
208.8t
*Of 146 departments using computers, 118 responded to this question.
tMultiple responses possible.
AOf 146 departments using computers, 111 responded to this question.
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as well. However, this type of data is somewhat different from
the data received at the middle and top management level. At
those levels the information provided by the computer will be
information which can be used to evaluate behavior and to measure
effectiveness. Despite the existence of rigid hierarchies among
the police little such evaluation usually occurs, but it seems
that if additional information and quantitative measures of
evaluation are produced, they will serve to strengthen the control
within police departments. Who actually benefits will naturally
depend on the ability of various people to use the information
generated effectively. Use of the computer then will not just
automatically lead to a passing of power upward within police
organization, but it will lead to a passing of power within the
bureaucracy of those who know how to use the information generated,
whether it be the chief of police, a district commander or
whatever.
If increased computerization leads to a potential shifting
of power upward within the police, one may ask how this coincides
and conflicts with the current pressures for decentralization
of power and community control. Such pressures have appeared in
a number of shapes and forms recently, but two of these threads
seem to be of greatest significance. First, there are pressures
to decentralize the control of the police, or in other words to
disperse the authority that governs the police and to put it in
the hands of local neighborhood communities and the supposedly
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representative governing bodies that might be selected by these
communities. And second, there are proposals to bring about
administrative decentralization. This would not result in any
drastic shifts of outside control of the police, but it could
mean shifts of power within the police department. The question
is how the computer might relate to these pressures? Anthony
Downs has postulated that the use of automated information systems
will result in gains in power by the government bureaucracy
as a whole at the expense of the general electorate and non-
5
governmental groups. It is likely that this will be the case
with police computer systems. Certainly it is possible to
centralize control with the police in certain areas (e.g., in-
vestigation of major crimes, centralized records, overall allo-
cation of resources, etc.) and still leave a certain amount of
local autonomy (e.g., citizen review of police behavior, local
modification of resource allocation). Such a centralized-
decentralized compromise is very unlikely to develop, however,
unless forced by political pressure. Police administrators are
unlikely to give up their control willingly both for reasons
of personal power and a fear of what the results might be. At
the most, a chief of police might be willing to establish a
greater administrative decentralization, but in such a situation
5
Anthony Downs, "A Realistic Look at the Final Payoffs
From Urban Data Systems", Op. cit., p. 208.
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power will simply be passed down to precinct and district
commanders and not to the control of various people within the
community.
In this power conflict, the use of the computer and the
information it generates cannot be expected to remain neutral.
Information is power, and if automation provides greater infor-
mation for evaluation and control, whether it goes to the chief
or to his district captain, such data can be expected to be used
to strengthen the role of evaluation and control. Police personnel
are responsible for deciding what information should go into the
system, and police personnel will basically decide the use
which it receives. Anthony Downs had the following to say about
the gain in power to government bureaucracy at the expense of
the general electorate as a result of computer information
systems, and his conclusions seem directly applicable to the police.
"Government officials have continuous 'inside access'
to the data generated by automated systems, and they also
control which data are built into those systems. No
matter how idealistic they are, they will resist universal
accessibility to these data. This occurs because accurate
and detailed reporting of the behavior of any large
organization- -private or public- -will inevitably reveal
operating deficiencies that would be embarrassing if
widely known. Moreover, the general electorate and most
nongovernmental groups are not technically sophisticated
when it comes to understanding and interpreting complex
data."
6
Ibid., p. 208.
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Movement Towards Professional Police Departments vs. More
Traditional Ones. In Varieties of Police Behavior, James Q. Wilson
discusses eight police departments and their varying styles
7
of operation. Three categories of style were identified: the
legalistic style (professional), the watchman style (traditional),
and the service style. Each of these were discussed in the first
8
chapter of this paper. Later on in his book, Wilson makes a
brief but interesting effort to generalize his conclusions to
a wider sampling of cities around the country. Form of government,
somewhat modified, is used as a substitute measure of political
climate. Four kinds of cities are identified- -those with a
mayor and council chosen by districts on a partisan ballot, those
with a mayor and council chosen on a nonpartisan ballot, those
with a council-manager government and a manager ranking low on a
scale of "professionalism", and those with a council-manager
9
government in which the manager scores high on such a scale.
7
James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, The
Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities, Atheneum, New
York, 1970.
8
Ibid, pp. 271-277.
9
"Two extreme types of council-manager cities were used-
-those with a manager having none of the 'professional' attributes
and those with a manager having all or most of these attributes.
The 'high professional' manager cities are in general those where
the manager has a post-graduate degree, has had previous exper-
ience in city management or other public capacity, and was
brought to the city where he was serving in 1960 from another
community. The 'low professional' cities are those where the
manager has no more than a bachelor's degree, has had no previous
304.
Wilson goes on to explain that the theory underlying
these categories is as follows:
". . the more partisan the political system, the more
politicians represent small geographic constituencies, and
the more nonprofessional the executive head of the govern-
ment, the more likely the city will have a political culture
favorable to the watchman police style. By contrast,
cities electing nonpartisan officials at large and vesting
executive authority in a highly professional city manager
will more likely have a political culture favoring
the legalistic police style. "l0
In order to test this idea, Wilson uses the arrest rate
for certain offenses as a substitue measure of law enforcement
policy or police style. The offenses used are those where police
discretion is great and as a consequence where police style is
likely to be most evident: larcenysimple assaults, drunkenness,
disorderly conduct, and driving while intoxicated. Controlling
for such factors as city size, wealth, and disproportionately
high non-white population, comparisons were then made between
number of arrests and form of government. (Wilson is careful
to emphasize that police style is not always best measured by
arrest rates, even for high-discretion offenses.) In making
experience in city management, and was recruited from the same
city where he was serving in 1960." Wilson, Ibid., p. 273.
10
Ibid., p. 272.
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these comparisons, Wilson outlines his specific hypotheses as
follows:
"Cities with professionalized 'good government' regimes
would be likely to have legalistic police forces that
made more arrests than other cities in law enforcement
situations (that is, for larceny and driving while in-
toxicated); that cities with partisan, mayor-council
regimes would be more likely to have watchman-style police
forces that would make more arrests in order maintenance
situations where the action is typically police-initiated
(that is, for disorderly conduct); that in order maintenance
situations where the police response is citizen-invoked
(that is, assault), there would be relatively little dif-
ference between police departments, and thus between
cities, because arrests in these cases require citizen
cooperation and therefore depend more on the
characteristics of the citizens than on the characteristics
of the police; and finally that drunkenness arrests
might or might not differ, depending on whether the
police saw such matters as problems of law enforcement
or order maintenance, but that professionalized cities
would probably show a higher arrest rate because they
were more likely to take the law enforcement point of
view."
Naturally, this methodology is rough and Wilson is
quick to qualify his subsequent conclusions. However, with a
special note to remember these self-proclaimed difficulties, the
results of his attempt are engaging and have an interesting
connection with this study. Table VI-5 outlines the arrest
rates for the selected offenses according to the community political
groupings explained above. The data seems to confirm the basic
hypotheses: city manager cities with "good government regimes"
seem to be more prone to have legalistic police forces, while
cities with more partisan mayor-council governments seem to be
more likely to have watchman style police forces. "The arrest
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rate per 100,000 population for larceny and drunkenness is nearly
twice as high in the professional as in the partisan cities,
whereas the rate for driving while intoxicated is about 50%
higher. The arrest rate for disorderly conduct, on the other hand,
is 42% higher in the partisan than in the professional cities.
The assault arrest rate, however, is about the same in the two
extreme city types."
Once again pointing out the crudeness and inadequacy of
statistical tests, Wilson concludes:
" .. there is good reason to believe that police pro-
fessionalism and municipal reform apparently have real
consequences for the substance of law enforcement not
just in the eight cities studied intensively but perhaps
in cities generally, even though the effects may be less
dramatic in the typical case than in the pure' types
selected for this study. And thus there is good reason
to believe that politics, in the broadest sense, influences
law enforce.¶.t but that the influence is more direct than
deliberate. "
It is engaging, now, to relate Wilson's findings dis-
cussed above with some that were pointed out earlier in Chapter II
as a part of this study. Tying the two together is revealing
concerning the relationship between style of police operation
and the use of computers.
In the I.C.M.A. survey it was found that police departments
in city manager cities were more likely to use computers than
11
Ibid., p. 274.
12
Ibid., p. 277.
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those in mayor-council cities. This relationship held true
despite the fact that most large cities which are prone to use
computers are mayor-council cities. (See Table II-1 and Figure
II-7, both in Chapter II.)
If police departments in city manager cities are more
likely to use computers (based on I.C.M.A. study) and to have
a legalistic or professional style of operation (according to
Wilson's study), then it leads to several interesting hypotheses:
first, that legalistic or professional police departments are
more likely to use a computer; and second, that the use of the
computer might eventually lead to a more legalistic or professional
approach by a police department.
For a legalistic police department the computer offers
the perfect tool to begin to evaluate success and to continually
move towards standards of performance. That is one reason why
police departments in city manager cities are more prone to a
professional style and in turn are more prone to use a computer.
In keeping with this, it seems that professional police departments
would have a greater chance for success in the mplementation of
computer use due to the responsive atmosphere which most likely
exists.
The evidence gathered during the site visits seems to
confirm this idea. The two police departments visited that were
most effective in using computers were Kansas City, Missouri and
Los Angeles, California (see Chapter IV). Los Angeles is noted
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throughout the country for its professional approach to police work,
and Kansas City, Missouri is fast developing a similar reputation.
Both are illustrations of a professional approach to police work
coupled and aided by an "effective" computer system. On the
other hand, several of the police departments (especially Boston)
which would tend to be classified as more watchman or traditional
13
style departments, seemed to be having difficulty by comparison.
Clearly, it would be fallacious to conclude that Los Angeles'
success in computer use is aided only as a result of their pro-
fessional style and that Boston has suffered problems only because
of their traditional approach. Still, it is a viable hypothesis
that police style will have a definite influence on police computer
use.
Not only is a professional department more likely to
use a computer, though, it also seems that computer use will
reinforce and even foster a professional approach. Within the
last several years computers have become status symbols for
police departments. With the availability of federal dollars
even police departments with a more traditional style have
purchased computers, and it is the feeling of this author that
the result has been a subtle push towards the professional, a
push towards measuring effectiveness quantitatively and towards
13In Thomas Repettos' Ph.D. Thesis, Boston is clearly
identified as a traditional, watchman style police department.
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utilizing quantitative analysis. Although perhaps nonmeasureable
in some departments, the overall influence will be towards a
more legalistic approach to police structure and task, and an
attempt to move matters of order maintenance in the direction
of law enforcement activities.
THE IMPACT ON PEOPLE
Many of the effects of computer use on police personnel
will come as a result of possible modifications in structure and/or
redefinitions of task and have therefore already been discussed.
In summary, it has been found that the importance of personnel
with quantitative backgrounds will increase. Further, the computer
will result in a shift in work for those doing routine tasks,
but it does not seem that it will result in a loss of jobs. If
the computer influences a redefinition or reemphasis in police
task, then the work of police personnel will be altered accordingly.
Still, the real impact of the computer on police depart-
ments will depend on the way it is received by the people within
the department and on their perception and utilization of the
machine as an effective tool. The amount of information collected
may or may not have any bearing on the outcome of a decision,
depending on the people and perspectives involved. Politics,
environment, and human nature all can, and perhaps should, over-
shadow the quantitative approach.
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In one of the cities visited, one policeman who has
been involved with computers from the early days of their appli-
cation in law enforcement felt that due to the attitudes and
reactions of peoplevthere were really only four or five police de-
partments throughout the country where they were ready to use
the computer as an effective management tool, as more than simply
a provider of rapid and useful information to the man in the
street. The primary reasons were twofold: first, the lack of
vision and direction on the part of the chiefs of police; and
second, a lack of enthusiasm and understanding on the part of the
patrolman on the street. According to the officer interviewed,
most policemen, particularly at the lower levels, "go to sleep
when you talk about using computers or better information for
decision making."
On the other hand, a number of police officers were
enthusiastic about the potential of the computer, particularly
regarding the impact that it might have on people within the
police department. Several police officers felt that one of the
greatest potential long run, subtle impacts of the computer would,
be to raise the quality of personnel in the department at all
levels and to force better administration. According to one
assistant chief of police, "As the computers come in, we're
going to see the last of the old time policeman, and that's good.
It's going to take a bright young man to learn how to use this
thing. Either I'm going to learn to think computers, or I'm
312.
going to have to get the hell out of here." This does not
mean that a man must be able to use the computer in order to
advance in rank in a police department. It does mean, though,
that police administrators will increasingly be required to
digest statistical information; and in the view of the assistant
chief quoted, this would have an affirmative effect in the
long run on the quality of law enforcement personnel.
In sumnary, the computer cannot be expected to resolve
the major law enforcement issues regarding police personnel.
But with time, subtle impacts may evolve. Increased emphasis
will be focused on the quantitative, and eventually automation may
serve to stimulate better information in the department and a
higher quality of police personnel. Still, such results are in
the future and in the short run basic "people" questions still
remain, such as what type of people should police departments
recruit? What should be the criteria for promotion? And what
training should be involved?
THE IMPACT ON POLICE TASK
Although the influence to date may be small, some impact
on police task as a result of law enforcement use of the computer
can already be identified, and this effect will continue to grow.
Two of these impacts will be discussed at this time: first, the
improved efficiency and reinforcement of current police tasks; and
second, alterations in the way police work is performed.
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Improved Efficiency and the Reinforcement of Current
Police Tasks. First, improved "police efficiency" will occur as
a result of implementing computer use. Improved "efficiency" will
be somewhat narrowly defined here to refer to the fact that certain
computer application will bring an increased output or perfor-
mance regarding aspects of law enforcement activity. As reported
earlier in the thesis in Chapter IV, applications for police
patrol and inquiry have already shown increased arrests from out-
standing warrants and in some cases subsequently increased revenues
as a result of rapid computerized response to requests or inquiries
from the field (especially in such cities as Kansas City, Los
Angeles, and Long Beach). In some cities, preliminary data has
even shown that reductions in the crime rate have occurred at
the same time that computer applications have been installed.
Such was the case in Kansas City with computer assisted resource
allocation for traffic control as reported in Chapter V. Causal
relations have not been proven, but there are strong probabilities
that such relationships exist. Improved efficiencies in police
administration and record keeping have brought better reports and
more accurate records. It is now possible for a number of
police departments to keep better tabs on what is happening in
their department and who is performing well.
Still, the definition of efficiency as used here is a
limited one. Since law enforcement needs are so closely meshed
with a variety of currents in our society, it is difficult to
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establish direct relationships between new techniques and even
such basic indicators as changes in a city's crime rate.
In an exploratory study such as this, time has not permitted the
collection of the data that would be necessary to attempt such an
effort. As a result, measures of efficiency have been reduced to
such indicators as increases in the number of persons arrested, the
recovery of stolen cars, and increased city revenues stemming
from better traffic enforcement and collection of parking tickets.
Using such measures, particularly illustrated in Chapter
IV, computer applications have proven successful in increasing
efficiency. However, outside this narrow context, it is difficult
to evaluate success regarding police task. By improving efficiency
in carrying out various aspects of police work, the current tasks
of police are reinforced. Although only a small portion of the
policeman's time is actually spent performing "law enforcement"
type tasks, many policemen still view themselves as crime fighters
and their orientation is biased in that direction. In most de-
partments little time is spent training a policeman how to settle
a family disturbance; instead the focus is on enforcing the law.
To the extent that the computer aids the policeman in improving his
efficiency in carrying out law enforcement tasks, automation will
serve to reinforce the current focus of the police.
If evaluation of performance is based on number of arrests
made, and the computer makes it easier to determine that number,
then automation will reinforce the importance of making arrests.
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The paper has already pointed out that the computer has brought
an increased influence for quantitative measure and those
people who are best at using them. Since quantitative indicators
are often developed in those areas where emphasis in the depart-
ment is being placed, computer use will support that emphasis.
In addition.; it can be expected that those tasks which are most
easily quantified will receive increased attention.
Naturally, a final determination as to whether this is
good or bad must remain as a value judgement. To many it is a
positive factor and will serve to bring a greater precision to
the police task. To others who question the current emphasis of
police work or who do not believe that the current task focus is
correct, the implementation of quantitative measures of
effectiveness and the computer is a potential threat and tends to
place emphasis on the wrong areas. Although saying little about
computers, James Q. Wilson has this to say about the use of only
numerical indicators to measure police success:
" The central problem of the patrolman and thus of the
police is to maintain order and to reduce, to the limited
extent possible, the opportunities for crime. Neither
objective is served by judging men on the basis of their
arrest records. Both objectives may be served by organi-
zing and supervising the patrolmen so as to increase their
capacity to make reliable judgements about the character,
motives, intentions and likely future actions of those
whom they must police . . . . The police supervisor, in
turn, would have to judge his patrolmen on the basis of
their ability to keep the peace on their beat, and this,
like the judgement the patrolman must make about the
citizen is necessarily subjective and dependent on close
observation and personal familiarity. Those departments
that evaluate officers by 'objectivet measuresl arrests
and traffic tickets) work against this ideal."
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Related to this if the hypothesis presented in the previous
section of the paper is true, the use of the computer will also
serve to support the legalistic approach to police tasks. In
fact, it may even move some more traditional departments towards
professionalization. rh the eyes of some this is a positive
direction, for others it is a negative and even threatening
possibility. According to William A. Westly,
". .. professionalization, which has been the major
goal of modern police administration during the past two
decades, has the effect of insulating the police from
public pressures. In addition, it presumably is accom-
panied by higher standards and better training (the methods
of insuring professionalization). That we want better
trained, more competent policement, insulated from the
political influence of graft is evident. Yet we must
be wary, since insulation from political influence without
other methods of integration such as a positive relation-
ship to the community, can mean insulation from all of
us, and if the goals of the police should vary from
those of the citizens, it can become a very serious
problem." 
-1 
To the extent that the computer reinforces this professionali-
zation unquestioned, its impact, too, may be negative.
Alterations in the Way Police Work is Performed. Improved
efficiency, professionalization, and the reinforcement of prevailing
approaches to police task are not the only impacts that the
computer may bring on the task performance of the police. Use of
14
James Q. Wilson, Op. cit., p. 291.
1 Ailliam A. Westley, Violence and the Police, A Sociolo-
gical Study of Law, Custon, and Morality, The M.I.T. Press, 1970,
pp. XV-XVI.
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the computer may also result in major alterations in police
operations. Perhaps the most striking potential stems from the
linking of an automated command and control system with new
approaches to resource allocation. Such a link is postulated
by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice:
"A computer assisted command and control system offers
many new possibilities for the deployment and control
of a police force. As the crime pattern in a city
changes hour-by-hour its patrol force could be deployed
to respond to it. As parts of the city are stripped
of patrolman by called-for-services, other units could
be assigned as backup. Under a riot or other emergency
situation contingency plans could be programmed so that
appropriate units would be deployed to the emergency and
adequate backup maintained. With all information on
calls stored in the computer, complete analysis of the
operations of the patrol force could be conducted regularly
to aid in assignig forces in response to changing
crime patterns."
If such computer applications are ever implemented, it
will mean major alterations in police work. A patrolman would
not be assigned to a particular beat, but a "fluid patrol"
would exist instead. When reporting for work he would be told
where to cruise, and a car locator devise would keep constant
track of where he was at so that his time could be put to optimum
use. It is entirely possible that such a method may lead to
greater efficiency, increased officer safety, and improved
administrative capability. However, such changes in the operations
1 6Task Force Report; Science and Technology, Op. cit.,
p. 28. A similar description is also found in Task Force Report;
The Police, Op. cit., pp. 59-60.
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of the police and ther performance of law enforcement tasks will
not come without major difficulties as well.
Financial constraints exist and aspects of technical
feasibility still remain to be worked out. One of the greatest
problems is the potential for depersonalization of police work
which may result and the resistance and difficulties which may
occur as a consequence. In Chapter V this was illustrated by
pointing out the conflict which existed in Los Angeles between
the resource allocation experiment and the department's basic
car plan. The idea of more effective deployment of patrol forces
was well accepted, but the specific application of LEMRAS, their
computerized resource allocation package, lead to a reduction
of the time that a man could spend in his "basic area" because
of increased cross-sector dispatching. The problem in part
was that LEMRAS did not consider enough variables in making
allocation decisions. As a consequence, though, much of the
advantage of the basic car plan was lost. This resulted in
patrolmen complaints of depersonalization and in at least a
partial disapproval of the computer application.
The introduction of fluid patrols has interesting poten-
tial, but it also has psychological and behavioral drawbacks. In
most departments policemen are currently assigned to a beat
and usually remain in that area for some time. This means that
they not only have the opportunity to get to know the people in
the area (some policemen fail to take advantage of this opportunity),
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but they also become familiar with the locations of where crime
is most likely and where preventitive patrol can most effectively
be performed. Further, they get used to eating in certain locations
on their beat and in doing such odd jobs as taking in and picking
up their laundry at certain spots while on patrol. However,
Dick Larson has shown that even when assigned a particular beat,
". .. the physics of radio-dispatch patrol operation often
causes an officer to leave his sector to respond to calls in other
sectors in his command. ... Thus, the one-man, one-sector
concept often breaks down in practice, thereby making it difficult
to assign responsibility for the delivery of services in the
17
sector." With this in mind then, to place too much emphasis on
the one-man, one-beat approach may be a popular myth. Still,
to alter somewhat fixed patterns of behavior through the intro-
duction of fluid patrol will not only meet resistance on the
logical grounds of not providing the policeman with the opportunity
of getting to know a community well, but it will also be fought
because it means a new style of operations and. the necessity
of learning a whole new set of behavioral patterns.
In conclusion, then, this is not to say that such altera-
tions in operation will not come. On the contrary, some form of
1 7Richard C. Larson, Urban Police Patrol Analysis, Op. cit.,
p. 244.
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command and control and automated resource allocation is quite
likely within the next five to ten years. However, it does suggest
that difficulties should be expected and disadvantages to fluid
patrol exist. As a consequence, perhaps the best alternative will
eventually be some type of compromise- -fluid patrols for some
officers but more specific, personalized beats for others. The
question is whether such a compromise can actually be achieved.
At a minimum careful planning, selective enforcement,
and the use of computer technology will bring an end to the
idea that the only way to fight crime is to "get more men out on
the street". Hopefully, this approach will be supplemented by
the concept of doing an increasingly good job of utilizing the men
who are available. It is important for police departments to
realize that employing more policemen is not the only alternative
solution to the cries of law and order. Not only can computer
technology be expected to help, at least in a narrow way, but
other options such as increased communication with the community,
better efforts at education, increased emphasis on an effective
correction process, and support for programs which may be helpful
in removing some of the causes of crime should all be considered
as alternative methods for improving the law enforcement picture
in any one city and in,'our country.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS ON THE USE OF COMPUTERS
BY THE POLICE
Over the last few years use of the computer by the police
has grown significantly. The application of technology has
become a reality in law enforcement work. This utilization will
continue to expand. Certainly much of the growth must be
attributed to the fact that federal dollars have been available
to help finance the costs. A determination as to whether or
not this expense is appropriate is contingent upon an examina-
tion of the benefits and impact of computer use.
At the beginning of this paper the question was raised
whether the expansion of computer use by the police is an
unnecessary waste stimulated by industrial pressure. The con-
clusion at this stage is that although industrial pressure and
the existence of money from the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration have played a major role in promoting and making possible
computer use, in many instances the application of such technology
has proved to be efficient and effective, as long as the criteria
for efficiency and effectiveness is a narrow one as outlined in
Chapter III. Response to the I.C.M.A. survey demonstrated that
favorable reaction to computer use among law enforcement
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personnel was a widespread phenomenon; and a variety of examples
from the site visits have shown that computer use, particularly
structured applications, can save time and dollars. Since the
traditional approach to meeting increased law ernforcement demand
has simply been to "hire more men", the use of analysis aided
by the computer offers a viable alternative which should be
carefully considered.
Still, departments vary widely in the success or failure
of implementing such technology, and a number of the factors
outlined in the previous chapters seem important in achieving
favorable performance. The computer is viewed by some departments
as being a nice but dispensable luxury, and there is always
the potential for waste. What proves successful in one police
department may be far less profitable in another.
There has been an evolution of computer use over the
last ten years, and there is no doubt that some applications
are easier to implement than others. Applications pertaining
to routine or structured areas, particularly, have proven effective,
although even there major differences remain among departments.
The computer has demonstrated its utility in providing rapid
real-time inquiry to the questions of patrolmen in the field and
in improving police performance, although questions of privacy
must constantly be considered (see Appendix C). Use of computers
in police administration, traffic control, and crime reporting
has been shown to bring added revenues and to lighten the paper
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work burden of law enforcement personnel. This level of implemen-
tation is primarily one of handling somewhat routine activities
which were already being performed manually, although most often
far less efficiently. Institutional and major behavioral changes
have not been required for their implementation.
Beyond these basic areas where computer implementation
begins to take on unstructured applications, the design and
execution becomes more difficult. The potential for impact is
greater, but the results are more difficult to measure. The theory
as presented in the literature is often better than the reality
that exists. Most police departments collect large amounts of
information, but often it is not the data that would be most
useful in providing relevant inputs into major patrol and tactical
decisions. Further, when it comes to such uses as computer aided
dispatching command and control systems, and resource allocation,
behavioral factors must be considered carefully, and the results
still remain uncertain. In many cases it is not the technical
but the behavioral, organizational, and administrative difficulties
that keep the police from realizing the full potential of computer
use.
The computer will not change people's basic nature. In
fact, it seems likely that there are only selected departments
that are ready to use the computer for more than a useful, but
relatively routine system of retrieving information rapidly.
As one police data processing manager put it: "Millions of
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dollars have been spent, but there's still an awful lot of garbage
coming out of police computer systems." The state of the art
as portrayed in the literature often exceeds reality, and a lot
of computer hardware has been sold to police departments which
do not need it or do not know how to use it.
The field of computer technology is still in its infancy,
though, and with this in mind, computers should not be expected,
at least in the next few years, to make major alterations in
the law enforcement function. Certainly, technical benefits will
be achieved, but it would be misleading to predict that the
major issues of law enforcement will be solved immediately
through the use of a machine. Law enforcement problems are a
function of society as a whole.- Still, as time goes on, subtle,
yet far-reaching effects may begin to emerge. In fact, some
impacts are currently being felt on structure, people, and task
as reported in Chapter VI. One of the critical questions to
ask, is whether or not these impacts will have a positive or
negative effect.
One of the primary reasons for police computer use is to
increase departmental efficiency and effectiveness. Implicit
in such objectives are the assumptions that the law enforcement
task as currently focused is correct, that the activities in
which the police are engaged are appropriate and worthwhile, and
that the goals and tasks of the police are legitimate and defined
so as to represent the interests and well-being of most segments
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of the community served. However, if one does not accept these
underlying assumptions and tries to raise the question of efficiency
beyond its narrow focus and to ask the question whether the
current tasks of the police are the correct ones, then an evalua-
tion of the use of the computer becomes far more complicated.
The issue is no longer whether or not the computer "works", but
if it "works", will it move the police in the wrong direction or
have potentially negative implications.
First, the use of the computer may serve to reinforce and
legitimize the current task of the police, thus making it even
more difficult for people to question its basic focus. Although
there has been a great deal of discussion on the appropriate role
for the policeman in our modernm society, the majority of the
"experimental" and "innovative" programs for the police funded
by both foundations and the federal government are based on the
idea that law enforcement as practiced now is essentially all
right, and that in most cases improving it only requires more of
the same- -more money, greater efficiency, etc.- -not basic
changes in the kinds of activities being performed. Similarly,
police computer use seems to be focused on efficiency and effective-
ness and to have little potential for solving the problems
surrounding the definition of police task. By reinforcing the
accepted task, computer use may focus attention in the wrong
direction and thus: make it more difficult even to question, let
alone resolve the issue of what the police should do.
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As an illustration of this, a wide variety of sources
have pointed out the fact that the majority of most crimes are
1
not reported. The question raised is what happens when sophis-
ticated technology is applied to such imprecise information? The
possibility that the computer may give legitimacy to material
that ought to be treated with skepticism is an issue that must
be resolved.
Further, because police work is highly discretionary
and often subjective, much of police behavior (whether it be
with or without computers) is detemined by the attitudes and
personal backgrounds of the individuals involved. If we are ever
going to solve the ultimate problems which face the law enforce-
ment community, success or failure will depend upon our ability
1
For example, the President's Crime Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice initiated the
first national study ever made of crime victimization. The
National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago
surveyed 10,000 households and found that the actual amount of
crime in the United States was several times that reported in the
FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The amount of personal injury
crime reported was almost twice the UCR rate, and the amount
of property crime more than twice as much. Forcible rapes were
more than three and a half times the UCR reported rate, burglaries
three times, aggravated assaults and larcenies of $50 and over
more than double, and robbery 50% greater than the reported
rate. Only vehicle theft was lcwer and then by a small amount.
(These statistics are reported in The Challenge of Crime in a
Free Society, Op. cit., pp. 20-21.)
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to work with people, not in introducing the application of new
technology. Computers cannot be expected to make the enforcement
of the law nondiscriminatory and equal, to improve the relations
between the community and the police, to do a better job of
recruiting and training policemen, or to make a wise determina-
tion as to the focus of police task. These problems must be
resolved at a more basic level by people.
In the mean time, the lack of training of police officers,
the background of recruits, and the existence of conflicts
between the police and racial minorities may make some policemen
and law enforcement agencies incapable of handling some of the
computer applications and their consequences. As stated earlier,
it is not the technical, but the behavioral organizational and
administrative difficulties that will hold the police back from
achieving the full potential of computer use.
Even if computers were programmed to effectively predict
criminal activity, such procedures would be useless unless
policemen themselves change. Before we rely too heavily on
police computer use, perhaps we should develop alternative roles
for policemen and an environment with a minimum amount of such
negatives as racism, hostility, and antagonism. Obviously this
is a herculean task which is not going to be accomplished over-
night. Perhaps planning for the increased use of computer technology
by policement throughout the country cannot wait until these issues
are resolved, but it must at least take their existence into
328.
consideration.
With people it is often the case that a person's greatest
strengths are closely related to their greatest weaknesses. An
aggressive, forceful person may achieve success as a consequence
of his dynamic personality, but he may also alienate many because
of his strong and singlesighted approach. His greatest strength-
-being forceful and dynamic- -is closely tied to his greatest
weakness- -being overpowering, threatening and alienating.
Such is the case with computer use by the police. There
is great potential to aid in the more effective enforcement of
the law through rapid comminication and a more rational, structured
approach to decision making. On the other hand, these very
benefits, if not properly controlled or planned, may lead to
misuse and a reinforcing of an inappropriate approach to police
work. For example, it is easy to brush aside critical questions
involving privacy and the protection of individual rights as
"progress" marches forward, Computer technology in police
departments should not simply be introduced and controlled by
police and computer experts. What is needed is a broadly based
role for the community and other interested groups in overseeing
these activities, and relating them to changing concepts of
police work.
In summary then, most arguments against the computer are
made on the grounds that too much money is currently being spent
on law enforcement technology, particularly when it is not clear
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that the benefits of such technology justify the costs. This
study has found such arguments to be valid in a few cases, but
in the majority, it appears that the benefits of the computer
do justify the costs, particularly with structured applications.
(Naturally, success regarding use varies from department to
department.) Further, this effectiveness and efficiency will
continue to develop with time as computer technology becomes
more sophisticated, and particularly as police departments get
better at handling the organizational and behavioral problems
which often accompany the introduction of technology and the
implementation of change. Certainly at this stage oversell
and unmet expectations exist in some departments. Still, infor-
mation technology is in its comparative infancy, and time will
probably bring some major alterations in the operations of law
enforcement work as a consequence of the computer.
However, there are other issues surrounding the use of
the computer that are ever more important than those of costs
and benefits. The use of information technology by the police
must be placed in perspective. The most pressing law enforcement
questions at this time are to define the basic task of the police,
to identify where the patrolman's time is really being spent, to
determine whether or not this is a correct allocation of
resources, and to examine whether or not current recruiting and
training practices compliment the basic needs and focuses of
the police. The computer along with proper analysis may help
·Y ·___ ·__ -C · __ ___··_I I II1IY--l-_ll
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in a small way to resolve these issues, but until this is done,
the implementation of the computer may also serve to reinforce
the status quo, to lock in and substantiate our present approach,
and to indirectly work against major renovation if it is required.
As a consequence, it is possible to be worried about the negative
effects of the computer on the grounds of the changes that it
won't bring instead of those that it will. The computer would
be a fantastic tool if it could solve some of the inherent
problems of our society such as racism, inequality and poverty;
or even at a less significant level if it could answer some of
the basic issues which the law enforcement community faces today
such as what is the basic task of the police, how should police
departments be structured, and who should be selected to serve?
The computer has a role to play in police departments, but it
is only a machine and as such, its use should always be considered
in the context of the larger law enforcement issues of our time.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Urban
Service
1140
3 3 2 ConnecticutAvenue
Northwest
Washington DC
20036
International
City
Management
Association
PART A: To be filled out by the
CHIEF OF POLICE of all police
departments.
1. Are you currently using a computer in your police department (whether it is owned
by your department or city, another jurisdiction, or a service bureau)? ...........
If "YES," please go on to Question 2 and answer questions 2 through 8.
If "NO," please skip to Question 9 and answer only questions 9 through 12.
YES ( ) NO ( ) 7
2. Has the police computer system met the expectations which you originally had? (Check one)
8- 1. Yes, in fact it has exceeded expectations.
2. Yes, it has met expectations.
3. No, it has not met expectations.
4. No, and major change(s) must be made.
5. Reactions are still mixed.
6. It is still too early to tell.
7. Other (please specify):
3. In your judgement, are the benefits which come from your computer worth the cost? (Check one)
9- 1. Yes.
2. Maybe, the yardsticks for measuring benefits are still very crude.
3. It's still too early to tell.
4. Not now, but I believe they will in the future.
5. No.
6. Other (please specify):
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4. The following questions are included to get some idea as to how accurate
(Please check your opinion in response to each question.)
Yes
(1)
333.
and useful the computer system is to you.
No
(2)
Sometimes
(3)
Don't
know
(4)
a. Does the system provide you with information you
need to make decisions? ....................
b. Do you have confidence that the information in the
system is almost always accurate? ..............
c. Is the response of the system to your inquiry fast
enough to suit vour needs? ..................
10
_ 11
5. In your judgement, what is the biggest effect that the computer has had in your police department up to now? (Please
indicate the top three by ranking them 1, 2, or 3 in order of their importance in the space provided.)
13 a) Eliminated routine reporting and recording tasks.
14 b) Made it easier to oversee and monitor the performance of police units or patrolmen.
15 ________c) Improved the ability to distribute manpower in the department (e.g., selective
enforcement, more effective allocation of patrol resources, etc.).
16 d) Improved the patrolman's efficiency in identifying and apprehending criminals.
17 ______e) Provided better control of the budget and allocating dollars.
18 f) No significant effect has been noticed up to now.
19 g) Other (please specify):
6. Have changes taken place in the amount of control or influence exercised by different people or divisions in the police
department as a result of putting the computer into use? (Check one space for each person or staff level.)
More Less No change in
influence influence influence
(1) (2) (3)
a. Chief of Police ..........................
b. Asst. Chief or other direct staff of Chief ..........
c. Precinct, district, or division commanders ........
d. Research, planning division ..................
e. Data processing division ....................
f. Patrolmen in the field ....................
g. Other (please specify):
7. Has the computer created pressure to use quantitative or numerical information to justify decisions that were formerly
treated as "intuitive," "seat of the pants," or qualitative? (Check one)
27- 1. Yes 2. Partially 3. No
If "YES" or "PARTIALLY," how do you feel about this emphasis towards the quantitative as opposed to the
qualitative? (Check one)
28- 1. Too much 3. Too little
2. About right , 4. Other (specify):
12
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
-
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8. On the basis of your police department's experience with a computer, what major recommendations would you
make to a department that is considering using one?
-- t..s , : , , ( 
9. Do you'planto uscomputer within the next 3 years? (Check one)
29- 1. Yes 2. No 3. Uncertain
If "YES," in what year? (Check one)
30- 1. 1971 3. 1973
2. 1972 4. 1974
10. What have been your reasons up to now for not using a computer? (Check as many as apply.)
31- 1. Our department is too small.
2. We have not been able to afford such facilities.
3. The cost outweighs the benefits for us.
4. Our present methods of operation are satisfactory.
5. We do not feel the computer will be useful for our police department.
6. Using one would have an unfavorable impact on the police force.
7. Other (please specify):
11. Although you do not have local computer facilities for your own information processing, do you have direct
terminal access to information generated from any of the following computer facilities? (Check as many as apply.)
32- 1. FBI National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
2. State Police Information Systems
3. Regional Police Information Systems (Networks of local police departments or
other local government units).
4. Other (please specify):
12. If you are planning to use a computer, are you hoping to receive aid from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) in developing your use of the computer? (Check one)
_ 1. Yes 2. No 3. Uncertain
Signed:_ Title:
Thank You!
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PART B: To be
partments using
card equipment.
filled out by all de-
computer or punch
NOTE: This part of the questionnaire
is designed to collect information on
the use of both computers (referred
to as electronic data processing equip-
ment and abbreviated EDP) and punch
card equipment (referred to as elec-
tronic accounting machines and ab-
breviated EAM). Computer and punch
card equipment will jointly be referred
to as data processing equipment (or
more technically automated data proc-
essing equipment and abbreviated
ADP).
la. Who has immediate responsibility for data processing in your police department?
Name: Titli-
I b. To which division within the police department does this person report? (Check one)
7- _ 11. Directly to the Chief
2. Asst. Chief or other direct staff of the Chief
3. Operations (field services) division
_4. Auxiliary services
5. Administration division
6. Research and planning
_7. Other (please specify):
2. What kind of data processing equipment are you currently using (whether it is owned by the police department or
city, another jurisdiction, or a service bureau)? (Check one)
-1. Computer (EDP)
2. Punch card equipment (EAM)
3. Both computer and punch card equipment
If you are using only punch card equipment (No. 2), please move on to. Question 6.
If you are using a computer or both a computer and punch card equipment, please continue with Question 3.
-1-
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3. Which statement below best describes the ownership of the computer(s) used by your police department? (Check one)
1.
a 2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Use only outside service bureau equipment.
Owned or leased solely by the police department.
Owned or leased solely by the municipal government.
Owned or leased solely by the state or state agency.
Joint ownership (lease) by the city and police department.
Joint ownership (lease) by the police department and other criminal justice agencies.
Other (specify):
If using only outside service bureau equipment (No. 1), please move on to Question 6. Otherwise continue with
Question 4.
4. Please supply the following information concerning the computer(s) your police department currently is using. (If
you are using one computer, simply answer Section A. If you are using two, please complete both Section A and
Section B. If you are using more than two, place others on a separate sheet and attach.)
Information needed
Section A
Information on
1st computer
Section B
Information on
2nd computer
a. Manufacturer (please check): ......... _1. IBM _7.
.2. RCA 8.
3. CDC 9.
. 4. UNIVAC
5. Honeywell
6. Burroughs
NCR 10
GE
Other:
_1.
L2.
~3.
4.
5.
6.
IBM 7.
RCA 8.
CDC 9.
UNIVAC
Honeywell
Burroughs
b. Model No......................
c. Memory size ...................
d. Is the computer dedicated solely for
the use of the police dept.? .........
e. Does your department utilize any
remote terminals? ...............
If "YES," number of teletype
remote terminals .................
If "YES," number of visual 
display terminals .................
12-16
K Bytes
K Words
YES _NO
YES NO
22-24 K Bytes
28-30 K Words
34 YES __NO
36 .YES _NO
38-39
42-43
5. Do other police departments utilize your computer facilities? .......... YES ( ) NO
If "YES," how many? ................ ............................
9-
NCR 11
GE
Other:
17-21
25-27
31-33
35
37
40-41
44-45
( ) 46
i' I
-- --
47-48
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6. In the chart below, for each application currently being processed by ADP, please indicate which you are now using -
either computers (EDP) or punch card equipment. (EAM). If you are using EDP please indicate whether or not you
have real time access, and the year the oomputer-was first implemented. (By real time access we mean direct access
through a terminal to computer files at any time so that all inquiries will receive almost immediate response - for
example, real time access to a file of stolen vehicles through a video display terminal.)
If specific planning is already underway for additional applications to be installed sometime within the next three
years, please follow the same procedure outlined above under Future Planned Use as to equipment and real time
access.
CURRENT USE: FUTURE PLANNED USE:
Applications
Crime Related Applications
1. Criminal Offense File
(Including info on
type of crime, where,
when, etc.) 49-
2. Criminal Arrest File
(Including info on
type of crime, where,
when, etc.) 55-
3. Modus Operandi File
(criminal patterns,
techniques) 61-
4. Juvenile Criminal
Activity (who, where
type of crime) 67-
5. Warrant File (file of
wanted persons, bench
warrants, etc.) 1i-
6. Stolen property file
(file of stolen autos,
guns, other) 17-
7. Intelligence Compilations
File (Info on organ-
ized crime, subversive
activities, etc.) 23-
8. Field Interrogation
Report File (field
reports on suspicious
persons, etc.) 29-
9. Automated Finger-
print Searching 35-
(Check either
one or both)
EDP
(1)
EAM
(2)
Real Time
Access?
YES
(1)
SO-50-
56-
62-
68-
12-
18-
24-
30-
36-
NO
(2)
If using
EDP, list
year 1st
imple-
mented
(51-52)
(57-58)
(63-64)
(7-8)
(13-14)
(19-20)
(25-26)
(31-32)
(37-38)
(Check either
one or both)
EDP
(1)
53-
59-
65-
9-
15-
21-
27-
33-
39-
EAM
'(2)
Real Time
Access Planned?
YES
(1)
54-
60-
66-
10-
16-
22-
28-
34-
40-
NO
(2)
- CONTINUED ON THE NEXT .PAGE -
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Question 6 Continued CURRENT USE:
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FUTURE PLANNED USE:
Applications
Police Operations Applications
10. Computer Aided
Dispatching 41-
11. Police Service Analysis
(info on type of call,
location, time,
arrest, etc.) 47-
12. Patrol Allocation and
Distribution (predict
crime level, establish
beat boundaries, etc.) 53-
13. Jail arrests (info on
who was booked, time,
disposition) 59-
14. Communications switch-
ing (communication with
other computers, message
switching) 65-
15. Geographic Location File
(computer "geographic
map" for dispatching,
analysis, etc.) 9-
16. Vehicle Registration File
(info on registered
vehicles) 15-
Traffic Related Applications
17. Traffic Accident File
(info on nature of accident
who, etc.) 21-
18. Traffic Citation File
(citations, court docket
preparation, disposition) 27-
19. Parking Violation File
(violations, collections) 33-
20. Personnel Records
39-
21. Payroll Preparation
45-
22. Budget Analysis & Fore-
casting (PPBS Systems) 51-
23. Inventory Control File
(info on police inventory) 57-
24. Vehicle Fleet Maintenance
(accounting for police
vehicles) 63-
(Check either
one or both)
EDP
(1)
EAM
(2)
Real Time
Access?
YES
(1)
42-
48-
54-
60-
66-
10-
16-
22-
28-
34-
40-
46-
52-
58-
64-
NO
(2)
If using
EDP, list
year 1st
imple-
mented
(43-44)
(49-50)
(55-56)
(61-62)
(67-68)
(11-12)
(17-18)
(23-24)
(29-30)
(35-36)
(41-42)
(47-48)}
(53-54)
(59-60)
(65-66)
(Check either
one or both)
EDP
(1)
45-
51-
57-
63-
7-
13-
19-
25-
31-
37-
43-
49-
55-
61-
67-
EAM
(2)
Real Time
Access Planned?
YES
(1)
46-
52-
58-
64-
8-
14-
20-
26-
32-
38-
44-
50-
56-
62-
68-
NO
(2)
I
I
I
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7. Please indicate (by number) the three applications listed in Question 6 which you feel are most important or will be
most important to your department.
9-10 11-12
8. Do you include information in your data processing data base about the Court disposition of crime (i.e., information
on convictions and/or acquittals?)
13- 3 1. Yes
2. No
3. Not now, but plan to in future
9. What were the total data processing expenditures for your police department for your last budget year ending
between January 1, 1970 and December 31, 1970. If exact numbers are not available in this form, please estimate.
Personnel $ 14-1 R
Equipment (including maintenance) $ 19-23
Service Bureau (either public or private)
Consultant or other outside expense
Other (please specify):
TOTAL
$
$
$
$
24-28
29-33
34-38
39-44
10. If no data processing costs in any of the categories listed in Question 9 are charged to the police
instead are paid directly by the city or another jurisdiction, please check here.
department, but
Yes, no data processing costs are charged to the police department.
11. For each category of data processing personnel, please indicate the number of full time police department employees,
both sworn and civilian, as of January 1, 1971, and January 1, 1966.
1971
Sworn
Supervisory
Systems Analysts
Programmers
Machine Operators
(46-47)
(54-5 5)
(62-63)
(7-8)
1966
Civilian
(48-49)
(56-57)
(64-65)
(9-10)
Sworn
(50-5 1)
(5 8-59)
(66-67)
(11-12)
Civilian
(52-53)
(60-61)
(68-69)
(13-14)
12. Is your police department presently connected with the computer facilities of any of the following,
through a terminal or by direct computer to computer hook-up? (Check all appropriate spaces.)
Yes,
Terminal
Access
(1)
either by access
Yes,
Computer-To-
Computer Hook-Up
(2)
a. FBI National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
b. State Police Information Systems ...........
c. Regional Police Information Systems
(Networks of local police departments) ......
d. Other (lease secifv): 
7-8
45-
IS5
16
17
18
---
.
__ _ 
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340.IMPACT AND EVALUATION OF COMPUTER USE
The remaining Questions, 13-25, pertain strictly to the application of the computer. Only those departments which are
using computer services should respond. If y6ur department is using only punch card equipment, please sign the questionnaire
on the last page, attach to Part A of the survey, and return.
13a. Who in the department made the initial proposal for the use
19- 1. Chief of Police
2. Assistant Chief or Other Direct
Staff of the Chief
3. Data Processing Manager
4. Research, Planning Director
13b. What stimulated their interest? (Check more than one if necessary.)
20- 1. Professional meetings 5.
2. Journals or written reports 6.
3. Activity in other cities and states 7.
4. Computer salesman 8.
9.
of the computer? (Check more than one if necessary.)
5. Other Administrative or
Operations Officer
6. Office of the Mayor or City Manager
7. Outside Consultant
8. Other (specify):
Outside Consultants
FBI Univorm Crime Reporting
IACP Departmental Surveys
Possibility of Federal Assistance
Other (snecifv):
14. What are your major reasons for using a computer? (Please indicate the top three reasons by ranking them 1, 2, or
3 in order of their importance in the space provided.)
21 a)
22 b)
23 c)
24 d)
2 5 e)
26 f)
27 g)
28 h)
29 i)
To make internal operations more efficient
To monitor the performance of police precincts or units
To improve the patrolman's ability to rapidly identify and apprehend criminals
To improve the ability of the department to investigate crimes
To improve surveillance capacity
To improve service to the public
To get better management information
As a part of the "professionalization" program of the department
Other (please specify):
15. How often have you used an outside consulting service in the planning and preparation of the various computer applica-
tions in your department? (Please check how often for each of the various types of consulting services listed below.)
Never Occasionally Often
(1) (2) (3)
a. Analysis of comupter operations
(feasibility study) 
b. System design or analysis 
c. Program preparation .....................
d. Installation planning .....................
e. Review and evaluation ............. ,..... ..
f. Other (specify):
30
31
32
33
34
35
- v-r ---- v s-
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16. Is the computer based system in your police department likely to become part of a citywide information system?
(Check one)
36- 1. Yes 2. No 3. Uncertain
If "YES," would there by any question about losing the control of police information in such a citywide system?
(Check one)
_37 _ _ 1. Yes 2. No 3. Uncertain
17. In your judgement, who should control the computer system used by the police? (Check one)
38- 1. Police department only
2. City or county government only
3. Joint ownership between police department and city or county government
4. Joint ownership between police department and other criminal justice agencies
5. Other (please specify):
18. Who usually initiates recommendations for new computer applications? (Check more than one if necessary.)
__39 __l i. Chief of Police 5. Other administrative or operations officer
2. Assistant Chief or Other Direct 6. Office of the Mayor or City Manager
Staff of the Chief
7. A Police Dept. Computer Committee
3. Data Processing Manager 8. Outside Consultant
4. Research, Planning Director
9. Other (specify):
19. How do your operations officers (not including your data processing manager) usually participate in computer projects?
(Check more than one if necessary.)
40. 1. They usually do not
2. They pose problems they hope the computer can solve
3. They act occasionally as consultants regarding their operations
4. They staff and/or manage those projects relating to their operations
5. Other (please specify):
20. Have you used any education or training programs connected with the introduction and
use of computers in your police department? ....................................... YES ( ) NO ( ) 41
If "YES," please indicate the type of education or training programs at the various staff levels within your depart-
ment. (Check all appropriate spaces for each staff level.)
Individual Special Question- Only Other
Training Answer Written (please
Briefings Classes Sessions Materials specify)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a. Civilian ........... 42
b. Patrolmen......... 43
c. Precinct or District
Commanders ....... 44
d. Other Superior Officers
(Sgt., Lt., Captain).... 4s
e. Top Command (Above
Captain) ........... 46
_ _____~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_ ____ 1111~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
21. In what areas of the computer operation have you had or are you having problems? (Check all spaces which apply.)
Past Problems Present Problems
(1) (2)
a. Planning ................... ....... 47
b. Recruitment ............................... 48
c. Training ................................... 49
d. Equipment performance ....................... so
e. Equipment reliability ......................... 51
f. Equipment maintenance ................... .... 52
g. Programs................... 53
h. Scheduling & Priorities ......................... 54
i. Management acceptance of the computer operation ..... 55ss
j. Integrating the operation with the rest of the department. . 56
k. Organizational or Personnel Problems ............... 57
1. Other (specify): - 58
22. Have you received money from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to aid in the use of
computers in your department? (Check one)
59_ 1. Yes
2. No
3. No, but we have applied or are planning to apply for a grant
23. Has the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (and the funds which this Administration dispenses) made a
difference regarding the use of the computer in your police department? (Check one)
60- 1. Yes, we would not have had a computer without assistance
2. Yes, our computer efforts would have been smaller without assistance
3. Uncertain
4. No, our computer usage would have been the same
5. Other (please specify):
24. It has been said that the computer would eliminate the work of those doing routine and recording tasks. What have
been the major influences, if any, of the computer in this respect in your police department? (Check all spaces
which apply.)
61- _______ 1. It has not had any significant effect
2. It has freed people to do other nonclerical work in the department
3. People are still doing routine tasks, but now they relate to data processing and the computer
4. It has led to hiring additional clerical help to handle EDP needs (e.g., keypunchers, data collectors, etc.)
5. People have had to leave the police department because their jobs have been eliminated
6. Other (specify):
25. On the basis of your department's experience with a computer, what major recommendations would you make to a
department that is considering installing one?
Signed: _ Title:
THANK YOU!
--8-- 342.
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APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF EXPECTATIONS/HYPOTHESES
As a review it seems appropriate to group the
basic hypotheses of the study in summary form. In the
course of the thesis, each of these has been dealt
with or discussed in one way or another. Although many
of these hypotheses were outlined several years ago at
the start of the research in one form or another, it
is important to point out that some have been modified
and even derived from the research effort. By this
point it is a little difficult to separate hypotheses
from conclusions, and certainly I would not purport
that the two are entirely independent.
The specific expectations which guided the
research are as follows:
General Expectations
... Computer use will be growing rapidly among police
departments, with one of the greatest contribu-
tors to this rise being the existence of money
from the LEAA.
... The acceptance of the computer in police depart-
ments will be positive but not striking. Evalua-
tion of the accuracy, speed, and utility of
information provided from the computer will vary
from city to city, but overall will be positive.
... Computers will bring increased effectiveness
(narrowly defined--see Chapter III) but primarily
only in routine or structured areas where the
machine is used to duplicate operations which
were previously being carried out on a manual
basis.
... In computer applications which are less routine
(more unstructured) the results to date will be
less clear. Greater difficulties regarding
implementation, and organizational and behavioral
resistance will exist.
Influence on police task
... Improved efficiency in carrying out the activi-
ties of the police (narrowly defined).
... Greater emphasis on a quantitative approach to
defining and evaluating police task (and related
to this the potential exists for a greater
emphasis on the law enforcement aspects of
police task).
Potential alterations in the way police work
is performed, and related to this, a potential
for a certain depersonalization of the role
of the policeman.
... A greater sharing of information among various
police jurisdictions (local, regional, state,
and national).
Influence on police structure
... A movement towards greater centralization of
power for those at the top level.
... An increase in influence and importance of those
who have technical backgrounds related to quanti-
tative and computer skills.
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Influence on people
... An increase in influence in police departments
of technically educated people.
... Increase in the "quality" of people holding
positions of responsibility.
... A shift in work activities of those doing routine
and recording tasks, but not a loss of jobs.
... Behavioral/people problems will be the primary
difficulties holding back computer use.
Other influences
... Greater reception of computer use in a legalistic
or professional police department.
... Potential influence of the computer to move a
police department towards a more legalistic or
professional approach.
... Negative potential impacts in the area of privacy
and protection of individual rights.
346.
APPENDIX C
A NOTE ON PRIVACY AND THE POLICE COMPUTER
Although they will not be examined in great
depth in this dissertation, questions pertaining to
security and privacy are of major concern as they
relate to the use of computers by the police. In
particular, it is important to consider questions
pertaining to privacy, the handling of information, and
access to computerized records. These questions reflect
some of the most important "power payoff" issues
surrounding the impact of automation. The computer has
great ability to perform tedious tasks precisely,
rapidly, and without fatigue, tasks that would drive
mortal man out of his mind. However, as a machine it
is without a sense of values. It is therefore the
user's responsibility to determine how the machine
should be used and to ensure the necessary protection
of individual rights.
According to Alan F. Westin, the basic issue
of privacy raised by computerization is
whether the increased collection and processing of
information for diverse public and private purposes,
if not controlled, could lead to a sweeping power
of surveillance by government over individual lives
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and organizational activity. As we are forced
more and more each day to leave documentary
fingerprints and footprints behind us, and as
these are increasingly put into storage systems
capable of computer retrieval, government may
acquire a power-through-data position that
armies of government investigators could not
create in past eras.l
In October 1966 a special government task force
on the storage and access of government statistics
chaired by Carl Kayson, Director of the Institute of
Advance Study in Princeton, proposed that a "national
data center" be established to improve the usefulness
of available statistics for policy planning purposes
by funneling such statistics into a central information
bank.2 The proposal received Congressional attention
and national publicity, but after strong debate both
for and against, it was eventually tabled, at least
for the time being. However, although such a direct
proposal was put off, whether good or bad, the fact is
that a great deal of indirect efforts are already under-
way to make the processing of data regarding both
statistical and individual information more efficient
and effective from our government's point of view.
'Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, Atheneum,
New York, 1967, p. 158.
2Report of the Task Force on the Storage of
and Access to Government Statistics, October, 1966,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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This is particularly true with law enforcement.
A number of efforts are already underway to utilize
the benefits of high speed information technology to
establish more effective local, regional, state, and
national networks for maintaining records and processing
data.
It seems that the critical issues raised are
of two types: 1) what kind of information should be
placed in the computer system? and 2) what should be
done with the information once it is in the system and
what safeguards can be found to prevent error and
misuse? Melvin Bockelman, Manager of the Computer
Facilities of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department
distinguishes between privacy and security by stating
that issues revolving around the first area are basically
questions of privacy, while those in the second area are
problems of security.3 Utilizing this distinction,
there are basically two kinds of issues involving security
and privacy: first, those of a social, legal, and con-
stitutional nature; and second, questions which are more
technical in nature. Sometimes questions of privacy are
3Melvin F. Bockelman, "Privacy and the Computer in
our 20th Century Environment," unpublished speech made
available to the author while at the Kansas City Police
Department. The exact date and place was not indicated.
349.
more often related to social and legal questions while
those of security are more technical in nature. The
distinction, though, is only of use at the extremes.
The key privacy issues revolve around deciding
what individual or aggregate data should be placed in
the computer system. Who should be given the right to
define parameters? When, where, with whom, what, how
and why should information be stored in a data system?
These are difficult social questions and they require
long and careful thought. The ultimate solution will
require long hours of congressional, judicial and
administrative work, and it seems that there is not
enough thinking in this area underway. Great care
should be made to insure that information placed in the
system is completely accurate. Sometimes this can be
reduced to a technical question of source and data
verification. The basic question, though, of "what
data?" still remains.
The primary security concern is that of safe-
guarding and insuring the proper use of stored informa-
tion. At the heart of the issue is the solution to such
questions as: Who should have access to the information?
Who should control and monitor the process of dissemina-
tion? And, for what purposes should the data be used?
Should you insure that a person always has access to the
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information in such files concerning him? And if so,
how? Once the basic questions have been answered, certain
technical safeguards can be applied. Users may be
allowed access only to certain portions of the informa-
tion in the system by requiring careful "id codes" and
by "keying" certain computer terminals so that they can
be used to access only a small portion of the actual
records in the computer files. Still the solution to
the basic questions is at the heart of the problem.
From an operational point of view, there are
three basic problems areas that are relevant to security
and privacy:4
1. Unintentional errors. There is always the
possibility that the data finally stored in
the system will be incorrect due to typographical
errors, mistaken identities, etc., even if there
is no deliberate attempt to do so. For example,
it is possible to keypunch data incorrectly;
thus instead of a man having "1" criminal con-
viction he might be recorded as having "11."
2. Misuse of data. Information can be used
out of context or for purposes beyond legiti-
mate criminal justice functions, both by persons
who are actually authorized access, and by
those who acquire the information without
authorization. For example, the Kansas City,
Missouri Police Department goes to great extremes
4 Found in Security and Privacy Considerations
in Criminal History Information Systems, Technical Report
No. 2, Project SEARCH (System for Electronic Analysis and
Retrieval of Criminal History Files), Committee on
Security and Privacy, Dr. Robert Gallati, Chairman,
July, 1970, p. 5
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to maintain proper security. However, in
1970-71, two known violations of data confiden-
tiality occurred regarding the police computer
system. In one case, a police official in a
neighboring city used the system to check out
prospective tenants for apartment owners. The
violator was "reprimanded" by the Kansas City
Police Department and the department he was a
part of was told they would be taken out of
the regional network if another violation took
place. In another instance, a police officer
used a remote terminal to obtain an arrest
record and then made it available to an employer.
Again a strong reprimand was given. As a
consequence of these two instances, security
has been tightened all around and strong notices
were issued to all users warning against any
such practices in the future. Still, no one
has been dropped from the Kansas City system
yet, and such abuses remain difficult to guard
against.
3. Intentional data change. The data maintained
can be destroyed or modified for personal reasons
or to restrict the proper and effective perfor-
mance of criminal justice functions. For
example, it has been suggested that organized
crime may attempt to penetrate criminal justice
systems, particularly those on a national scale,
for the achievement of this purpose.
Perhaps the best illustration of a criminal justice
information system where special effort must be made to
consider problems of privacy and security is the federally
funded Project SEARCH (Systems for Electronic Analysis
and Retrieval of Criminal Histories). Project SEARCH
began as an 18-month multi-state effort in June 30, 1969
to develop a prototype computerized criminal justice
information system. It was financed by the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration and ten participating
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states (Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Texas, and
Washington).
The objectives of Project SEARCH were twofold:5
1. Establish and demonstrate the feasibility
of an on-line system allowing for the interstate
exchange of offender history files based on a
compatible criminal history justice offender
record integrating basic information needs of
police prosecution, judicial and correctional
agencies.
2. Design and demonstrate a computerized
statistics system based on an accounting of
individual offenders proceeding through the
criminal justice system.
The project has now gone beyond the developmental
phase, and implementation is underway. According to a
letter from Mr. Jerris Leonard, LEAA Administrator, to
SEARCH Project Group Chairman O. J. Hawkins, January 25,
1972, the LEAA now intends to provide for all 50 states
in the U.S. to participate in future SEARCH activities.
Letters were being written to the Governors of each
state asking them to nominate a representative to serve
on an expanded 50-state Project Group. The first
meeting of this group was scheduled for April, 1972.6
5 SEARCH, Systems for Electronic Analysis and
Retrieval of Criminal Histories, p. 2. Fifteen page
information brochure prepared as a part of the informa-
tion dissemination effort of Project SEARCH, Grant
Project 69-DF-022 and 69-DF-041. No date given.
6 Project SEARCH, newsletter, Volume 4, Issue 1,
February, 1972, pp. 1-2.
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Although consideration is being made of questions
of privacy and security as a part of Project SEARCH,
the idea of an automated national criminal history file
is one that should not be viewed lightly. The potential
for increased law enforcement efficiency and effective-
ness seems great, but there is also great potential for
unintentional errors, misuse of data, and intended data
change. In Project SEARCH, the basic questions of what
information should be included in the system and who
should have access to such data have been addressed,
but not on a sufficient scale with national public
exposure. There is a real need for national guide-
lines regarding the implementation of such systems.
Project SEARCH has developed a set of guidelines, but
the issue is so important, that a continuing public
discussion on such policy should be held at a general,
judicial, legislative and administrative level.
In a speech on "Privacy and the Computer in our
20th Century Environment" Melvin J. Bockelman outlined
ten major guidelines which he felt provided a foundation
for "reasonable privacy within ethical and acceptable
7Melvin J. Bockelman, "Privacy and the Computer,"
footnote 28.
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standards of our society." They were as follows:
1. Data included in the system must be limited
to that based upon a source document maintained
on file in the agency which exercises manage-
ment control over the system.
2. Adoption of a careful and permanent program
of data verification against source documents.
I believe we must be committed to the spending
of approximately 5% of our total automation
budget in support of validation of automated
information files. This could be accomplished
effectively in 4 steps.
a. Printout of automated files for
validation against source documents which
were the original authority for the data
entry in the first place.
b. Creation of computer programs which
can identify incorrect codes and data,
earmarking these for correction against
the source document of entry.
c. Creation of computer programs which
can edit against relationship conditions
and requirements. This is a very valuable
"caution indicator" and has in many
instances alerted our department to a
whole series of inconsistencies.
d. Provision of the clerical staff necessary
to insure proper validation.
3. Education programs should be instituted
for all who might be expected to employ system
data especially those who access data from
remote terminals.
4. The computer system should be programmed
to screen all inquiries to exclude those
inquiries inconsistent to system rules.
5. Those systems operating in a telecommunica-
tions environment should log all actions
occurring on the network, so that any or all
transactions taking place may be examined at
any time from the real time log file.
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6. Program Systems should be designed to provide
for "Locked Data Files" in which such files
cannot be accessed until the proper codes or
passwords are read and matched by the computer
which then authorizes access to the files.
7. Rigid security and inventory controls should
be implemented in computer library operations to
prevent duplicating files and removal of same
to unauthorized sources.
8. Remote terminal operations should be under
programmed control to rigidly control access
to only those real time files that the user
has prior clearance to access.
9. Users of system data should be clearly
informed that careless use of system data
represents unprofessional conduct and may be
subject to disciplinary or litigation action.
It is of the utmost importance that a procedure
be written which clearly identifies to whom
data may be released, under what circumstances,
and should identity of the citizen named be
removed before release?
10. Of major importance I believe is the need
to give the citizen the right to some control
over when his name is being considered for
reference to another agency. It is the constant
receipt of unwanted credit cards and unsolicited
business ventures that is very repulsive to many
citizens. To counter-balance this trend and to
gain the confidence of our citizens I suggest
application forms include a column on the card
which simply asks the citizen to indicate simply
YES or NO, whether his name can be referred to
other prospective business interests. So what
if 95% say no, we will probably have a much
more active prospect list and we are also doing
our part in upgrading the quality of automation
in the eyes of the general public.
This listing of policy guidelines is a place
to start, and it is certainly necessary. However, the
guidelines seem mainly to deal with the more technical
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side of assuring accurate information and preventing
misuse. The idea of technical security seems to be
fairly well covered but the basic issues of who and how
to determine what information should be in the system,
and who should be given access still remain unanswered.
It is these issues that this author feels to be most
important; and it is these issues which seem most
neglected.
In summary, these issues of privacy and security
are perhaps the most critical in considering the
potential impact and application of computers in the
area of law enforcement. Certainly, a great deal more
thinking and debate must be carried out. The ultimate
solution will revolve around the trade-off relationship
between the "need to know" on the one hand in order to
increase police efficiency and performance, and on the
other hand, the right of the individual to privacy and
security.
The words of Alan Westin are important to
consider in closing:
For planning, efficiency, and social control, these
government data centers, computerized transaction
systems, and central record files of the future could
bring enormous benefits to society. But unless
safeguards for privacy are placed carefully in the
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planning and administration of systems that most
computer experts feel to be inevitable develop-
ments of the next two decades, the growth in data
surveillance will be awesome. Meanwhile, the
present dossiers and computerized information
systems continue to increase, without many legal
or administrative guidelines as yet to cope with
the issues of privacy that they raise.
8Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, pp. 167-168.
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